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Preface for Students 
 
I’m going to argue that you have no free will. I’m going to argue for some 
other surprising things too, for instance that death isn’t bad for you, 
taxation is immoral, and you can’t know anything whatsoever about the 
world around you. I’m also going to argue for some things you’re probably 
not going to like: that abortion is immoral, you shouldn’t eat meat, and God 
doesn’t exist. 
 The arguments aren’t my own. I didn’t come up with them. I don’t even 
accept all of them: there are two chapters whose conclusions I accept, three 
I’m undecided about, and five I’m certain can’t be right. (I’ll let you guess 
which are which.) This isn’t merely for the sake of playing devil’s advocate. 
Rather, the idea is that the best way to appreciate what’s at stake in 
philosophical disagreements is to study and engage with serious 
arguments against the views you’d like to hold. 
 Each chapter offers a sustained argument for some controversial thesis, 
specifically written for an audience of beginners. The aim is to introduce 
newcomers to the dynamics of philosophical argumentation, using some of 
the arguments standardly covered in an introductory philosophy course, 
but without the additional hurdles one encounters when reading the 
primary sources of the arguments: challenging writing, obscure jargon, and 
references to unfamiliar books, philosophers, or schools of thought.  
 The different chapters aren’t all written from the same perspective. This 
is obvious from a quick glance at the opening chapters: the first chapter 
argues that you shouldn’t believe in God, while the second argues that you 
should. You’ll also find that chapters 5 and 6 contain arguments pointing 
to different conclusions about the relationship between people and their 
bodies, and chapter 7 contains arguments against the very theory of 
morality that’s defended in chapter 10. So, you will be exposed to a variety 
of different philosophical perspectives, and you should be on the lookout 
for ways in which the arguments in one chapter provide the resources for 
resisting arguments in other chapters.  
 And while there are chapters arguing both for and against belief in God, 
that isn’t the case for other topics we’ll cover. For instance, there’s a chapter 
arguing that you don’t have free will, but no chapter arguing that you do 
have free will. That doesn’t mean that you’ll only get to hear one side of the 
argument. Along the way you will be exposed to many of the standard 
objections to the views and arguments I’m advancing, and you can decide 
for yourself whether those objections are convincing. Those who need help 
finding the flaws in the reasoning (or ideas for paper topics) can look to the 
reflection questions at the end of each chapter for some clues.  
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 As I said, the arguments advanced in the book are not my own, and at 
the end of each chapter I point out the original sources of the arguments. In 
some chapters, the central arguments have a long history, and the 
formulations I use can’t be credited to any one philosopher in particular. 
Other chapters, however, are more directly indebted to the work of specific 
contemporary philosophers, reproducing the contents of their books and 
articles (though often with some modifications and simplifications). In 
particular, chapter 7 closely follows the opening chapters of Michael 
Huemer’s The Problem of Political Authority; chapter 8 reproduces the central 
arguments of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s “A Defense of Abortion” and Don 
Marquis’s “Why Abortion is Immoral”; and chapter 9 draws heavily from 
Dan Lowe’s “Common Arguments for the Moral Acceptability of Eating 
Meat” and Alastair Norcross’s “Puppies, Pigs, and People”. 
 I’m grateful to Jeff Bagwell, Matt Davidson, Nikki Evans, Jason 
Fishbein, Bill Hartmann, Colton Heiberg, İrem Kurtsal, Jeonggyu Lee, 
Clayton Littlejohn, David Mokriski, Seán Pierce, and Neil Sinhababu for 
helpful suggestions, and to the Facebook Hivemind for help selecting the 
further readings for the various chapters. Special thanks are due to Chad 
Carmichael, Jonathan Livengood, and Daniel Story for extensive feedback 
on a previous draft of the book, and to the students in my 2019 Freshman 
Seminar: Shreya Acharya, Maile Buckman, Andrea Chavez, Dylan Choi, 
Lucas Goefft, Mino Han, PK Kottapalli, Mollie Kraus, Mia Lombardo, Dean 
Mantelzak, Sam Min, Vivian Nguyen, Ariana Pacheco Lara, Kaelen 
Perrochet, Rijul Singhal, Austin Tam, Jennifer Vargas, Kerry Wang, and 
Lilly Witonsky. Finally, thanks to Renée Jorgensen for permission to use her 
portrait of the great 20th century philosopher and logician Ruth Barcan 
Marcus on the cover. You can see some more of her portraits of 
philosophers here: www.reneebolinger.com/portraits.html 
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Preface for Instructors 
 
 
Learning from Arguments is a novel approach to teaching Introduction to 
Philosophy. It presents accessible versions of key philosophical arguments, 
in a form that students can emulate in their own writing, and with the 
primary aim of cultivating an understanding of the dynamics of 
philosophical argumentation.  
 The book contains ten core chapters, covering:  
 
1. The problem of evil 
2. Pascal’s wager  
3. Free will and determinism  
4. Cartesian skepticism and the problem of induction  
5. Personal identity  
6. Death 
7. Taxes 
8. Abortion (covering the violinist and future-like-ours arguments)  
9. The morality of meat-eating 
10. Ethical theory (with a focus on utilitarianism) 
 
Additionally, there is an introductory chapter explaining what arguments 
are and surveying some common argumentative strategies, an appendix on 
logic explaining the mechanics and varieties of valid arguments, and an 
appendix providing detailed advice for writing philosophy papers. 
 Each of the ten core chapters offers a sustained argument for some 
controversial thesis, specifically written for an audience of beginners. The 
aim is to introduce newcomers to the dynamics of philosophical 
argumentation, using some of the arguments standardly covered in an 
introductory philosophy course, but without the additional hurdles one 
encounters when reading the primary sources of the arguments: 
challenging writing, specialized jargon, and references to unfamiliar books, 
philosophers, or schools of thought.  
 Since the book is aimed at absolute beginners, I often address objections 
that would only ever occur to a beginner and ignore objections and nuances 
that would only ever occur to someone already well-versed in these issues. 
Theses defended in the chapters often are not ones that I myself accept. 
Instead, decisions about which position is defended in the chapter were 
made with an eye to pedagogical effectiveness. 
 Instructors will find the book easy to teach from. The chapters are self-
standing with no cross-referencing, and may be taught in any order. The 
central arguments of each chapter are already extracted in valid, 
premise/conclusion form, ready to be put up on the board or screen and 
debated. The chapters also contain plenty of arguments that haven’t been 
extracted in this way, but that are self-contained in a single paragraph, 
making for moderately challenging—but not too challenging—argument 
reconstruction exercises. The reflection questions at the end of each chapter 
can easily be incorporated into class discussion.   
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 The book can be used in different ways in the classroom. Instructors 
may decide to take on the persona of the author of the chapter, leaving it to 
the students to find a way of resisting the arguments—which I have found 
to be an enjoyable and effective way of teaching the material. Or they may 
use the arguments in the chapter as a jumping-off point for presenting the 
standard positions and responses. They may wish to supplement the 
chapters with the original sources of the arguments or with readings 
representing competing philosophical positions, possibly drawn from the 
list of further readings at the end of each chapter.  
 Don’t worry about Learning from Arguments being too “one-sided”. It’s 
true that whichever view is being defended in the chapter always gets the 
last word. But along the way, students are exposed to clear and charitable 
presentations of the standard objections to the views and arguments 
advanced in the chapter, and can decide for themselves whether the 
chapter’s responses to those objections are convincing. Students who need 
help finding the flaws in the reasoning (or ideas for paper topics) can look 
to the reflection questions at the end of each chapter for clues about the 
most promising places to resist the arguments.  
 Additionally, I think instructors will find there to be significant 
pedagogical advantages to a “one-sided” approach. When beginners are 
presented with a full menu of available views, surveying the pros and cons 
of each, this can sometimes give the wrong impression: that, in philosophy, 
all views are equally defensible, that it’s all a matter of opinion, and that it’s 
up to you to pick and choose whichever view you like best. What the 
approach in Learning from Arguments emphasizes is that it’s not that easy. If 
you want to say that abortion is permissible or that people have free will, 
you have to work for it, identifying some flaw in the arguments for the 









The aim of this book is to introduce you to the topics and methods of 
philosophy by advancing a series of arguments for controversial 
philosophical conclusions. That’s what I’ll do in the ten chapters that 
follow. In this Introduction, I’ll give you an overview of what I’ll be arguing 
for in the different chapters (section 1), explain what an argument is 
(sections 2-3), and identify some common argumentative strategies 
(sections 4-7). I’ll close by saying a few words about what philosophy is. 
 
1. Detailed Contents 
As I explained in the preface, each chapter is written “in character”, 
representing a specific perspective (not necessarily my own!) on the issue 
in question. This is not to say that they are all written from the same 
perspective. You should not expect the separate chapters to fit together into 
a coherent whole. I realize that this may cause some confusion. But you 
should take this as an invitation to engage with the book in the way that I 
intend for you to engage with it: by questioning the claims being made and 
deciding for yourself whether the reasons and arguments offered in 
support of those claims are convincing.   
 In chapter 1, “Can God Allow Suffering?”, I advance an argument that 
an all-powerful and morally perfect God would not allow all the suffering 
we find in the world, and therefore must not exist. I address a number of 
attempts to explain why God might allow suffering, for instance that it’s 
necessary for appreciating the good things that we have, or for building 
valuable character traits, or for having free will. I also address the response 
that God has hidden reasons for allowing suffering that we cannot expect 
to understand.  
 In chapter 2, “Why You Should Bet on God”, I advance an argument 
that you should believe in God because it is in your best interest: you’re 
putting yourself in the running for an eternity in heaven without risking 
losing anything of comparable value. I defend the argument against a 
variety of objections, for instance that it is incredibly unlikely that God 
exists, that merely believing in God isn’t enough to gain entry into heaven, 
and that it’s impossible to change one’s beliefs at will. 
 In chapter 3, “No Freedom”, I advance two arguments for the 
conclusion that no one ever acts freely. The first turns on the idea that all of 
our actions are determined by something that lies outside our control, 
namely the strength of our desires. The second turns on the idea that our 
actions are all consequences of exceptionless, “deterministic” laws of 
nature. In response to the concern that the laws may not be deterministic, I 
argue that undetermined, random actions wouldn’t be free either. Finally, 
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I address attempts to show that there can be free will even in a deterministic 
universe. 
 In chapter 4, “You Know Nothing”, I argue for two skeptical 
conclusions. First, I advance an argument that we cannot know anything 
about the future. That’s so, I argue, because all of our reasoning about the 
future relies on an assumption that we have no good reason to accept, 
namely that the future will resemble the past. Second, I advance an 
argument that we cannot know anything about how things presently are in 
the world around us, since we cannot rule out the possibility that we are 
currently having an incredibly vivid dream.   
 In chapter 5, “What Makes You You”, I criticize a number of attempts to 
answer the question of personal identity: under what conditions are a 
person at one time and a person at another time one and the same person? 
I reject the suggestion that personal identity is a matter of having the same 
body, on the basis of an argument from conjoined twins and an argument 
from the possibility of two people swapping bodies. I reject the suggestion 
that personal identity can be defined in terms of psychological factors on 
the strength of “fission” cases in which a single person’s mental life is 
transferred into two separate bodies. 
 In chapter 6, “Don’t Fear the Reaper”, I advance an argument that death 
cannot be bad for you, since you don’t experience any painful sensations 
while dead, and that since death is not bad for you it would be irrational to 
fear it. I argue that you don’t experience any painful sensations while dead 
by way of arguing that physical organisms cease to be conscious when they 
die and that you are a physical organism. I also address the suggestion that 
what makes death bad for you is that it deprives you of pleasant 
experiences you would otherwise have had.   
 In chapter 7, “Taxation is Immoral”, I argue that it is wrong for 
governments to tax or imprison their citizens, on the grounds that these 
practices are not relevantly different from a vigilante locking vandals in her 
basement and robbing her neighbors to pay for her makeshift prison. I 
address a variety of putative differences, with special attention to the 
suggestion that we have tacitly consented to following the law and paying 
taxes and thereby entered into a “social contract” with the government.   
 In chapter 8, “Abortion is Immoral”, I examine a number of arguments 
both for and against the immorality of abortion. I argue that the question 
cannot be settled by pointing to the fact that the embryo isn’t self-sufficient 
or conscious or rational, nor by pointing to the fact that it has human DNA, 
that it is a potential person, or that life begins at conception. I then examine 
the argument that abortion is immoral because the embryo has a right to 
life, and I show that the argument fails since having a right to life doesn’t 
entail having a right to continued use of the mother’s womb. Finally, I 
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advance an alternative argument for the immorality of abortion, according 
to which this killing, like other killings, is wrong because it deprives its 
victim of a valuable future. 
   In chapter 9, “Eating Animals is Immoral”, I defend the view that it is 
immoral to eat meat that comes from so-called “factory farms”. I begin by 
criticizing three common reasons for thinking that eating meat is morally 
acceptable: because people have always eaten meat, because eating meat is 
necessary, and because eating meat is natural. I then argue that eating 
factory-farmed meat is immoral, on the grounds that it would be immoral 
to raise and slaughter puppies in similar ways and for similar reasons. 
 In chapter 10, “What Makes Things Right”, I advance a “utilitarian” 
theory of morality, according to which the rightness or wrongness of an 
action is always entirely a matter of the extent to which it increases or 
decreases overall levels of happiness in the world. I defend the theory 
against the objection that it wrongly permits killing one person to save five. 
Along the way, I consider the ways in which morality is and isn’t subjective 
and variable across cultures, and what to say about the notorious “trolley 
cases”. 
 In appendix A, “Logic”, I examine one of the features that makes an 
argument a good argument, namely validity. I explain what it means for an 
argument to be valid, and I illustrate the notion of validity by presenting 
and illustrating four types of valid arguments.  
 In appendix B, “Writing”, I present a model for writing papers for 
philosophy courses: introduce the view or argument you plan to criticize 
(section 1), advance your objections (section 2), and address likely 
responses to your objections (section 3). I explain the importance of clear 
and unpretentious writing that is charitable towards opposing viewpoints; 
I offer advice for editing rough drafts; I identify some criteria that 
philosophy instructors commonly use when evaluating papers; and I 
explain the difference between consulting online sources and plagiarizing 
them. 
 In appendix C, “Theses and Arguments”, I collect together the key 
arguments and theses discussed in the book. Readers may find it helpful to 
have a printed copy of this appendix at hand, or have it open in a separate 
tab, while reading through the chapters. 
 
2. The Elements of Arguments 
Let’s begin by having a look at what an argument is. An argument is a 
sequence of claims, consisting of premises, a conclusion, and in some cases 
one or more subconclusions. The conclusion is what the argument is 
ultimately trying to establish, or what’s ultimately being argued for. The 
premises are the assumptions that, taken together, are meant to serve as 
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reasons for accepting the conclusion. A subconclusion is a claim that is meant 
to be established by some subset of the premises but that isn’t itself the 
ultimate conclusion of the argument.  
 As an illustration, consider the following argument: 
 
Against Fearing Death 
(FD1) You cease to be conscious when you die 
(FD2) If you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead isn’t 
bad for you 
(FD3) So, being dead isn’t bad for you 
(FD4) If being dead isn’t bad for you, then you shouldn’t fear death 
(FD5) So, you shouldn’t fear death 
 
The argument has three premises: FD1, FD2, and FD4. FD5 is the conclusion 
of the argument, since that’s what the argument is ultimately trying to 
establish. FD3 is a subconclusion. It isn’t the conclusion, since the ultimate 
goal of the argument is to establish that you shouldn’t fear death, not that 
being dead isn’t bad for you (which is just a step along the way). Nor is it a 
premise, since it isn’t merely being assumed. Rather, it’s been argued for: it 
is meant to be established by FD1 and FD2.   
 In this book, you can always tell which claims in the labeled and 
indented arguments are premises, conclusions, and subconclusions. The 
conclusion is always the final claim in the sequence. The subconclusions are 
anything other than the final claim that begins with a “So”. Any claim that 
doesn’t begin with “So” is a premise. However, when it comes to unlabeled 
arguments—arguments appearing in paragraph form—all bets are off. For 
instance, I might say: 
 
Death isn’t bad for you. After all, you cease to be conscious when you 
die, and something can’t be bad for you if you’re not even aware of it. 
And if that’s right, then you shouldn’t fear death, since it would be 
irrational to fear something that isn’t bad for you. 
 
The paragraph begins with a subconclusion, the conclusion shows up right 
in the middle of the paragraph, and neither of them is preceded by a “So”. 
Here, you have to use some brain-power and clues from the context to 
figure out which bits are the basic assumptions (the premises), which bit is 
the conclusion, and which bits are mere subconclusions.  
 All of the labeled arguments in the book are constructed in such a way 
that the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises—or, as I 
sometimes put it, the conclusion “follows from” the premises. You may or 
may not agree with FD1, and you may or may not agree with FD2. But what 
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you can’t deny is that FD1 and FD2 together entail FD3. If FD3 is false, then 
it must be that either FD1 or FD2 (or both) is false. You would be 
contradicting yourself if you accepted FD1 and FD2 but denied FD3. 
Because all the arguments are constructed in this way, you cannot reject the 
conclusion of any of the labeled arguments in the book while agreeing with 
all of the premises. You must find some premise to deny if you do not want 
to accept the conclusion. (See Appendix A, “Logic”, for more on how to tell 
when a conclusion is a logical consequence of some premises.) 
 
3. Premises and Conditionals 
There are no restrictions on which sorts of statements can figure as premises 
in an argument. A premise can be a speculative claim like FD1 or a 
conceptual truth like FD4. A premise can also be a statement of fact, for 
instance that a six-week-old embryo has a beating heart, or it can be a moral 
judgment, for instance that a six-week-old embryo has a right to life. 
Arguments can have premises that are mere matters of opinion, for instance 
that mushrooms are tasty. They can even have premises that are utterly and 
obviously false, for instance that the sky is yellow or that 1+1=3. Anything 
can be a premise. 
 That said, an argument is only as strong as its premises. The point of 
giving an argument is to persuade people of its conclusion, and an 
argument built on dubious, indefensible, or demonstrably false premises is 
unlikely to persuade anyone. 
 Arguments frequently contain premises of the form “if… then…”, like 
FD2 and FD4. Such statements are called conditionals, and there are names 
for the different parts of a conditional. The bit that comes between the ‘if’ 
and the ‘then’ is the antecedent of the conditional, and the bit that comes 
after the ‘then’ is the consequent of the conditional. Using FD2 as an 
illustration, the antecedent is you cease to be conscious when you die, the 
consequent is being dead is not bad for you, and the conditional is the whole 
claim: if you cease to be conscious when you die then being dead is not bad for you. 
 (Strictly speaking, conditionals don’t have to be of the form “if… 
then…”. They can also be of the form “… only if…”, as in “You should fear 
death only if being dead is bad for you”, or of the form “… if …”, as in “You 
shouldn’t fear death if being dead isn’t bad for you”.)  
 Conditionals affirm a link between two claims, and you can agree that 
some claims are linked in the way a conditional says they are, even if you 





The Drinking Age Argument 
(DK1) Kristina is twenty years old 
(DK2) If Kristina is twenty years old, then Kristina is not allowed to buy 
alcohol 
(DK3) So, Kristina is not allowed to buy alcohol 
 
You might object to this argument because you think that Kristina is 22 and 
that she is allowed to buy alcohol. Still, you should agree with the 
conditional premise DK2: you should agree that being 20 years old and 
buying alcohol are linked in the way DK2 says they are. You should agree 
that DK2 is true even though you disagree with both its antecedent and its 
consequent. To deny DK2, you’d have to think, for instance, that the legal 
drinking age was 18. But if you agree that the legal drinking age is 21, then 
your quarrel is not with DK2; it’s with DK1.  
 Likewise, you can agree with the conditional premise FD4 even if you 
think that being dead is bad for you. To disagree with FD4, you’d have to 
think that it’s sometimes rational to fear things that aren’t bad for you.  
 
4. Common Argumentative Strategies 
Arguments can play a variety of different roles in philosophical debates. 
Let’s have a look as some common argumentative strategies that you’ll 
encounter in the book. 
 First, an argument can be used to defend a premise from another 
argument. Premise FD1 of the Against Fearing Death argument—that you 
cease to be conscious when you die—is hardly obvious. So, someone who 
likes the Against Fearing Death argument might try to produce a further 
argument in defense of that premise, like the following: 
  
The Brain Death Argument 
(BD1) Your brain stops working when you die 
(BD2) If your brain stops working when you die, then you cease to be 
conscious when you die 
(FD1) So, you cease to be conscious when you die 
 
Notice that in the context of the Brain Death Argument FD1 is a conclusion, 
whereas in the context of the Against Fearing Death argument it’s a premise. 
Which role a given statement is playing can vary from one argument to the 
next. And whenever one wants to deny a claim that’s a conclusion of an 
argument, one must identify some flaw in that argument. That means that 
anyone who planned to resist the Against Fearing Death argument by 
denying FD1 now has to reckon with this Brain Death Argument.  
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 Second, an argument can be used to challenge another argument. There 
are two ways of doing so. One would be to produce an argument for the 
opposite conclusion. For instance, one might advance the following 
argument against FD5: 
 
The Uncertain Fate Argument 
(UF1) You don’t know what will happen to you after you die 
(UF2) If you don’t know what will happen to you after to die, then you 
should fear death 
(UF3) So, you should fear death 
 
Notice that UF3 is a denial of the conclusion of the Against Fearing Death 
argument. Thus, if the Uncertain Fate Argument is successful, then 
something must go wrong in the Against Fearing Death argument, though it 
would still be an open question where exactly it goes wrong. 
 Another way to challenge an argument is to produce a new argument 
against a premise of the argument you wish to challenge. Here, for instance, 
is an argument against FD1 of the Against Fearing Death argument: 
  
The Afterlife Argument 
(AF1) You go to heaven or hell after you die 
(AF2) If you go to heaven or hell after you die, then you don’t cease to 
be conscious when you die 
(AF3) So, you don’t cease to be conscious when you die 
 
Unlike the Uncertain Fate Argument, The Afterlife Argument challenges a 
premise of the Against Fearing Death argument, and does indicate where 
that argument is supposed to go wrong. 
 I don’t mean to suggest that these are especially good arguments. Not 
all arguments are created equal! People who believe in the afterlife aren’t 
likely to be convinced by the Brain Death Argument, and people who don’t 
believe in the afterlife aren’t likely to be convinced by the Afterlife 
Argument. As you read on, you’ll discover that a lot of the work in 
philosophy involves trying to construct arguments that will be convincing 
even to those who aren’t initially inclined to accept their conclusions. 
 
5. Counterexamples 
Arguments often contain premises which contend that things are always a 





 The Beating Heart Argument 
 (BH1) A six-week-old embryo has a beating heart 
 (BH2) It’s always immoral to kill something that has a beating heart 
 (BH3) So, it’s immoral to kill a six-week-old embryo 
 
The second premise, BH2, says that killing things that have beating hearts 
is always immoral. Put another way, the fact that something has a beating 
heart is sufficient for killing it to be immoral. 
 Arguments also often contain premises which contend that things are 
never a certain way. For instance, someone who is pro-choice might advance 
the following argument in defense of abortion: 
 
 The Consciousness Argument 
 (CN1) A six-week-old embryo isn’t conscious 
 (CN2) It’s never wrong to kill something that isn’t conscious 
 (CN3) So, it isn’t wrong to kill a six-week-old embryo 
 
The second premise, CN2, says that killing things that aren’t conscious is 
never wrong. Put another way, in order for a killing to be wrong, it’s 
necessary for the victim to be conscious at the time of the killing. 
 When a premise says that things are always a certain way or that they’re 
never a certain way, it’s making a very strong claim. And one can challenge 
such a claim by coming up with counterexamples, examples in which things 
aren’t the way that the premise says things always are, or in which things 
are the way that the premise says things never are. For instance, you might 
challenge BH2 by pointing out that worms have hearts, and it isn’t immoral 
to kill them. And you might challenge CN2 by pointing out that it’s wrong 
to kill someone who’s temporarily anesthetized, even though they’re 
unconscious. In other words, worms are counterexamples to BH2 and 
anaesthetized people are counterexamples to CN2.  
 These counterexamples can then be put to work in arguments of their 
own, for instance: 
 
The Worm Argument 
(WA1) If it’s always immoral to kill something that has a beating heart, 
then it’s immoral to kill worms 
(WA2) It isn’t immoral to kill worms 




The Temporary Anesthesia Argument 
(TA1) If it’s never wrong to kill something that’s unconscious, then it 
isn’t wrong to kill a temporarily anesthetized adult 
(TA2) It is wrong to kill a temporarily anesthetized adult 
(TA3) So, it is sometimes wrong to kill something that’s unconscious 
 
Argument by counterexample is a very common argumentative strategy, 
and we’ll see many examples in the different chapters of the book.  
 It’s important to realize that these arguments do not require saying that 
embryos are in every way analogous to worms or to temporarily 
anesthetized adults, or that killing an embryo is the moral equivalent of 
killing a worm or a temporarily anesthetized adult. The arguments from 
counterexamples formulated above don’t say anything at all about 
embryos. Rather, they’re giving independent reasons for rejecting that 
general principles (BH2 and CN2) being employed in the Beating Heart 
Argument and the Consciousness Argument. 
 One last thing. You’ll sometimes encounter claims in the book that 
include the phrase “if and only if”. For instance, later on in the book we’ll 
address the question of what makes something bad for you. Breaking your 
leg is bad for you, and relaxing in a hot tub isn’t bad for you. Those are just 
some examples of things that are and aren’t bad for you, but suppose we 
wanted to give a more general answer to the question of what makes 
something bad for you. Here’s a first stab at doing so, which we’ll encounter 
in chapter 6: 
 
  (HD) Something is bad for you if and only if it’s painful  
 
HD gives the right results in the cases we just considered: it says that 
breaking your leg is bad for you, since that’s painful, and that relaxing in a 
hot tub isn’t bad for you, since that’s not painful.   
 HD can be seen as two claims packed into one. First, it’s saying that 
something is bad for you if it’s painful. In other words, if something is 
painful, that’s sufficient for it to be bad for you; painful things are always 
bad for you. Second, it’s saying that something is bad for you only if it’s 
painful. In other words, something’s being painful is necessary for it to be 
bad for you; non-painful things are never bad for you.  
 So, HD is saying that being painful is necessary and sufficient for being 
bad for you. Accordingly, it can be challenged in two different ways. First, 
you might try to show that being painful isn’t sufficient, by producing 
examples of things that are painful but aren’t bad for you. Second, you 
might try to show that being painful isn’t necessary, by producing examples 
of things that aren’t painful but that are still bad for you. An example of 
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either sort would count as a counterexample to HD and would be enough 
to show that HD is incorrect. Can you think of one? 
 
6. Argument by Analogy 
Another common argumentative strategy is argument by analogy. We’ll 
encounter such arguments repeatedly in this book. Here is an example from 
chapter 7, which is meant to show that it’s wrong for the government to tax 
and imprison its citizens: 
 
VIGILANTE  
Jasmine discovers that some con men have set up a fake charity and are 
conning some people in her neighborhood. She captures them at 
gunpoint, leads them to her basement, and plans to keep them there for 
a year as punishment. Quickly realizing how expensive it is to take care 
of them, Jasmine goes to her neighbors and demands $50 from each of 
them, at gunpoint. She explains that half the money will go towards 
taking care of her prisoners and that the rest will go towards a gym she 
is building to help keep troubled kids off the street. Those who do not 
comply are locked up in her basement with her other prisoners. 
 
Thinking about this scenario is meant to elicit the intuition that Jasmine is 
doing something wrong. But what Jasmine is doing seems entirely 
analogous to what the government does when it taxes and imprisons its 
citizens. If that’s right, then we should think that taxation and 
imprisonment by the government are wrong as well. 
 What really drives an argument by analogy isn’t so much the presence 
of similarities between the two cases being compared, but rather the absence 
of a certain kind of difference. In VIGILANTE, the idea is that there’s no 
morally relevant difference between what Jasmine does and what the 
government does, that is, no difference between them that could explain 
why the one is wrong while the other is okay. The argument can be framed 
as follows:  
 
Against Taxation and Imprisonment 
(TX1) If there is no morally relevant difference between two actions A 
and B, then: if A is wrong, then B is wrong 
(TX2) It is wrong for Jasmine to extort and kidnap her neighbors 
(TX3) There is no morally relevant difference between Jasmine extorting 
and kidnapping her neighbors and the government taxing and 
imprisoning its citizens 
(TX4) So, it is wrong for the government to tax and imprison its citizens 
 
 17 
 The idea behind TX1 is that, if one action is immoral and another isn’t, 
there has got to be some explanation for that, some difference between them 
that accounts for the moral difference. To put it another way, it would be 
arbitrary to hold that one action is right and another is wrong unless one can 
point to some difference between the actions to explain why they differ 
morally. TX2 is meant to strike you as obvious after reading the VIGILANTE 
case. And the idea behind TX3 is that there are no differences between what 
Jasmine does and what the government does that make for a moral 
difference between the cases. 
 The challenge for those who don’t want to accept the conclusion of the 
argument, TX4, is to identify some morally relevant difference, and 
defenders of the argument must then either argue that the indicated 
differences aren’t morally relevant, or else modify the story so that the 
indicated differences are no longer present. 
 
7. Thought Experiments 
The VIGILANTE case is what’s called a thought experiment. In a thought 
experiment, a fictional scenario is presented—some more realistic than 
others—and then readers are asked for their intuitive reactions to the case. 
We’ll see many more examples throughout the book.  
 Thought experiments can be put to work in defending or challenging an 
argument in a number of different ways. We just saw how they can play a 
role in argument by analogy. They also often play a supporting role in 
arguments by counterexample. In chapter 3, for instance, we’ll encounter 
the following argument for the idea that we sometimes do things of our 
own free will: 
  
The Argument for Freedom 
(FR1) Sometimes you perform an action after deciding to perform that 
action 
(FR2) If one performs an action after deciding to perform it, then one 
performs that action freely 
(FR3) So some of your actions are performed freely 
 
The second premise, FR2, says that so long as someone does what they 
decided to do, that by itself suffices for it to count as a free action. Later in 





HYPNOTIC DECISION  
Tia is on the run from the law and knows the cops are hot on her trail. 
She is also a master hypnotist. As she passes Colton on the street, she 
hypnotizes him and plants an irresistible post-hypnotic suggestion: 
whenever he hears someone shout Freeze! he will grow very angry with 
the person, decide to tackle them, and then tackle them. Just then, Kabir 
the cop arrives on the scene, sees Tia, and shouts Freeze! As a result of 
the hypnotic suggestion, Colton gets angry at Kabir, consciously decides 
to tackle him, and then tackles him. 
 
Colton did do exactly what he decided to do, namely tackle Kabir. But when 
we think about this case, it seems to us, intuitively, that Colton did not freely 
tackle Kabir; this isn’t something he did of his own free will. So HYPNOTIC 
DECISION looks to be a counterexample to FR2, which is reason to reject FR2 
and think that the Argument for Freedom fails. 
 When it comes to thought experiments, the details matter, and the cases 
we’ll use in this book are carefully constructed with an eye to the work 
they’re intended to do. HYPNOTIC DECISION, for example, is carefully 
constructed to serve as a counterexample to FR2, and in order for it do so 
it’s crucial that Colton tackles Kabir as a result of Tia’s hypnotic suggestion. 
At times, you might naturally wonder what happens if we vary the details 
of a case. For instance, you may wonder: what if Colton snaps out of Tia’s 
hypnotic control at the last second, but still decides to tackle Kabir? Well, 
that’s a different case. Let’s call it HYPNOTIC BREAK. HYPNOTIC BREAK isn’t a 
counterexample to FR2, since intuitively Colton is acting freely in this new 
case. But that doesn’t change the fact that the original case, HYPNOTIC 
DECISION, is a counterexample to FR2. And so long as there’s one 
counterexample to FR2, that’s enough to show that it’s is false. 
 After reading a few of the chapters, you might begin to get suspicious 
of all this reliance on thought experiments. In particular, you might wonder 
how purely fictional, unrealistic cases could be relevant to the questions 
we’re trying to answer. If a zoologist says that zebras have black and white 
stripes, it would be no objection to say that you can imagine a zebra with 
purple and orange stripes. Why, then, when a philosopher affirms FR2, is it 
supposed to be an objection that we can imagine a case in which someone 
isn’t acting freely despite doing what they decided to do?  
 Here’s the difference. When a zoologist says that zebras have black and 
white stripes, she only means to be claiming that, normally, zebras are like 
this. Neither my imaginary purple and orange zebra, nor even actual albino 
zebras, are any objection to a claim like that. The philosopher, by contrast, 
means to be making a stronger claim. She isn’t just saying that, normally, 
people are acting freely when they do what they decide to do. Rather, she 
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is saying that doing what one decides to do is what makes an action free, or 
that that’s just what it is for an action to be free. And a claim like that is true 
only if it is absolutely exceptionless, both in actual cases and in merely 
possible cases. 
 To see this, suppose I wanted to know what makes someone a bachelor. 
And suppose you reply: what makes someone a bachelor is that they are an 
unmarried man under eighty feet tall. That’s obviously a terrible account of 
what it is to be a bachelor. But why? All actual unmarried men under eighty 
feet are bachelors, and all actual bachelors are unmarried men under eighty 
feet tall. So, there are no actual counterexamples. Still, it’s clear that being 
under eighty feet tall isn’t required for being a bachelor; height has nothing 
to do with what makes someone a bachelor. The in-principle possibility of 
a ninety-foot-tall bachelor is enough to show that this is an unsatisfactory 
account of bachelorhood. Likewise, the mere possibility of doing what one 
decided to do without acting freely is enough to falsify a philosophical 
thesis about what makes actions free.  
 Why, though, do philosophers make such strong claims—especially if 
that opens them up to refutation by imaginary cases? The answer (at least 
in part) is that philosophers want the claims they defend to be definitive: 
they are trying to definitively settle the philosophical questions at issue. For 
instance, think about the Beating Heart Argument from section 5, according 
to which the fact that something has a beating heart makes it wrong to kill 
that thing. Suppose, though, that this were put forward merely as a useful, 
but not exceptionless, rule of thumb: that it’s normally wrong to kill things 
with beating hearts. In that case, even if I could convince you beyond any 
doubt that it’s normally wrong to kill things with heartbeats and that six-
week-old embryos have a heartbeat, that would not yet settle the question 
of whether it’s wrong to kill them. After all, maybe embryos are one of the 
exceptions to the rule, one of the abnormal cases where it’s okay to kill 
something that has a beating heart. 
 Philosophical principles would have no “bite” unless these are meant to 
be absolutely exceptionless. So, it is for good reason that philosophers are 
searching for absolutely exceptionless principles. But this is precisely what 
opens them up to refutation by thought experiments; one possible 
exception would be enough to show that the principle is false. 
 
8. What is Philosophy? 
As you can see, this book is going to cover a wide array of topics, including 
whether you should fear death, whether abortion is immoral, whether God 
exists, and whether we ever do things of our own free will. So, what do 
these topics all have in common, that makes them all philosophical topics?  
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 It’s hard to say. Philosophy is sometimes characterized as the study of 
life’s most fundamental questions. That does capture some of the topics 
we’ll cover, like the true nature of morality and the existence of God. But 
the question of whether we should have to pay taxes hardly seems like one 
of “life’s most fundamental questions”. And other questions that we’d 
naturally describe as being among life’s most fundamental questions, like 
whether we’re alone in the universe or how many generations the human 
race has left, aren’t exactly philosophical. So, this won’t do as a definition 
of philosophy, since there are counterexamples: being one of life’s 
fundamental questions is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a 
philosophical question. 
 In all honesty, I’m not sure how to give necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a topic’s being philosophical. Philosophers have lots of 
interesting things to say about biology, physics, sociology, and psychology, 
and it can be difficult (and probably unnecessary) to say where the science 
ends and the philosophy begins.  
 Perhaps a more promising approach to saying what makes some 
inquiries and not others philosophical would be to look, not for what unites 
the topics studied, but rather at how they are studied. Philosophers try to 
answer questions and make sense of things just by thinking carefully about 
them, attempting to resolve controversial questions and assess challenges 
to commonsense assumptions using rational argumentation alone. (Though 
this doesn’t mean that philosophical argumentation can’t be informed by 
scientific discoveries and other worldly observations.) As Delia Graff Fara 
puts it,  
 
“By doing philosophy we can discover eternal and mind-independent 
truths about the nature of the world by investigating our own 
conceptions of it, and by subjecting our most commonly or firmly held 
beliefs to what would otherwise be perversely strict scrutiny.”  
 
After finishing the book, I think you’ll have a pretty good sense of what 
Professor Fara meant by “perversely strict scrutiny”. And I don’t think she 
meant this as a criticism. Philosophy—at its best—can sometimes feel like 
thinking in slow motion. Even when an idea or argument seems clear 
enough, philosophers like to break it down into its component parts; 
separate out all of the different premises and assess the plausibility of each 
individually; identify challenges to the premises and break them down into 
their component parts; see whether arguments can be strengthened by 
small changes to how they are formulated; and so on. Some things can only 
be figured out by paying the closest attention to the smallest details.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Can God Allow Suffering? 
 
Views and arguments advanced in this chapter are not necessarily endorsed by the 
author of the textbook, nor are they original to the author, nor are they meant to be 
consistent with arguments advanced in other chapters. Different chapters represent 
different philosophical perspectives. 
 
1. Introduction 
Imagine that you are a tourist, visiting the distant country of Nornia. You 
see some wondrous sights: stunning skyscrapers, beautiful parks, galleries 
full of masterpieces. You also see extreme poverty and injustice, poorly 
designed highways, grossly corrupt and inefficient government agencies, 
falsely accused prisoners serving life sentences, and many other terrible 
things. After seeing all this, suppose you are told that Nornia is run by a 
wise and compassionate ruler with limitless power and who keeps careful 
track of everything that goes on in his country. You wouldn’t believe it for 
a second. 
 Now look around the world. You’ll see some wondrous sights: stunning 
mountain peaks, beautiful prairies, staggering artistic and athletic talent. 
But you will also find poverty and injustice, a planet afflicted by extreme 
weather and natural disasters, bodies afflicted by all manner of diseases and 
injuries, and many other terrible things. Now, suppose you are told that this 
is the work of a maximally powerful, all-knowing, and morally perfect 
deity. You shouldn’t believe it for a second.  
 There is no God, and we can know that there is no God simply by 
reflecting on the impressive variety of evils and sufferings we encounter in 
the world. Or so I shall argue. After laying out the argument (section 2), I 
address three attempts to explain why God would allow the sorts of 
suffering we endure: because suffering enables us to appreciate the good 
things we have (section 3), because suffering is necessary for acquiring 
valuable character traits (section 4), or because God must permit suffering 
in order for us to have free will (section 5). I then consider the response that 
God has his reasons for allowing suffering, but that those reasons are 




2. The Argument from Suffering 
My argument that God doesn’t exist is easy to state and highly intuitive: 
 
The Argument from Suffering 
(AS1) There is suffering in the world 
(AS2) If there is suffering in the world, then God does not exist 
(AS3) So, God does not exist 
 
By ‘suffering’, here, I mean any pain or discomfort that living beings 
endure—large or small, physical or emotional. 
 The first premise, AS1, is entirely uncontroversial. Even if your life has 
gone pretty smoothly, you could still fill a book with the pains and 
sufferings—large and small, physical and emotional—that you have 
experienced. And that’s just one life. 
 To see the idea behind the second premise, AS2, note that God is 
supposed to be a perfect being. In particular, he is supposed to be 
omnipotent (that is, maximally powerful), omniscient (all-knowing), and 
omnibenevolent (morally perfect). Let’s call a being with all three of these 
qualities an omnibeing. Now, consider how an omnibeing would react to any 
suffering that might crop up in the world. Being omniscient, an omnibeing 
would instantly be aware of the suffering. Being omnibenevolent, she 
would want to prevent it if she could. Being omnipotent, she could prevent 
it if she wanted to. So, an omnibeing would prevent it. Put another way, the 
only way for there to be suffering if there were an omnibeing around is if 
the omnibeing wanted there to be suffering, couldn’t prevent it, or doesn’t 
know it’s happening—none of which seems possible given the definition of 
‘omnibeing’. So, if there is suffering, it must be because there is no 
omnibeing around to stop it.  
 Some who believe in God may be willing to admit that God is not an 
omnibeing. You might say that God isn’t omnipotent: he knows all about 
your toothache, and he wishes he could do something about it, but he just 
isn’t able to. Or you might say that God isn’t omniscient: he would end the 
toothache if he knew about it, but he genuinely has no idea that you have a 
toothache right now. Or you might say that God isn’t omnibenevolent: he 
knows about your toothache and could stop it if he wanted to, but he really 
couldn’t care less about you and your toothache.   
 Admittedly, my Argument from Suffering will be ineffective against 
someone who believes in an imperfect God like this, for they will simply 
deny AS2 of the argument. At the same time, I suspect that a great many 
believers will be unwilling to admit that God is imperfect, which means the 
argument is still a problem for them. For simplicity, I’ll take it for granted 
for the remainder of the chapter that it’s not in dispute that God (if he exists) 
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is an omnibeing, and I’ll focus on attempts to explain why an omnibeing 
would—and how one even could—permit suffering. 
 What I expect most theists to say in response to the Argument from 
Suffering is that God allows suffering because there is some greater good 
that can be obtained only by those who have endured certain kinds of 
suffering. But in trying to identify what that greater good is, it’s important 
to use your imagination. For instance, you might be tempted to say that 
God allows people to die—despite all the suffering involved both for the 
victim and for those left behind—because if no one ever died, then the 
world would quickly become overpopulated, and there would be even more 
suffering given our limited resources. But it’s not as if an omnibeing would 
have to choose between death and overpopulation. With limitless power, 
an omnibeing could easily have created a world for us with unlimited space 
and unlimited resources, a world that would never be in danger of 
becoming overpopulated. 
 Accordingly, any account of why an omnibeing would allow suffering 
must identify some greater good that would be completely impossible in the 
absence of suffering. I’ll examine three suggestions—that suffering is 
necessary for appreciating the good things we have, that suffering is 
necessary for building valuable character traits, and that allowing suffering 
is necessary for free will—and I will argue that none provides an adequate 
response to the Argument from Suffering.    
 
3. The Appreciated Goods Defense 
Let’s begin with the suggestion that, without some suffering in the world, 
no one would be able to appreciate good things. After all, the idea goes, if we 
were in a constant state of pleasure and contentedness, that would just 
strike us as a normal, unremarkable baseline. And it’s better for us to 
appreciate the good things we have than merely to have the good things 
without in any way appreciating them. So, since God wants the best for us, 
he would want us to appreciate the good things we have, and he would 
therefore permit all of the suffering necessary for attaining that 
appreciation. Call this The Appreciated Goods Defense. 
 On closer inspection, however, it just isn’t plausible that no one could 
appreciate the good things they have without suffering. Again, you have to 
use your imagination. Suppose God wanted to create beings who 
experience nothing but pleasure but also wanted them to be able to 
appreciate that pleasure. He could do so by arranging for their pleasure to 
keep increasing at every moment. That way, they can always look back on 
their earlier states of pleasure and feel appreciative that they are now so 
much better off. With this sort of possibility in mind, it is hard to see why 
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there would have to be any suffering in order for people to appreciate good 
things.  
 One might object that there’s a limit to the amount of pleasure that 
human beings are capable of experiencing, perhaps connected to the 
quantity of serotonin our brains are capable of generating. But even if we 
actually have these psychological limitations, surely there’s nothing to 
prevent an omnibeing like God from removing those limitations if he 
wanted to. 
 Moreover, even if it were true that some suffering is needed in order to 
appreciate good things, there surely is no need for all the suffering we 
endure. A chilly, overcast day now and then can help one appreciate warm 
sunny days, but there is surely no need for endless, soul-crushing Midwest 
winters. A bit of back pain now and then can help one appreciate a healthy 
body, but there is surely no need for debilitating, chronic back pain and 
other such maladies. The problem, in short, is that if God’s intention is just 
to make it possible for us to appreciate good things, then so much of the 
suffering we endure is entirely pointless; it serves no purpose. 
 This suggests a way of revising the original argument from suffering to 
get around the objection. The original argument is perhaps too strong, 
insofar as AS2 suggests that an omnibeing could never have any reason for 
allowing any suffering. But all we really need in order to show that there is 
no omnibeing is that some particular types of suffering we endure serve no 
conceivable purpose. Let us then replace the Argument from Suffering with 
the following Argument from Pointless Suffering: 
 
The Argument from Pointless Suffering 
(PS1) There is pointless suffering in the world 
(PS2) If there is pointless suffering in the world, then God does not exist 
(PS3) So, God does not exist 
 
PS1 is admittedly more controversial than AS1, since PS1 says not just that 
there is suffering but that some of that suffering serves no purpose. Still, 
PS1 is highly plausible in light of the examples just given: it is hard to 
imagine what purpose could possibly be served by chronic back pain and 
brutal winters. The idea behind PS2 is that an omnibeing can allow 
suffering only if there is some good reason for allowing it. But, by definition 
(of ‘pointless’), there is no good reason for allowing pointless suffering. So, 
if there is pointless suffering, it must be because there is no omnibeing 
around to prevent it.   
 Notice that in the original Argument from Suffering the first premise 
(AS1) was entirely uncontroversial and the second premise (AS2) was the 
one to challenge. Now the reverse is true. The second premise (PS2) is now 
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uncontroversial—an omnibeing can’t allow suffering for no reason—and it’s 
the first premise that I expect believers to challenge. As we saw, the 
Appreciated Goods Defense is not up to the task: even if some suffering is 
needed in order to appreciate good things, clearly not all of our suffering is 
necessary for this purpose.   
 
4. The Character Building Defense 
Let’s try out a different objection to PS1. Here the idea is that there are 
certain highly valuable character traits that can be developed only in the 
face of adversity, failure, temptation, and other sources of suffering. Take 
courage, for instance. If there were no suffering, then nothing could be 
dangerous, and in a world without danger no one has the opportunity to 
become courageous. Similar points can be made for empathy, loyalty, 
perseverance, self-control, forgiveness, and trustworthiness. In short, 
building character requires a potential for suffering. And, the idea goes, 
these character traits are sufficiently valuable to justify allowing all of the 
suffering necessary for cultivating them. Call this the “Character Building 
Defense”. 
 What’s nice about the Character Building Defense is that it’s able to 
account for such a wide range of bad things, including some extreme forms 
of suffering. Without profound acts of betrayal, there could be no profound 
acts of forgiveness. Without the horrors and hardships of war, no one could 
reach the levels of courage and selflessness that soldiers attain. Since these 
sufferings are necessary in order to have the best kind of world—one with 
courageous and forgiving people—we can see why God would allow them. 
Furthermore, the Character Building Defense seems equipped to handle the 
alleged examples of pointless suffering mentioned in the previous section: 
by enduring chronic back pain and soul-crushing winters, one learns 
perseverance and endurance. 
 Ultimately, though, the Character Building Defense fails to account for 
all apparent cases of pointless suffering. For while some soldiers find that 
the horrors of war strengthen their moral character, others are pushed to 
their breaking point and return home with debilitating PTSD. Or take 
someone who is tortured mercilessly and then killed before the experience 
can help them build character. The Character Building Defense seems 
unable to explain the purpose of the suffering in such cases.  
 Proponents of the Character Building Defense may insist that at least the 
friends and family of the traumatized soldier or torture victim get to develop 
valuable character traits as a result of their own grief and sadness. But it 
seems deeply at odds with the omnibenevolence of an omnibeing to allow 
someone to suffer terribly for someone else’s benefit. In any event, we can 
sidestep this response by focusing on cases where the people suffering have 
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no friends or family whose moral character is enhanced by the suffering, or 
cases where the tragedy pushes the friends and family of the victim beyond 
their breaking points. All it takes is one such case to show that PS1 is true. 
 
5. The Free Will Defense 
Let’s consider one last version of the appeal to greater goods, which turns 
on the idea that allowing suffering is a necessary condition for free will. 
Here, the idea is that a world in which people have the ability to do things 
of their own free will has to be a world in which suffering is permitted. God 
could force us to always do the right thing, but being forced to perform an 
action is incompatible with doing it freely. And free will is plausibly a very 
valuable thing: a world in which people are able to freely choose to do the 
right thing is superior to a world in which everyone is an automaton, 
performing only kind and wholesome actions but never because they freely 
choose to do so. This, the idea goes, is why God decided to give us free will, 
even though that requires allowing some suffering. 
 The Free Will Defense is well equipped to handle many of the alleged 
cases of pointless suffering considered above. No one can ever freely make 
good choices unless God steps back and permits people to sometimes make 
bad choices, including warring and torturing. So, the Free Will Defense 
does look more promising than the Character Building Defense. Even so, 
we shouldn’t be satisfied by the Free Will Defense either.  
 First, the Free Will Defense only accounts for suffering caused by other 
humans. It goes no way towards explaining how an omnibeing could allow 
suffering caused (for instance) by disease or scarcity or natural disasters or 
animals. There could still be free will in a world without earthquakes, 
droughts, dog bites, back pain, and cold winters.  
 Second, it’s not even clear that the Free Will Defense can account for all 
the human-caused suffering in the world. Certainly, there could still be 
plenty of valuable freedom in the world if, now and then, God discreetly 
intervened to prevent a genocide or a terrorist attack or a third-degree burn. 
By analogy, a loving parent can allow their child the freedom to make their 
own mistakes, but would still intervene if the kid is about to step off a cliff 
or fire up a chainsaw. So, the Free Will Defense can’t explain all the human-
caused suffering we encounter in this world.  
 Third, it’s not even clear that there could be free will in a world in which 
God exists. After all, since God is supposed to be omniscient, he already 
knows everything you’re going to do before you do it. To see how this 
causes trouble for the Free Will Defense, let’s focus on just one example of 
an alleged free action. You see a fifty-dollar bill fall out of someone’s pocket. 
You grab it, and you’re pretty confident that no one would notice if you 
kept it for yourself. But you decide to do the right thing and return it. If God 
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is an omnibeing, he must already know what you were going to do with the 
money; otherwise, there’d be something he doesn’t know and he wouldn’t 
be omniscient. But in order for God to know in advance that you’d return 
the money, it had to already have been settled that you were going to return 
the money. God couldn’t have known what you were going to do if it was 
still an open possibility that you were going to keep the money. But if it was 
already settled in advance that you were going to return it, then it’s not true 
that you could have kept it. And if you couldn’t have behaved any 
differently from how you actually behaved, then what you did wasn’t really 
up to you. It wasn’t a free action after all!   
 Of course, there’s nothing special about the particular example I chose. 
The same problem arises for any allegedly free action. What that shows is 
that the Free Will Defense is a complete nonstarter. Suffering can’t be 
explained as something God permits in order to make room for free will, 
since any world with an omnibeing—who already knows in advance 
everything that’s going to happen—is already a world without free will.   
 
6. The Hidden Reasons Defense 
We have been unable to identify any greater good that could justify an 
omnibeing in allowing all the different kinds of suffering people endure. 
But perhaps theists will insist that we shouldn’t expect to be able to identify 
that greater good. We inhabit a universe unfathomably larger than the small 
corner of it we’ve seen, they’ll say, with human concerns that are 
infinitesimally smaller than those of a deity with an entire universe to look 
after. Accordingly, the idea goes, it would be absurd to think that we’d be 
able to discern or even comprehend God’s reasons for allowing this or that 
kind of suffering. In other words, what God sees as good may be different 
from what we are able to recognize as good, given our limited perspective.  
 I find this response deeply unsatisfying. True, it’s possible be that every 
last bit of suffering we find in the world is an indispensable part of some 
magnificent plan that we can’t even begin to imagine. We can’t be one 
hundred percent certain that it isn’t. I admit that. But it would be absurd to 
think that, just because we can’t be certain that the suffering isn’t all part of 
some secret plan, we should therefore believe that there is some such secret 
plan. Rather, the reasonable thing to believe (even though we can’t be 
absolutely certain that it’s true) is that the suffering people endure is often 
exactly what it seems to be: pointless suffering. 
 To help see this, let’s return to the example from the beginning of the 
chapter. You are touring the country of Nornia and observe a mix of 
wondrous and terrible sights. Having seen all the poverty, injustice, 
pollution, road hazards, corruption, inefficiency, cruelty, etc., you laugh off 
the suggestion that the ruler of the country has limitless power, perfect 
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compassion, and complete knowledge of everything that goes on in his 
country.  
 Now suppose that your tour guide reminds you that it is a very large 
country, most of which you haven’t seen. You are reminded that the ruler 
is privy to classified information and has concerns and projects that you 
know nothing about. You are reminded that, for all you know, the poverty, 
pollution, and so on are all a necessary part of his master plan for creating 
the best of all possible countries. Reminded of all this, should you now 
believe what your tour guide says, that the country has a ruler with 
unchecked power, knowledge, and compassion? Of course not. You should 
continue laughing. 
 This suggests the following argument against appealing to hidden 
reasons: 
 
The Argument for Disbelief  
(DB1) You should not believe that all the suffering in Nornia is necessary 
for some unknown greater good that its ruler has in mind 
(DB2) If you should not believe that all the suffering in Nornia is 
necessary for some unknown greater good that its ruler has in 
mind, then you should not believe that all the suffering in the 
actual world is necessary for some unknown greater good that 
God has in mind 
(DB3) So, you should not believe that the suffering people endure in the 
actual world is necessary for some unknown greater good that 
God has in mind 
 
 DB1 is plausible. You can of course admit that it’s possible that the ruler 
knowingly allows all the corruption and cruelty and poverty as an 
ingenious means to some benevolent end, just as you can admit that it’s 
possible that the earth is flat and that all the evidence to the contrary is part 
of some elaborate hoax. You can admit that there’s a remote possibility that 
flat-earthers are right, but that obviously doesn’t mean you should believe 
that they are right. Likewise, even if you admit that there’s a remote 
possibility that the tour guide is telling the truth, that doesn’t mean you 
should believe what she says. 
 As for DB2, the idea is that we ought to give similar answers to the 
question of whether the ruler has good, hidden reasons for all the suffering 
in Nornia and the question of whether God has good, hidden reasons for 
all the suffering in the universe. There is no difference between what we 
know about Nornia and what we know about the universe that could make 
it reasonable to believe in hidden reasons in the one case but not the other.  
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 Think of it this way. Try to explain why all the apparent defects of Nornia 
justify disbelief in what the tour guide said. I bet that any explanation you 
give would serve equally well as an explanation for why the apparent 
defects of the universe justify disbelief in an omnibeing with hidden 
reasons. Or try to explain why it’s reasonable to believe that the apparent 
defects of the universe are part of an omnibeing’s secret plans. I bet that 
your explanation would serve equally well as an explanation for why it’s 
reasonable to believe your tour guide, that the apparent defects of Nornia 
are all part of its benevolent ruler’s ingenious plans. 
 Just to be clear, I’m not saying that the cases are exactly analogous: God 
is supposed to be an omnibeing, whereas the ruler is a mere mortal. My 
point is just that the reasons for disregarding the suggestion that ruler must 
have some secret plan for all the suffering are equally reasons for 
disregarding the suggestion that some omnibeing has a secret plan for all 
the seemingly pointless suffering we see around us.  
 
7. Conclusion 
I have argued that the sorts of suffering we find in the world cannot be 
reconciled with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and 
omnibenevolent God. We have examined a number of attempts to reconcile 
them, which involved pointing to one or another purpose that might be 
served by the suffering, but we found that these attempts cannot make 
sense of the full range of suffering that people endure. Finally, I argued that 
it is not reasonable to believe that the suffering is all in service of some 
unknown greater good that, due to our limited perspective, we have been 
unable to identify.   
 
Reflection Questions 
1. Is it possible to escape the objections raised in sections 3, 4, and 5 by 
combining the Appreciated Goods Defense, the Character Building 
Defense, and/or the Free Will Defense?  
 
2. God is widely believed to reward people with eternal happiness in 
heaven. Could this be turned into a response to the argument from 
suffering? Why or why not? 
 
3. One might respond to the Argument from Suffering and the Argument 
from Pointless Suffering by insisting that God has to allow bad things to 
happen to certain people, because they deserve it and—being perfectly 




4. Can the Hidden Reasons Defense be defended against the objections 
raised in section 6? In particular, what do you think about the claim that 
“there is no difference between what we know about Nornia and what 
we know about the universe that could make it reasonable to believe in 
hidden reasons in the one case but not the other”? 
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Why You Should Bet on God 
 
Views and arguments advanced in this chapter are not necessarily endorsed by the 
author of the textbook, nor are they original to the author, nor are they meant to be 
consistent with arguments advanced in other chapters. Different chapters represent 
different philosophical perspectives. 
 
1. Introduction 
I am going to try to convince you that you should believe in God. But I’m 
going to do it in a different way than you might expect. I’m not going to 
give you an argument that God exists. I won’t try to convince you, for 
instance, that there has to be a God in order to serve as a first cause of the 
universe (what’s sometimes called “the cosmological argument”), or that 
we have to posit an intelligent designer in order to explain all the forms of 
life and other complex systems we find in the world (what’s sometimes 
called “the teleological argument”). Rather, I’m going to argue that you 
should believe in God because it’s in your best interest to do so. 
 Here’s an analogy, to give you a feel for the sort of argument I’m going 
to give. Imagine that you’re at a casino and you’re deciding whether to bet 
your $10 on red or on black at the roulette table. But it’s not a regular game 
of roulette. The way it works is that if you bet on red and win you walk 
away with $20, and if you bet on black and win you walk away with a 
million dollars. You don’t know whether it will land on red or black. And 
yet you know exactly what to do: bet on black. Why? Because you stand to 
gain so much if it comes up black and stand to lose so little if it doesn’t. 
Similarly, you have no way of knowing whether or not God exists. Still, you 
should believe in God. Why? Because you stand to gain so much by 
believing in God and stand to lose so little. Indeed, only by betting on God 
do you stand a chance of winning the ultimate jackpot: eternal afterlife in 
heaven. 
 In sections 2-3, I’ll give a more careful and rigorous presentation of this 
argument. Then, in section 4, I’ll address some potential objections to the 
argument, for instance that it’s extremely unlikely that God exists or that 
belief alone is not enough to guarantee entrance into heaven. Finally, in 
section 5, I address the worry that it’s impossible to make yourself believe 





2. Practical Reasoning in an Uncertain World 
In this section, I will take a big step back from the question of whether you 
should believe in God, and look more generally at how we make rational 
decisions about what to do in situations of uncertainty. After looking 
informally at the sorts of considerations we take into account when making 
such decisions (section 2.1), I lay out a more rigorous way of thinking about 
rational decision-making, in terms of “expected utility calculations” 
(section 2.2).  
 
2.1 Costs, Benefits, and Likelihoods 
Let’s shift from the roulette-wheel example to something more realistic. 
You’re at a party and you spot your crush across the room. You’re trying to 
decide whether to go talk to him (or her, but let’s go with “him”) and 
confess your feelings. The night is young and you’ve still got your wits 
about you, and you want to make a smart decision. What sorts of things do 
you need to take into account?  
 First, you need to think about your options and the possible outcomes. 
Your options are telling him that you’re crushing on him or saying nothing. 
(What about flirting without blurting? We’ll get to that; let’s keep it simple 
for now.) And the possible outcomes are that he likes you back or that he’s 
not into you.  
 Second, you need to consider the costs or benefits of each “eventuality”, 
that is, each way things might unfold. If you confess your feelings to him 
and he’s into you too, you get to date your crush and you’ve won big. If 
you confess your feelings and he’s not into you, you’ll probably have some 
mix of embarrassment that he turned you down but maybe also pride that 
you had the courage to take a risk. If you don’t confess your feelings but 
actually he is into you, you’ve missed a huge opportunity. And finally, if 
you don’t confess your feelings and he isn’t into you, you’ve dodged a 
bullet.  
 Third, you need to think about how good or bad the different costs and 
benefits are, relatively speaking. What’s worse: the embarrassment of 
getting turned down or missing out on the opportunity? Probably the 
missed opportunity is worse. Then again, if you’ve got a new crush every 
weekend, you’re incredibly sensitive about being rejected, and you have 
plenty of other interested suitors, maybe the embarrassment is worse. It’s 
going to vary from person to person, and what you ought to do will depend 
in part on how good or bad the different eventualities are for you.  
  Finally, you need to take into account the likelihood of each of the 
possible outcomes. Obviously, it makes a difference whether the chances 
that he likes you back are very good or very slim. If there’s virtually no 
chance that he’s into you, then it’s not worth the risk of embarrassment. If 
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it’s more or less certain he is into you—if he’s been sending you heart emojis 
all day and keeps winking at you across the room—then it’s not worth 
worrying about the insignificant chance of embarrassment.  
 Somehow or other, you weigh all these different factors and make a 
smart decision about what to do. In fact, you do this sort of thing all the 
time: deciding whether to lug around an umbrella all day when you’re not 
entirely sure if it’s actually going to rain; deciding whether to turn back 
when you remember you forgot to lock the front door and you’re already 
five minutes away; deciding whether to go see a certain movie when you’re 
not entirely sure if it’s going to be any good; and so on. And you do it 
without the help of a calculator and without having to write out a pro/con 
list. But there is a more rigorous way of thinking about such decisions, and 
it will prove to be a useful tool for thinking about them—and, in particular, 
for thinking about whether to believe in God. 
 
2.2 Expected Utility Calculations 
We can model the decision about talking to your crush by using a certain 
sort of “decision matrix”. The matrix will represent the options available to 
you (as rows), the possible outcomes (as columns), and the likelihood of 
each outcome. And it will use numerical values to represent your rankings 
of the different eventualities (that is, option/outcome pairs).  
 To make this a bit more concrete, let’s suppose that in the crush case that 
the eventualities are ranked from best to worst as follows (where a higher 
number represents a better eventuality):  
 
4: Confess your feelings and he’s into you 
3: Don’t confess your feelings and he’s not into you 
2: Confess your feelings and he’s not into you 
1: Don’t confess your feelings and he is into you  
 
And let’s suppose you think there’s about a 75% chance that he likes you 
back. Then the matrix would look like this: 
 
Matrix 2.2.1 
 He’s into you 
75% 




Confess your feelings 4 2 3.5 
Don’t confess your feelings 1 3 1.5 
 
 I’ve snuck in an extra column for expected utility. This is the column we’ll 
use to crunch the numbers, calculating what the smart choice is for you, 
given your preferences and the likelihoods of the different outcomes. Before 
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I explain where these numbers (3.5 and 1.5) are coming from, let me say 
something about how to think about these expected utilities. 
 In effect, the expected utility of an option tells you how well you’d do, 
on average, if you kept choosing that option over and over again. Imagine 
that you’re in an infinite loop. You choose an option, and then time rewinds 
and you choose that same option again and again—and 75% of the time he’s 
into you and 25% of the time he isn’t. The fact that confessing has an 
expected utility of 3.5 and not confessing has an expected utility of 1.5 tells 
you that on average you’d do a little over twice as well by repeatedly 
choosing to confess than by repeatedly choosing not to (since 3.5 is a little 
over twice as much as 1.5). And what that tells you is that the smart thing 
to do is confess your feelings. 
 But where exactly are these numbers coming from? To calculate the 
expected utility of a given option, you multiply the value of each possible 
outcome of the action by the likelihood of that outcome, and add together 
the results. Or put in terms of the rows and columns of Matrix 2.2.1: to 
calculate the expected utility of the top row, you multiply the value in the 
top row of the first column by the likelihood associated with that column, 
multiply the value in the top row of the second column by the likelihood 
associated with that column, and add them together. So, we get: 
 
 Confessing your feelings = (.75 x 4) + (.25 x 2) = 3.5 
 Don’t confess your feelings = (.75 x 1) + (.25 x 3) = 1.5 
 
The specific numbers themselves don’t have much significance. It’s not as 
if you get 3.5 “units” of happiness by confessing your feelings or anything 
like that. What matters is the relative differences between the expected 
utilities for different actions: the expected utility of telling your crush how 
you feel (3.5) is over two times as big as the expected utility of not telling 
him (1.5). 
 This gives us an argument for confessing your feelings: 
 
The Argument for Confessing Feelings 
(CF1) One should always choose the option with the greatest expected 
utility 
(CF2) Confessing your feelings has a greater expected utility than not 
confessing 
(CF3) So you should confess your feelings 
 
Premise CF1 is justified by the fact that, in ordinary cases like this, these 
decision matrices and expected utility calculations do such a good job of 
reflecting the rational thing to do in situations with uncertain outcomes. 
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And premise CF2 is reasonable to the extent that we have filled in the matrix 
correctly, ranking the eventualities and assigning probabilities to the 
outcomes in a sensible way.  
 There are two more things I want to point out about this model of 
decision-making before I (finally) bring us back around to the question of 
believing in God. First, although it doesn’t actually make a difference 
whether we use 1 and 4 or 10 and 40 for the lowest and highest score, what 
does make a difference is how large or small the numbers used in the 
rankings are relative to one another. By using 1 for the worst eventuality 
and 2 for the second-worst, that means that the worst-case scenario is only 
twice as bad as the second-worst. But sometimes the worst-case scenario is 
way worse than any other eventuality. Suppose for instance that you do 
very badly with humiliation, and that for you a rejection is about 100 times 
worse than a missed opportunity. We can represent that by using a 
weighted ranking, giving the eventuality of confessing and getting rejected 
a value that’s 100 times lower than the others: 
  
Matrix 2.2.2 
 He’s into you 
75% 





Confess your feelings 100 1 75.25 
Don’t confess your feelings 98 99 98.25 
 
 
Now, the expected utility of confessing is less than the expected utility of 
not confessing, and so the calculations tell us that you ought to hold your 
tongue—which is the right result if you really do take rejection that hard. 
 Second, I’ve obviously oversimplified the example by pretending that 
there are only two possible outcomes. Really, there are at least three 
different ways things could turn out: he’s into you, he’s not into you and he 
rejects you in front of everyone, or he’s not into you but he discreetly and 
privately rejects you. We can get more fine-grained about your options too: 
confess your feelings, flirt a little, or completely avoid him. Our model for 
decision-making can easily accommodate this simply by adding extra rows 
and columns to our decision matrix: 
 
Matrix 2.2.3 
 He’s into 
you 
--% 








Confess your feelings     
Flirt with him     
Avoid him     
 36 
 
All you have to do is figure out a weighted ranking of the different 
eventualities, estimate the likelihood of each of the different outcomes, 
crunch the numbers, see which option has the greatest expected utility, 
and—voilà!—now you know what you should do. 
 
3. The Expected Utility of Believing in God 
This same sort of reasoning from expected utilities can be put to work in an 
argument that you ought to believe in God:  
 
 The Argument for Betting on God 
(BG1) One should always choose the option with the greatest expected 
utility 
(BG2) Believing in God has a greater expected utility than not believing 
in God 
(BG3) So you should believe in God 
 
 Premise BG1—which is exactly the same as CF1 above—is justified by 
the fact that it is so sensible to rely on expected utility calculations in the 
sorts of ordinary examples considered above. If you thought the option 
with the greatest expected utility is the smart choice in all other cases, it 
would be weird and unprincipled to think it isn’t the smart choice in just 
this one case of deciding whether to believe in God. 
 To justify BG2, we have to construct the decision matrix. And that’s 
going to look something like this: 
 
 Matrix 3.0 
 God exists 
50% 
God doesn’t exist 
50% 
Expected Utility 
Believe in God ∞ 2 ∞ 
Don’t believe in God 1 3 2 
 
 Since we don’t know one way or the other whether God exists, I’ve 
assigned a probability of 50% to God existing and 50% to God not existing. 
I’ve given the lowest score (1) to the eventuality of not believing he exists 
when he in fact does, since that presumably means you’re going to hell. The 
second lowest (2) goes to the eventuality in which you do believe in God 
but he doesn’t exist, since in that case you’ve been wasting your time going 
to church, praying, and living an upstanding religious life. Slightly better 
(3) is being an atheist and being right about it, since then you get all the 
benefits of an atheist lifestyle (for instance skipping church) without any 
punishment at the end. Top score goes to the eventuality in which you 
believe in God and God does turn out to exist, and this gets a value of 
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infinity (∞) rather than 4, since the amount of pleasure and fulfillment you 
receive in an eternal afterlife in heaven is infinitely greater than what you 
get in any of the other eventualities. 
 We then calculate the expected utilities in just the way we did in section 
2.2. The calculation in the second row is straightforward arithmetic: (.5 x 1) 
+ (.5 x 3) = 2. As for the first row, the expected utility of believing in God = 
(.5 x ∞) + (.5 x 2). What’s (.5 x ∞)? In other words, how many things do you 
have left if you take infinitely many things and then remove half of them? 
Answer: ∞. (Take all the numbers and remove all the odd ones. You’re still 
left with infinitely many even numbers.) Now add 1 (that is, .5 x 2), and you 
still get ∞. After all, if you add one thing to infinitely many things, you still 
have infinitely many.    
 Finally, we need to compare the expected utilities of the two options. 
Which is greater: ∞ or 2? Obviously ∞. So, the expected utility of believing 
in God is greater than the expected utility of not believing in God. And 
that’s the argument for BG2. 
 
4. Challenging the Decision Matrix 
The argument for BG2 relies on a number of assumptions I made about how 
to fill in the decision matrix (Matrix 3.0): the range of possible options and 
outcomes, the likelihood of the different outcomes, and the relative 
goodness or badness of the different eventualities. Thus, one way of 
challenging BG2 is to insist that, in one way or another, I’ve constructed or 
filled in the decision matrix incorrectly. In this section, we’ll consider at a 
variety of different challenges of this kind. 
 But before turning to that, let me quickly dispense with a different line 
of objection, which some readers may find tempting. People sometimes 
object that the argument rests on some sort of conceptual error simply 
because it invokes the notion of infinity, and they say that it doesn’t make 
any sense to talk about infinity, or to compare infinite quantities with finite 
quantities, or something to that effect. But surely that’s not right. Suppose 
you’re choosing between two offers for free movie tickets. One gives you 
free entry to twenty movies. The other gives you limitless free entry: no 
matter how many times you go for free, you can always go for free again. 
Do you throw your hands up and say “How could I possibly decide?? It 
makes no sense to talk about limitless tickets!” No, you accept the second 
offer. And it makes perfect sense why you would: because the second offer, 
despite involving an infinite quantity, gives you more of a good thing than 




4.1 Wrong Probabilities 
One might complain that I’ve grossly overestimated the probability that 
God exists, by assuming that it’s a 50/50 chance that he exists. Perhaps you 
think it’s extremely unlikely that God exists. Surely, though, you’ll admit 
that it’s at least possible that God exists. If you die and are ushered into God’s 
presence, you’ll be surprised, but not in the way that you’d be surprised if 
you were ushered into the presence of something you think is genuinely 
impossible, like a round square.  
 So, let’s say it’s a 1% chance that God exists (though the response I’m 
about to give will work even if you think it’s a .00000001% chance). In that 
case, we need to update a couple of the boxes in the original decision matrix: 
 
 Matrix 4.1 
 God exists 
1% 




Believe in God ∞ 2 ∞ 
Don’t believe in God 1 3 2.98 
 
Changing the probabilities required us to change the expected utility of not 
believing in God. It shot up almost a whole point! But the expected utility 
of believing in God doesn’t change at all. Why is that? Let’s crunch the 
numbers. What’s .01 x ∞? In other words, what do you get when you have 
infinitely many things, and you take away 99 out of every 100 of them? 
Answer: ∞. Now add 1.98 (= .99 x 2) to that, and you get ∞. The expected 
utility of believing in God doesn’t change and is still greater than the 
expected utility of not believing in God. Thus, so long as there is some 
chance that God exists, however small it may be, the argument for BG2 still 
works. 
 
4.2 Belief Isn’t Enough 
You might object that believing in God isn’t all by itself enough to get into 
heaven. You might think that you also have to meet some further 
conditions, for instance that you led a good, moral life and followed God’s 
commandments. I might ask you how you know that, but then again you 
might ask me how I know that badly-behaved believers go to heaven. 
(Touché.) So, let me just grant the point for the sake of argument: only well-
behaved believers get into heaven. What that means is that the original 
decision matrix is inadequate, since it runs together two importantly 
different options: being a well-behaved believer and being a badly-behaved 
believer.  
 The fix is to expand our matrix so that each of these options has a row 





 God exists 
50% 




Believe in God and be good ∞ 3 ∞ 
Believe in God and be bad 2 4 3 
Don’t believe in God 1 5 3 
 
The new row introduces new eventualities, which means we have to redo 
the rankings. I gave a 1 to the eventuality in which you don’t believe in God 
and yet he does exist, and a 2 to being a badly-behaved believer, on the 
assumption that God will punish you for that too but will be a little more 
lenient since you at least believed in him. I’ve scored being an atheist in a 
Godless world (5) higher than being a badly-behaved believer in a Godless 
world (4), and I’ve ranked both ahead of the life of a well-behaved believer 
in a Godless world (3). Finally, the eventuality in which you’re a well-
behaved believer and God does exist gets ∞, since this is what will get you 
into heaven, and that’s infinitely better than any of the other eventualities. 
 So, what does this all mean? What it means is that—assuming that you 
have to be a well-behaved believer to get into heaven—being a well-
behaved believer has greater expected utility than either being a badly-
behaved believer or not believing in God at all. It’s still true, then, that the 
option with the greatest expected utility requires you to believe in God. So, 
we have not yet found a reason to reject BG2.  
 It may be that I haven’t gotten all the scores exactly right. Maybe I’m 
wrong, and God gives exactly the same punishment to both nonbelievers 
and badly-behaved believers. In that case, you could make it a tie and 
change the 2 in the first column to a 1. Or maybe I’m wrong that the life of 
an atheist in a Godless world is more rewarding than the life of a believer 
in a Godless world. Fine, we can lower the score for “God does not exist” 
in the bottom row. It doesn’t matter. The argument still goes through, since 
the expected utility of being a nonbeliever or a badly-behaved believer still 
comes out to be some finite number, whereas the expected utility of being 
a well-behaved believer will be infinite. 
 
4.3 Heaven is Finite 
The reasoning behind BG2 takes for granted that God rewards believers 
with something that’s infinitely valuable, for instance an eternal afterlife 
filled with an infinite amount of pleasure. But I haven’t offered any 
evidence or argument for that. For all we know, God rewards believers only 
with some finite amount of pleasure—maybe ten years in heaven. And one 
might object that this imperils the argument: if we can’t be sure that 
believers stand to receive something of infinite value, then there’s no 
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guarantee that the expected utility of believing will be infinite, and thus no 
guarantee that it will come out greater than the expected utility of disbelief. 
 But that’s the wrong way to look at it. Let’s just acknowledge that we 
can’t be sure whether God is generous and rewards believers with 
something of infinite value or whether God is stingy and rewards believers 
with something of finite value. That means that Matrix 3.0 is oversimplified, 
and that we need to expand the decision matrix to include three columns: 
one for the possibility of a generous God who offers infinite rewards, one 
for the possibility of a stingy God who offers only finite rewards, and one 
for the possibility that there’s no God. 
 
Matrix 4.3 









Believe in God ∞ 1,000,000 2 ∞ 
Don’t believe 1 1 3 2 
 
 
I’ve valued the eventuality in which you’re a believer and God turns out to 
be stingy at 1,000,000 to reflect the idea that it’s still many orders of 
magnitude better than the next best eventuality, in which you’re a 
nonbeliever and God doesn’t exist. Again, though, the exact values don’t 
really matter, nor do the exact probabilities. All that matters is the ∞ on the 
top left, since that’s going to ensure an infinite expected utility for believing 
in God. So, even if we can’t be sure that God rewards anyone with an 
infinitely valuable afterlife, we still get the result that we ought to believe 
in God.  
 
4.4 Many Gods to Choose From 
Let’s consider one last objection to BG2. You might worry that getting into 
heaven isn’t simply a matter of believing in God. You’ve got to believe in 
the right God. If the true God is the Christian God and you believe in Zeus 
(or vice versa), you’re going to hell. And the decision matrix can’t tell you 
which God is the right God to believe in. 
 I think that’s right. But it’s no objection to BG2. Once again, what this 
shows us is that Matrix 3.0 was oversimplified. We need additional rows 
reflecting the different gods we can choose to believe in, and additional 






 Matrix 4.4 









Christian God  
∞ 1 3 ∞ 
Believe in Zeus 1 ∞ 3 ∞ 
Don’t believe 2 2 4 3 
 
Once again, I’ve done my best to assign probabilities and score the non-
infinite eventualities, and once again it doesn’t much matter whether I’ve 
gotten it exactly right. And we can, if you like, expand the matrix to include 
more and more possible gods, but that shouldn’t affect the argument either.   
 What we get now is a tie for greatest expected utility. So that means that 
the objection under consideration is right as far as it goes: we aren’t told 
whether to believe in the Christian God or whether to believe in Zeus. But 
notice that believing in some God or other continues to have greater expected 
utility than not believing at all. So, the decision matrix still tells us that the 
greatest expected utility is attained by (and only by) believing that there is 
a God. So, there is no successful challenge to BG2 here.  
 
5. Is Belief Voluntary? 
I have examined a number of ways one might challenge my decision matrix, 
and in each case we’ve seen that the matrix can be modified without 
jeopardizing the Argument for Betting on God. I can’t claim to have 
surveyed every possible way of challenging the matrix, but we must stop 
somewhere, and I think that our success in handling the objections 
discussed above gives us reason to be optimistic that the argument can 
withstand further challenges to the matrix. But let us move on to an 
importantly different style of objection. 
 Suppose you find my reasoning entirely convincing. You decide that—
despite all of your many reasons for doubting that God exists—it’s time to 
start believing in God. You say to yourself: okay, believe!! Nothing changes, 
you still don’t believe in God. You clench your fists, furrow your brow, and 
try again: believe!!! Nothing changes. You still don’t believe in God. 
 What you’ve just discovered is that belief is not voluntary. You don’t get 
to decide what to believe in the way that you get to decide what to imagine 
or what to say. And that’s potentially a problem for the argument for two 
reasons. First, it threatens to make the argument ineffective: if the point of 
the argument is to get you to believe in God, then it can’t get the job done. 
Second, it threatens to undermine BG1. BG1 says you should always go 
with the option that has the greatest expected utility. But saying that you 
should do something implies that you can do it. Accordingly, if you can’t 
choose the option with the greatest expected utility—in this case, believing 
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in God—then it’s not true that you should choose it, in which case BG1 is 
false.  
 The problem with this objection is that furrowing your brow and trying 
really hard to believe something different isn’t the only possible way of 
changing your beliefs. By way of comparison, alcoholics can’t change 
whether they have intense cravings for alcohol merely by willing 
themselves to stop craving it. But what they can do is check themselves into 
rehab, steer clear of their old haunts and friends who may rekindle their 
drinking habit, join an AA program, and so on. 
 Similarly, changing your beliefs isn’t something you can do directly, on 
the spot, by merely willing it to be so. But if you want to change your mind 
about God, you can do so indirectly. Go to church, read some scripture and 
other religious literature, surround yourself with the smartest and most 
inspirational believers you can find, steer clear of clever atheists, and so on. 
It does sometimes happen that nonbelievers find the Lord. Figure out how 
they did it, and follow their lead. Changing what you believe may be 
difficult, but that doesn’t mean it can’t be done. 
 
6. Conclusion 
I have argued that, faced with a decision between believing in God and not 
believing in God, the smart choice—the one with the greatest expected 
utility—is to believe. I defended the idea that one should prefer the option 
with the greatest utility by showing that it yields the right result in 
everyday cases (like whether to confess your feelings to your crush). I then 
showed how the possibility of attaining something of infinite value ensures 
that belief in God has the greatest expected utility. And we saw that the 
argument is resilient: it still works even if we suppose it’s very unlikely that 
God exists, even if we grant that God only rewards well-behaved believers 
or may only reward believers with a finitely valuable afterlife, and even 




1. For all we know, disbelief in God or belief in the wrong God will result 
in being sent to hell and enduring something infinitely bad. How might 
the introduction of negative infinite values into the decision matrices 
affect the Argument for Betting on God? 
 
2. For all we know, God rewards only those who believe in him for 
wholesome reasons, and won’t reward those who believe in him purely 
out of a self-interested desire to get into heaven. Can this be used to 
underwrite an effective argument against BG2? 
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3. For all we know, there is no God but rather an evil deity who punishes 
believers and rewards atheists. Can this observation be used to challenge 
BG2? 
 
4. In section 4.4, we considered the objection that there are many Gods to 
choose from. Can that objection be strengthened by arguing that there 
are infinitely many Gods to choose from? 
 
5. Suppose that you are given the opportunity to enter a lottery to win an 
infinite amount of money. The thing is, there’s only a one-in-a-million 
chance of winning, and the cost of a lottery ticket is every last dollar you 
have in your bank account and all of your worldly possessions. Would 
it be rational to enter the lottery? If not, is that a problem for BG1? 
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Views and arguments advanced in this chapter are not necessarily endorsed by the 
author of the textbook, nor are they original to the author, nor are they meant to be 
consistent with arguments advanced in other chapters. Different chapters represent 
different philosophical perspectives. 
 
1. Introduction 
Do we ever do anything of our own free will? You might think it’s obvious 
that we do. It may seem obvious that your decision to read this chapter isn’t 
unfree in the way that, say, an action performed under hypnosis is. You 
thought about whether to start reading the chapter, you made the decision 
to read it, and then you did that very thing that you decided to do. What 
more could be required for your action to count as free? 
 In what follows, I will argue that more is needed for freedom and, 
moreover, nothing anyone ever does has what it takes to count as free. I 
admit that this is a radical thesis, with radical implications. For instance, 
our very practice of holding people morally responsible for their actions 
presupposes that those actions were performed freely. (You wouldn’t 
blame someone for kicking you when they’re under the control of a 
hypnotist.) Accordingly, my thesis that no one acts freely would seem to 
imply that no one should be held responsible for anything they do. But just 
because it’s a radical thesis with radical implications, that doesn’t mean it 
isn’t true. 
 I’ll present two arguments for my thesis that no one ever acts freely. The 
first turns on the idea that everything we do is a result of our desires, which 
are not under our control (sections 3-5). The second turns on the idea that 
everything we do is the inevitable result of things that happened long 
before we were even born (sections 6-9). Those who wish to stand by the 
intuitive idea that we do at least some things freely must find some flaw in 
each of the arguments. 
 
2. Freedom Unmotivated 
Before turning to my arguments that we never act freely, let me address—
and attempt to undermine—the powerful intuition that we do often act 
freely. As indicated above, we tend to think we act freely because many of 
our actions seem to have all of the marks of freedom: we examine our 
options, we decide what to do, and we do what we decided to do. To better 
assess this line of reasoning, let’s frame it as an explicit argument in defense 
of free action: 
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The Argument for Freedom 
(FR1) Sometimes you perform an action after deciding to perform that 
action 
(FR2) If one performs an action after deciding to perform it, then one 
performs that action freely 
(FR3) So some of your actions are performed freely 
 
 Premise FR1 is certainly true: we do make decisions, and often our 
actions line up with our decisions. And premise FR2 has its merits as well. 
You decided to read this chapter right now, and here you are reading this 
chapter. That seems like a free action, and FR2 correctly predicts that it’s a 
free action. But FR2 doesn’t imply that all actions are free. To see this, 
consider the following case (inspired by a scene from the movie Now You 
See Me): 
 
HYPNOTIC ACTION  
Tia is on the run from the law and knows the cops are hot on her trail. 
She is also a master hypnotist. As she passes Jordan on the street, she 
hypnotizes him and plants an irresistible post-hypnotic suggestion: 
whenever he hears someone shout Freeze! he will fall into a hypnotic 
trance and tackle the person who said it. Just then, Kabir the cop arrives 
on the scene, sees Tia, shouts Freeze!, and Jordan tackles him.  
 
Jordan never decided to tackle Kabir. He just fell into a trance, and when he 
emerged from the trance he found himself on top of Kabir pinning him to 
the ground. Certainly, Jordan’s action isn’t free: he didn’t freely tackle 
Kabir. FR2 doesn’t say that this action is free, and rightly so. Good job, FR2!  
 On closer inspection, though, it’s clear that FR2 cannot be correct. For 
consider a variant of HYPNOTIC ACTION, in which the hypnotist is not only 
in control of the person’s actions but also their decisions. 
 
HYPNOTIC DECISION  
Tia is on the run from the law and knows the cops are hot on her trail. 
She is also a master hypnotist. As she passes Colton on the street, she 
hypnotizes him and plants an irresistible post-hypnotic suggestion: 
whenever he hears someone shout Freeze! he will grow very angry with 
the person, decide to tackle them, and then tackle them. Just then, Kabir 
the cop arrives on the scene, sees Tia, and shouts Freeze! As a result of 
the hypnotic suggestion, Colton gets angry at Kabir, consciously decides 
to tackle him, and then tackles him. 
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Clearly, tackling Kabir isn’t something Colton did of his own free will. True, 
it may seem to him, from the inside, as if he was free to do otherwise. He 
may even experience regret, feeling that he could have and should have 
controlled his temper and decided against tackling Kabir. But, whether he 
realizes it or not, Tia’s hypnotic hold over him is so powerful that he 
couldn’t have decided otherwise. His will was not free nor was the action 
that sprung from it.  
 It’s true that the HYPNOTIC DECISION case is unrealistic. But that doesn’t 
stop it from being a counterexample to premise FR2. FR2 says that someone 
acted freely so long as they did what they decided to do, and Colton is a 
clear example of someone who isn’t acting freely despite doing exactly what 
they decided to do. Since FR2 is false, our ordinary reason for thinking that 
we sometimes act freely is undermined. (For a discussion of how unrealistic 
cases can be relevant for assessing philosophical claims, see section 7 of the 
Introduction.) 
 
3. The Desire Argument Against Free Action 
Colton’s action in HYPNOTIC DECISION isn’t free. But why not? The natural 
answer is that, although he made a choice and did what he wanted to do, 
his desires weren’t under his control: he wasn’t in control of the 
overwhelming desire to tackle Kabir. What this suggests is that freedom 
requires more than just making choices and doing what you desire to do. It 
requires that your desires be under your control as well. And this is the 
insight that drives the first of my two arguments against free action. The 
argument can be stated as follows: 
 
The Desire Argument 
(DS1) What you choose to do is always determined by your desires 
(DS2) You can’t control your desires 
(DS3) So, what you choose to do is always determined by something 
you can’t control 
(DS4) If what you choose to do is always determined by something you 
can’t control, then you never act freely 
(DS5) So, you never act freely 
 
By “desire”, I mean any kind of wanting, including passionately yearning 
for something, but also less dramatic things, like wanting to buy some more 
socks. Let us examine the idea behind each of the premises, and then I’ll 
turn to two ways that one might try to resist the argument. 
 Here is the idea behind DS1. You made a choice about what to have for 
lunch yesterday, and you chose to have Taco Bell rather than Panda 
Express. Why? Presumably, it’s because you had a stronger desire for 
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Mexican food than for Chinese. Or perhaps you decided to make a peanut 
butter and jelly sandwich for lunch. Why? Because your desire to save 
money was stronger than your desire for some delicious fast food. You 
make the choices you do because you have the desires you do, and when 
your desires come into conflict (for instance the desire to buy lunch and the 
desire to save money) you act on whichever desire is stronger. DS1 doesn’t 
say that you’ll act on every desire you have, just that the choices you make 
are always a function of the various things you want and how badly you 
want them.  
 To see the idea behind DS2, notice that we do not choose our desires. 
Perhaps you’re pre-med because you like helping people. But it’s not as if, 
at some point, you chose to like helping people. At some point you realized 
that this is your passion, and at some point you chose to pursue that 
passion, but at no point did you choose to be passionate about it. Nor did 
you at any point choose to like Mexican food better than Chinese food, or 
dogs better than cats. We don’t choose our likes and passions and desires; 
they come to us unbidden. So, it would seem that which desires we end up 
with is not the sort of thing that’s under our control. 
 The final premise, DS4, is motivated by our intuitions about HYPNOTIC 
DECISION. Even though Colton did choose to tackle Kabir (no one is denying 
that people make choices!), he didn’t choose to do so freely, and the best 
explanation for this is that his desire to tackle Kabir was not under his 
control. In other words, because his choices were being controlled by 
something (his desire) which was not itself under his control, his action is 
unfree. Generalizing from that: an action can’t be free if it’s controlled by 
something that’s not under one’s control. And that’s exactly what DS4 is 
saying.   
 Some will be tempted to reject DS4, insisting that even if your choices 
are determined by desires that are outside your control, they’re still your 
choices and your desires, and that’s enough to make them free. But 
HYPNOTIC DECISION shows why that’s a misguided response. It’s plain to 
see that Colton wasn’t acting freely when he tackled Kabir. And yet it’s true 
that he chose to tackle Kabir, as a result of his desire to tackle Kabir. So, the 
mere fact that one’s actions are the product of one’s own desires and one’s 
own choices is not enough to make those actions free.    
 Now that we have seen why the premises of the argument are at least 
initially plausible, let me address two important objections. According to 
the first, DS1 should be rejected because one’s strongest desires do not 
always win out. According to the second, DS2 should be rejected because 




4. The Argument from Undesired Actions  
A natural reaction to DS1 is to attempt to find cases in which one manages 
to overcome one’s strongest desires. Suppose your alarm goes off early in 
the morning, waking you up for your 8am class. Your bed is so cozy; your 
hangover, so vicious. There is no part of you that wants to get out of bed. 
And yet, somehow, you drag yourself out of bed and get to class. Is this not 
a counterexample to DS1?  
 It isn’t. The argument underlying this objection would have to go 
something like this: 
 
The Argument from Undesired Action 
(UA1) Your desire to stay in bed was stronger than your desire to get 
out of bed 
(UA2) If your desire to stay in bed was stronger than your desire to get 
out of bed, then what you choose to do is not always determined 
by your desires 
(UA3) So, what you choose to do is not always determined by your 
desires   
 
UA1 may well be true. It may well be that you have no desire at all to get 
out of bed. But UA2 is false. What’s true is that the desire to stay in bed isn’t 
overpowered by a desire to get out of bed. But you have other desires that 
overpower it, for instance the desire to get a good grade in the class. If not 
for that desire, you wouldn’t have gotten out of bed. So, in the end, this is 
just another case of your actions being determined by your desires. 
 Other putative counterexamples to DS1 fail for similar reasons. Maybe 
after reading section 3, just to (try to!) prove me wrong, you’ll make yourself 
a banana and toothpaste omelet for lunch, and eat the whole thing despite 
how disgusting it tastes. Does that show that your actions aren’t 
determined by your desires? No, it just shows that your desire to do 
something absurd and unpredictable is stronger than your desire to eat 
something tasty. Or maybe you’ll flip a coin to decide where to go for lunch: 
Panda Express if it’s heads, Taco Bell if it’s tails. It comes up heads and you 
go to Panda Express despite feeling more like Taco Bell. Does that show 
that something other than your desires is determining what you choose to 
do? No. All it shows is that your desire to honor the coin flip was stronger 
than your desire to eat what sounds tastiest.  
 One might still be worried about DS1. Suppose you’re at a job interview 
and your arm suddenly and randomly twitches, causing you to spill a glass 
of water all over your potential employer. You surely had no desire 
motivating you to do that. Doesn’t that show that what you do isn’t always 
determined by your desires? Indeed, it does. But that’s no problem for DS1. 
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DS1 doesn’t say that what you do is always determined by your desires. It 
says that what you choose to do is always determined by your desires. Since 
you didn’t choose to spill the water—it’s just something you did by 
accident—this is no counterexample to DS1. 
 
5. The Argument from Desire-Defeating Actions 
DS2 says that you cannot control your desires, which I motivated by 
pointing out that you don’t choose your desires. One might object that, just 
because you don’t choose your desires, that doesn’t mean that you have no 
control over them. I didn’t choose to have dark hair, but I do have control 
over whether I have dark hair. I can always dye it or shave my head. 
Likewise, even if I didn’t choose my desires, I can take steps to change them.  
 An example. Suppose that, for ethical reasons, I decide to become a 
vegetarian. Yet I have such an overwhelming desire for meat that I can’t 
stop myself from eating it. What’s a wannabe vegetarian to do? Here’s one 
thing I can do. I can force myself to sit through hours of horrific and 
disturbing videos of farm animals being mistreated and slaughtered. In 
time, I will have conditioned myself to be nauseated by meat and will lose 
the desire for it altogether. Or suppose that I have become addicted to some 
drug, and I want to kick the addiction. I can check myself into rehab until 
the desire for the drug subsides. In other words, even though I never 
initially chose to desire meat or drugs so strongly, I can change those desires 
by taking actions that lead me to have the desires I’d prefer to have.   
 Let’s call these actions that enable one to overcome one’s desires “desire-
defeating actions”. One could try to argue against DS2 on the grounds that 
we are able to control our desires by performing desire-defeating actions:  
 
The Argument from Desire-Defeating Action 
(DD1) Your desires can be changed by performing desire-defeating 
actions 
(DD2) If your desires can be changed by performing desire-defeating 
actions, then you can control your desires 
(DD3) So, you can control your desires 
 
 I find this argument unconvincing, and here’s why. In order to decide 
to perform a desire-defeating action, you have to want to perform it. If I had 
no desire to watch the videos to help curb my craving for meat, I wouldn’t 
have. More generally, whether you do end up choosing to performing a 
desire-defeating action is determined by whether you have a strong enough 
desire to perform that desire-defeating action.  
 To see why that’s a problem for the Argument from Desire-Defeating 
Action, forget about free will for a moment, and let’s just think about the 
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connection between ability and control.  Suppose I’m taking a ferry across 
the river, and I want to get to the other side quickly. There are two ferries—
one of which is much faster than the other—and there’s an attendant 
directing people onto the ferries. He puts some people on the fast ferry and 
some on the slow ferry, and no one has any say over which ferry he puts 
them on. Yes, it’s true is that I am able to get to the other side quickly if I 
get on the fast ferry. But it’s not up to me which ferry I take. That’s 
determined by the attendant, who I can’t control and who has complete 
control over which ferry I take. Since I have no control over whether I get 
on the fast ferry, I have no control over whether I get to the other side 
quickly. 
 An exactly parallel point holds for desire-defeating actions. What’s true 
that my desires can be changed by performing desire-defeating actions. (In 
other words, DD1 is true.) But it’s not up to me whether I perform the 
desire-defeating action. That’s determined by the strength of my desire to 
perform a desire-defeating action, which is something I don’t control and 
which has complete control over whether I perform it. Since I have no 
control over whether I perform desire-defeating actions, I have no control 
over the desires I’m trying to change. So DD2 is false, and the Argument 
from Desire-Defeating Action fails. 
 
6. Determinism 
That completes our discussion of my first argument against free action. My 
second argument against free action involves the thesis of determinism, and 
argues from the truth of determinism to the conclusion that no actions are 
free. I present the argument from determinism in section 7, I address some 
challenges to determinism in section 8, and I address some attempts to 
show that free action is compatible with determinism in section 9.  
 But I’m getting ahead of myself: what is determinism? Roughly put, the 
idea is that everything that’s happening now and that will happen in the 
future was already guaranteed to happen by things that happened in the 
distant past. Determinism can be stated more rigorously using the notion 
of physical necessitation. To say that one state of the universe physically 
necessitates some other state is to say that it is logically impossible for the 
one to occur without the other occurring, given what the laws of nature are. 
Determinism can then be formulated as the thesis that all present and future 
states of the universe are physically necessitated by states of the universe in 
the distant past (that is, before any of us were born). 
 To get a better sense of what determinism is saying, let’s look at an 
analogy. Consider the counting rhyme One Potato Two Potato, which can be 
used as a way of randomly selecting some person or thing: 
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One potato two potato 
Three potato four 
Five potato six potato 
Seven potato more 
 
Here’s how it works. You line some people up—let’s say, Blake, Garrett, 
and Jason, in that order—and you start the rhyme by pointing at Blake as 
you say “One”. Then each time you reach a word in bold, you advance to 
the next person. So, you move to Garrett on ‘two’, Jason on ‘three’, back to 
Blake on ‘four’, and so on until you reach ‘more’. And whichever person 
you’re pointing at on ‘more’ is the person you’ve randomly selected (it’s 
Garrett). 
 But wait: the procedure isn’t really random, is it? Run through it again 
(without moving the people around), and once again you end on Garrett. 
Do it a third time. Again, it’s Garrett. What you’re seeing is that the order 
of people and the rules of One Potato Two Potato together necessitate a 
unique outcome.  
 Determinism is making an analogous claim: past states of the universe 
and the laws of nature together necessitate a unique future. Just as with the 
counting rhyme, there is only one way for things to unfold given how 
things were at the outset and given the rules (the laws) that dictate how one 
state of the universe gives rise to the next. It won’t always be obvious in 
advance how things will unfold (just like with the counting rhyme). Even 
so, given how things were in the distant past and given the laws governing 
how earlier states give rise to later states, there is only one way for things 
to end up. Or so says determinism.  
 Before moving on to discuss how determinism is supposed to rule out 
free action, let me make two points of clarification about what determinism 
is not saying. First, there is sense in which according to determinism, 
everything that happens is “fated” to happen. It was already settled, long 
before you were born, that you would do the things you have done and 
would experience the things you have experienced. But when people say 
that something was fated to happen, they often mean that, if it hadn’t 
happened in the way it did, it would somehow have happened some other 
way. For instance, that if you and your boyfriend hadn’t randomly met in 
some late-night diner, the universe would have conspired for you to meet 
in some other way (because you were “fated” to be together). Determinism 
says nothing of the sort. What determinism says is that things couldn’t have 
happened in any other way than the exact way they did happen, given the 
laws of nature and the way things were in the distant past. 
 Here’s the second point of clarification. You may be wondering: which 
fact about the distant past is supposed to explain why (for instance) you 
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chose to wear a red shirt today rather than a blue shirt. But determinism 
isn’t making the absurd claim that we can pinpoint one specific thing that 
happened hundreds of years ago that fully explains why you decided to 
wear this shirt. Rather, the idea is that the entire state of the universe 
hundreds of years ago, with all of its mind-boggling complexity, physically 
necessitated the state of the universe this morning, which included you 
putting on that shirt. 
 The following analogy may be helpful. Imagine a pool table with billiard 
balls scattered all around it. And imagine that, like me, you’re a terrible 
pool player and your go-to strategy is just to hit the cue ball as hard as you 
can towards the biggest cluster of balls and hope that in all the chaos 
something ends up going in. Suppose your wish comes true: the cue ball 
hits the seven ball and the eleven ball, and the seven ball knocks the nine 
ball towards the pocket and the eleven ball knocks the two ball out of the 
way just in time for the nine ball to go in. Given how the balls were arranged 
on the pool table just before your shot, together with how hard you hit the 
ball, the nine ball was bound to go in (as long as there was no outside 
interference). But there is no one ball that was responsible for the nine ball 
going in. It isn’t just that the nine ball was placed here, or that the eleven 
ball was placed there, or that you were aiming the cue ball in that exact 
direction. It was all of these things taken together that guaranteed that the 
nine ball would go in, and any changes in any one of them would have 
changed the final outcome.   
 Likewise, determinism isn’t saying that there’s some one fact in the 
distant past we can identify that’s responsible for some decision you made 
today. Rather, the idea is that the universe is like a gigantic pool table with 
atoms crashing around in seemingly chaotic but actually lawfully guided 
ways, and that those laws guarantee that whole earlier states of the universe 
will give way to specific later states of the universe.  
 
7. The Argument from Determinism  
Perhaps you can already see how determinism is going to cause trouble for 
free action. But let’s make the argument explicit: 
 
The Argument from Determinism 
(DT1) Determinism is true 
(DT2) If determinism is true, then you are never able to do otherwise 
(DT3) If you are never able to do otherwise, then none of your actions 
are free 
(DT4) So, none of your actions are free 
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 In the previous section, I explained what determinism is. But I haven’t 
yet given you any reason to think it’s true. So why accept DT1? Here’s one 
reason. Suppose that you are taking a physics exam, which poses a question 
about a game of pool. The cue ball has just been struck and is headed 
towards the eight ball. You’re given complete information about the state 
of the pool table immediately following the shot: the masses and positions 
of the various balls, the velocity of the cue ball and the direction it’s 
traveling, the dimensions of the table, the size of the pockets, and so on. The 
question is whether the eight ball will go in the pocket.  
 This is a fair question. With some effort, you can use the laws of physics 
and information about the balls and the table to calculate whether the shot 
is successful. But the question is fair, it would seem, only if determinism is 
true. For if the laws of physics together with the initial state of the table 
don’t determine whether the ball will go in—if things could go either way, 
as far as physics is concerned—then there would be no way to tell, even in 
principle, whether the eight ball will go in. 
 DT2 says that if determinism is true, then “you are never able to do 
otherwise”. What that means is that, for any given thing that you’ve done, 
you couldn’t have done anything other than that very thing. Suppose that 
yesterday you were choosing between Taco Bell and Panda Express, and 
you ended up going to Taco Bell. It might seem like you could have gone to 
Panda Express; you just didn’t go there. In other words, it might seem as if 
you were, in that moment, able to do something other than what you in fact 
did. What DT2 is saying is that, if determinism is true, then that’s not so. In 
that moment, you couldn’t have done anything other than go to Taco Bell.  
 Why accept DT2? The idea is that, if determinism is true, then all of your 
actions are consequences of things that you are powerless to change—the 
laws of nature and the distant past—which in turn means that the actions 
themselves are things you are powerless to change.  
 How about DT3? Here, the idea is that acting freely requires having 
multiple courses of action available to you and being able to choose among 
them. Yet if those courses of action you didn’t take weren’t really available 
you—if in truth you couldn’t have done anything other than what you in 
fact did—then your action wasn’t free after all. 
 Any one of these premises can be resisted. So, let’s consider each of them 
in turn.   
 
8. On Rejecting Determinism 
As its name suggests, the Argument from Determinism is premised on the 
assumption that determinism is true. Here I’ll consider two things that one 
might say in order to challenge that assumption: first that mental events are 
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exempt from determination by the laws of nature and distant past, and 
second that there is genuine randomness in the universe. 
 I can imagine someone insisting that determinism is true only when 
restricted to its proper domain: the physical world. What’s true is that 
physical states of the universe in the distant past physically necessitate all 
present and future physical states of the universe. But, the idea goes, they 
don’t physically necessitate present and future nonphysical states of the 
universe, like decisions and other mental states. 
 It’s hardly obvious that mental states aren’t physical states (aren’t they 
just brain states?), but, for the sake of the argument, let’s just grant that 
mental states are nonphysical. Still, this is not enough to block the argument 
from determinism. For the envisaged objector agrees that determinism still 
applies to all physical events, which includes everything that happens in 
and to our physical bodies. However, if everything that our bodies do is 
determined, then, by the same reasoning given above, our bodies are never 
able to do otherwise than what they in fact do. In that case, nothing we do 
with our bodies is done freely. But everything we do (other than thinking) is 
something we do with our bodies. So, we still get the result that virtually 
nothing anyone does is done freely, including everyday actions like going 
to Taco Bell for lunch or going for a morning run. 
 A different way of challenging DT1 is to insist that even the physical 
world isn’t governed by deterministic laws, because there is genuine 
randomness in the universe. Indeed, the view that the physical universe is 
nondeterministic arguably draws support from one of our best confirmed 
physical theories, quantum mechanics, which is standardly interpreted as 
saying that some things happen just as a matter of chance and that the laws 
of nature to some extent leave open what will happen next. But if there is 
genuine randomness in the physical universe (not just the apparent 
randomness you get with One Potato Two Potato), then determinism is false: 
the laws of nature don’t guarantee that a specific future will result from past 
physical states. 
 Perhaps one could challenge quantum mechanics, though that seems 
unwise, especially for those of us who don’t have a Ph.D. in physics. More 
modestly, one could challenge the standard, indeterministic interpretation 
of quantum mechanics (the “Copenhagen” interpretation), and argue for 
one of the alternative, deterministic interpretations (like the “many-
worlds” interpretation). But I’m not going to do either of those things. In 
fact, let’s just grant the point. Suppose that there is genuine randomness in 
the universe. Suppose DT1 is false. Still, it’s a shallow victory, since it’s hard 
to see how randomness is supposed to vindicate free action.  
 To see why, let’s suppose it was a matter of chance that you decided to 
read this chapter right now. Let’s say there was a 30% chance that you’d 
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decide to read the chapter, a 25% chance you’d decide to go for a walk, and 
a 45% chance that you’d decide to take a nap, and that for no further reason 
than that—just as a random fluke—you ended up deciding to read rather 
than nap or walk. That doesn’t sound like freedom to me! Think of it this 
way. If you were to rewind time to the moment just before you decided to 
read this chapter, over and over again a hundred times, then you’d do the 
reading about 30 times, nap about 45 times, and go for a walk about 25 
times. It’s completely random that, in this actual timeline, you decided to 
read. But if it was a random occurrence, then it wasn’t in any sense up to 
you or under your control whether to read or nap or walk. And actions that 
aren’t up to you or under your control aren’t free. 
What this suggests is that, surprisingly, our actions are unfree whether 
or not they’re determined. We can use this insight to fortify the argument 
from determinism, doing away with the assumption that determinism is in 
fact true: 
 
The Doomed Regardless Argument 
(DM1) If an action is determined to happen, then you couldn’t have 
done otherwise  
(DM2) If you couldn’t have done otherwise, then the action is not free 
(DM3) So, if an action is determined, then it is not free 
(DM4) If an action happens randomly, then it is not free 
(DM5) Every action you perform is either determined to happen or 
happens randomly 
(DM6) So, none of your actions are free   
 
We have already seen the motivation behind most of the premises, so I can 
be brief. The idea behind DM1 is that if an action is determined, then you 
have no control over the factors that are controlling your action (namely, 
the laws and distant past). The idea behind DM2 is that freedom requires a 
genuine ability to choose among different courses of action. The idea 
behind DM4 is that, if it was just a random matter of chance that you did 
what you did, then it was not up to you whether you did it. DM5 says that 
all actions are either random ones or determined ones, and indeed it is hard 
to see what middle ground there could be. If something is undetermined 
then nothing guarantees that it happens, in which case it must be a matter 
of chance that it happened. DM6 follows from these four premises: since 
there are only the two categories of actions, and actions belonging to either 





What we have seen is that it is no use trying to resist the Argument from 
Determinism by rejecting determinism, since I can always shift to the 
Doomed Regardless Argument. Indeed, what we have just seen is that free 
action might require determinism, since undetermined random actions can 
never be free. Thus, one might be tempted by a different strategy, a 
compatibilist strategy, which grants the truth of determinism (DT1) but 
insists that free action is actually entirely compatible with determinism.  
 Don’t get too excited. A compatibilist still has to find some premise to 
deny in the Argument from Determinism (as well as the Doomed 
Regardless Argument). Here again is the argument: 
 
The Argument from Determinism 
(DT1) Determinism is true 
(DT2) If determinism is true, then you are never able to do otherwise 
(DT3) If you are never able to do otherwise, then none of your actions 
are free 
(DT4) So, none of your actions are free 
 
The compatibilist does not deny DT1. So, she has to reject either DT2 or 
DT3. Let’s consider the prospects of each of these options. 
 
9.1 The Consequence Argument 
The idea behind DT2 was that, if determinism is true, then all of your 
actions are consequences of things that you are powerless to change—the 
laws of nature and the distant past—which in turn means that the actions 
themselves are things you are powerless to change. Let’s break down this 
line of reasoning. 
 
The Consequence Argument  
(CQ1) If determinism is true, then what you do is always a consequence 
of the laws of nature and the distant past  
(CQ2) You have no control over the laws of nature or the distant past 
(CQ3) So, if determinism is true, then what you do is always a 
consequence of things over which you have no control  
(CQ4) If what you do is always a consequence of things over which you 
have no control, then you are never able to do otherwise 
(DT2) So, if determinism is true, you are never able to do otherwise  
 
 The idea behind CQ1 is that, given determinism, everything that is 
happening and will happen is physically necessitated by events in the 
distant past, and what your body and brain do is no exception. Notice that 
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CQ1 is not saying that determinism is true. Nor is it saying that what you 
do is always a consequence of the laws of nature and the distant past. 
Rather, it’s drawing a conceptual connection between two things: if 
everything is determined by the laws and the distant past then everything 
you do is determined by the laws and the distant past. By analogy, suppose 
that Jiacong is on trial for burglary. Even if you think that Jiacong isn’t 
guilty and shouldn’t go to jail, you could still agree that if Jiacong is guilty 
then he should go to jail. Likewise, even if you reject determinism, you could 
(and should) still accept CQ1.  
 CQ2 is certainly true as well: try as you might, you can’t change the 
physical laws and you can’t change what happened before you were born. 
Perhaps you could if you had a time machine but, alas, you don’t. 
 To see why CQ4 is true, imagine that I’ve got you by the wrists, and I’m 
hitting you with your own fists and taunting you: “Stop hitting yourself! 
Stop hitting yourself!” Why is that so upsetting? Because I have 
overpowered you, and you can’t stop hitting yourself. You can’t do 
otherwise. And why is that? Because you have no control over that which 
is determining what you’re doing (namely, me). Generalizing: if you never 
have control over the things that determine what you do, then you could 
never have done otherwise than what you in fact did. 
 
9.2 Freedom without Options 
The case for DT2 seems airtight: clearly, you can never do otherwise if 
everything you do is a consequence of things that lie outside your control. 
That means that compatibilists will have to deny DT3. But how could 
anyone deny DT3? How could an action be free if you had no choice but to 
perform that action? 
 To see how this is possible, the compatibilist might invoke a hypnosis 
case of her own.  
 
HYPNOTIC BACKUP  
Tia the master hypnotist is on the run from the law and hires Clay to 
tackle any cop who turns up. Concerned that Clay might betray her, Tia 
gives Clay an irresistible post-hypnotic suggestion to tackle any cop he 
sees, but which will kick in only if she triggers it by shouting 
Abracadabra! When Kabir the cop arrives on the scene, Tia keeps a 
watchful eye on Clay to see if he’s going to back out. But Clay comes 
through: he decides to tackle Kabir all on his own, without Tia having 




Here is how this case is supposed to help the compatibilist. Notice that Clay 
could not have done otherwise. He’s either going to decide on his own to 
tackle Kabir, or he’s going to decide not to in which case Tia will trigger the 
irresistible post-hypnotic suggestion forcing him to tackle Kabir. Either way 
he tackles Kabir. But the mere fact that he couldn’t have done otherwise 
doesn’t stop us from holding him responsible for what he did. That fact by 
itself doesn’t convince us that tackling Kabir is something he didn’t do 
freely. After all, as it happens neither his decision nor his action was the 
result of hypnosis (although the tackling would have been the result of 
hypnosis had he shown signs of backing out). What this suggests is that the 
mere inability to do otherwise isn’t by itself reason to think that an action is 
unfree. Accordingly, the compatibilist might say, we have no good reason 
to accept DT3. 
 Even I have to admit that this is a clever objection. But ultimately the 
argument can be revised so as to sidestep this case. To see how, let me first 
try to diagnose our reaction to HYPNOTIC BACKUP. When we think about the 
tackling, we are inclined to hold Clay responsible and think that being 
prevented from doing otherwise didn’t prevent him from acting freely. 
Why are we so inclined? Because we think it was at least up to him whether 
to decide to tackle Kabir. Since he could have decided not to tackle Kabir, 
and since he did decide to tackle Kabir, we are open to thinking of the 
tackling as something he did freely.  
 But if determinism is true, then not only your actions but also your (and 
Clay’s) decisions are determined. With this in mind, we can revise the 
Argument from Determinism as follows: 
 
The Argument from Determined Decision 
(DT1) Determinism is true 
(DT2*) If determinism is true, then you are never able to decide to do 
otherwise 
(DT3*) If you are never able to decide to do otherwise, then none of your 
actions are free 
(DT4) So, none of your actions are free 
 
DT2* is just as plausible as DT2: if determinism is true then everything 
about you, including what goes on in your brain, is determined by factors 
outside your control. And DT3* is no longer threatened by HYPNOTIC 
BACKUP. As I said, HYPNOTIC BACKUP gives us reason to reject DT3 only 
insofar as we were thinking that Clay could have decided not to tackle 
Kabir. In order to challenge DT3*, we’d need to change the case so that Clay 
couldn’t even have decided not to tackle Kabir. But when we revise the case 
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in that way, our sense that he may still have been acting freely vanishes 
altogether. 
 
10. Freedom and Responsibility 
I have provided two arguments against the seemingly obviously claim that 
people sometimes act freely. The first turned on the assumption that our 
actions are determined by our desires, and the second turned on the 
assumption that our actions are determined by the laws of nature together 
with events that long preceded our births. Either way, our actions are 
determined by something over which we have no control, which, I have 
argued, suffices to show that no one ever acts freely. 
 At this point, you may be wondering whether it really even matters 
whether our actions are free. Of course it does! If nothing we do is under 
our control and no one ever does anything freely, then no one is ever 
morally responsible for what they do (just as no one is responsible for things 
they do when they are in a hypnotic trance). Nor does anyone genuinely 
deserve praise or blame for anything they do. Truly appreciating the 
arguments of this chapter requires drastically rethinking our assessments 
of people and their actions.  
 If no one is responsible or blameworthy for the things that they do, does 
it mean that no one should ever be punished for wrongdoing? Not 
necessarily. What’s true is that people should not be punished because they 
deserve it or because they’re to blame for what they’ve done. But it still 
makes good sense to punish people—and to threaten would-be criminals 
with punishment—to the extent that this has a positive effect on their 
behavior. In a world without free will, punishment must be seen as 
“forward-looking” as opposed to “backwards-looking”. We should punish 
people because punishment (and the threat thereof) has certain desirable 




1. Can the Argument from Undesired Actions be defended against the 
sorts of objections I raise in section 4? Are there better examples of 
undesired actions, which escape my objections?  
 
2. Can the Argument from Desire-Defeating Action be defended against 
the objections I raised at the end of section 5?   
 
3. Premise DM5 of the Doomed Regardless Argument (section 8) says that 
every action is either determined to happen or random. Is there really 
no middle ground? 
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4. At the end of section 9, I said that the HYPNOTIC BACKUP case cannot be 
revised to serve as a counterexample to DT3* of the Argument from 
Determined Decisions. Is that true?   
 
Sources 
Both the Desire Argument and the Argument from Determinism can be 
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consequence argument in section 9.1 is drawn from Peter van Inwagen’s 
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Responsibility”. For discussion of whether quantum mechanics is at odds 
with determinism, see Tim Maudlin’s “Distilling Metaphysics from 
Quantum Physics”. Here are some additional resources:  
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Alternative Possibilities 
• J. Ayer: Freedom and Necessity 
• Gregg Caruso: The Dark Side of Free Will 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rfOMqehl-ZA&vl 
• Clarence Darrow: Crime and Criminals (Address to the Prisoners in 
the Chicago Jail) 
• John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Manuel Vargas, and Derk 
Pereboom: Four Views on Free Will 
• Meghan Griffith: Free Will: The Basics 
• R.E. Hobart: Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable 
Without It 
• David Hume: Of Liberty and Necessity 
• Kristin M. Mickelson: The Manipulation Argument 
• Adina Roskies: Neuroscientific Challenges to Free Will and 
Responsibility 
• Peter van Inwagen: The Powers of Rational Beings 




You Know Nothing 
 
Views and arguments advanced in this chapter are not necessarily endorsed by the 
author of the textbook, nor are they original to the author, nor are they meant to be 
consistent with arguments advanced in other chapters. Different chapters represent 
different philosophical perspectives. 
 
You probably think you know all sorts of things about the world. You know 
when your earliest class starts tomorrow and when you’ll need to set your 
alarm in order to make it on time. You know that it will be colder on average 
in February than in August, and that the sun will rise and set tomorrow. 
You know who the president is, you know where your family lives, you 
know where you celebrated your last birthday, you know some trivia—like 
the capital of Alaska—and you know some immediately obvious things, 
like that you’re reading a book right now.  
 I will argue that you don’t know any of these things. My aim will be to 
show that you don’t know anything about “the world”, by which I mean 
the external physical world. I won’t try to argue that you don’t know 
anything about your own internal states—like thoughts and feelings—nor 
will I try to argue that you don’t know anything about nonphysical things 
like numbers, for instance that 1+1=2. (The title of the chapter admittedly 
overstates things a bit.) I’ll begin by arguing that you don’t know what the 
world will be like in the future, not even one moment from now (sections 
1-4). Then I’ll argue that you don’t even know what the world is like 
presently, not even what’s happening right in front of you (sections 5-9). 
 
1. Skepticism about the Future 
My first skeptical argument begins with the observation that if we know 
anything about the world, it would have to be in one of two ways. The first 
way is by direct observation. This is just what it sounds like: using your sense 
organs to obtain information that’s immediately available to you. That 
would be how you know that you’re holding a book (or a laptop) in your 
hands right now, that you’re wearing a bracelet, that the room smells like 
grandma for some reason, and so on.  
 But not everything we take ourselves to know about the world can be 
known on the basis of direct observation. Here’s an example. You wake up 
in the morning, look out the window, and see that everything is wet: the 
trees are dripping, the lawn is soaked, there are puddles in the street, and 
so on. You conclude that it rained overnight. But you didn’t directly observe 
it raining. Rather, you infer that it rained from things that you’ve directly 
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observed in the past. In the past, you’ve observed this sort of watery result 
being caused by rain falling from the sky. So, you draw the seemingly 
plausible inference that that’s how it happened this time.  
 This sort of reasoning is what’s called an induction: reasoning from the 
fact that certain things you’ve directly observed are always or usually a 
certain way to the conclusion that certain things you haven’t directly 
observed are that way too. Inductive reasoning isn’t foolproof. It’s possible 
that a plane dropped all that water to put out a fire, and that’s why 
everything is soaked. But the mere fact that induction can sometimes lead 
us astray doesn’t (by itself) show that it’s irrational to rely on it.  
 Our beliefs about how the world will be in the future are likewise based 
on induction. You expect the sun to set in the west tomorrow. Why? 
Because every time you’ve observed the sun set, it has set in the west. Or 
maybe you’re some kind of nerd and you believe the sun will set in the west 
tomorrow on the basis of laws of planetary motion. But why think those 
same laws of planetary motion will be in effect tomorrow? Presumably, it’s 
because they’ve always been in effect in the past.  
 Now that we have a handle on what induction is, let’s get to the 
argument. The argument is going to turn on the status of a certain principle, 
which I’ll call the Future Like Past principle, or FLP for short: 
 
(FLP) Future states of the world will be like past states of the world 
 
The argument, in short, is that we can’t know anything about the future 
because we’re not justified in believing FLP, that is, we have no good reason 
to believe that FLP is true.  
 Using your belief that the sun will set in the west tomorrow as an 
illustration, the argument runs as follows: 
 
Against Knowing the Future 
(KF1) If you are not justified in believing that FLP is true, then your 
belief that the sun will set in the west tomorrow is unjustified 
(KF2) You are not justified in believing that FLP is true 
(KF3) So, your belief that the sun will set in the west tomorrow is 
unjustified  
(KF4) If your belief that the sun will set in the west tomorrow is 
unjustified, then you don’t know that the sun will set in the west 
tomorrow 
(KF5) So, you don’t know that the sun will set in the west tomorrow 
 
I’ll explain the rationale behind KF1 and KF2 in the following two sections. 
(Though you may find it worthwhile to pause for a moment right now and 
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ask yourself: what reason do you have for believing FLP?) As for KF4, the 
idea is that being justified in believing something—having good reason for 
believing it—is a bare minimum requirement for counting as knowing it. 
For instance, if you think that there are sparrows in Australia, but this is 
just a guess and you don’t actually have any evidence that there are, then 
you obviously don’t know that there are sparrows in Australia, even if you 
happen to have guessed right. 
 
2. What it Takes to Know the Future 
Premise KF1 says that your belief that the sun will rise tomorrow is justified 
only if you have good reason to think that that FLP is true. Here’s the 
argument for that premise: 
 
The Faulty Foundation Argument 
(FF1) Your belief that the sun will set in the west tomorrow is based on 
FLP 
(FF2) If a belief is based on something that you aren’t justified in 
believing, then that belief itself is unjustified 
(KF1) So, if you are not justified in believing that FLP is true, then your 
belief that the sun will set in the west tomorrow is unjustified 
 
 To see the idea behind FF1, let’s again ask: why do you believe that the 
sun will set in the west tomorrow? You infer it from the fact that in the past 
it has always set in the west. But, implicitly, the inference relies on FLP. In 
other words, you’re at least implicitly running through a line of reasoning 
something like this: 
 
In the past the sun has always set in the west  
Future states of the world will be like past states of the world 
So, tomorrow the sun will set in the west 
 
Likewise for your belief that eating that whole McDonalds extra value meal 
is going to make you sleepy.  
 
In the past eating an entire extra value meal always made me sleepy 
Future states of the world will be like past states of the world 
So, eating this entire extra value meal will make me sleepy 
 
Implicitly or explicitly, you arrive at all your beliefs about future states of 
the world in this way.  
I don’t mean to suggest that we treat FLP as a hard and fast rule. No 
one thinks that the future will be like the past in every respect. We wouldn’t 
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use it to infer that there will never be flying cars or a cure for cancer. The 
principle we actually rely on in our reasoning is more nuanced, perhaps 
something like this: 
  
(FLP*) Future states of the world will be like past states of the world 
except in respects in which we can expect them to differ 
 
These complications needn’t concern us here. All I need for the argument 
for FF1 is that we always rely on some principle like this in our reasoning 
about the future, and that much seems indisputable. You can feel free to 
replace FLP with FLP*—or whichever other inductive principle you 
prefer—in the arguments below.  
 How about FF2? The idea there is that a justified belief can’t be built on 
a faulty foundation: if your reasons for believing something are no good, 
then that belief itself is no good. To help see this, consider the following 
case: 
 
POWER POSE  
Jared is getting ready for a job interview, and thinks it will help his 
chances if he spends five minutes “power posing”. When his fiancée 
Ashley asks him why he thinks that will help, Jared tells her that 
scientists have shown that power posing releases performance-
enhancing hormones into your bloodstream. Skeptical, Ashley does 
some Googling and informs Jared that the power-posing study has been 
completely discredited and is now widely regarded as “pseudo-
science”. 
 
When Jared finds out that the study has been discredited, that renders his 
belief that power posing releases performance-enhancing hormones 
unjustified. But if that belief is unjustified, then any belief based on it is 
going to be unjustified as well. It would obviously be irrational for Jared to 
go on believing that power posing will help him in the interview once he 
admits that he has no good reason to believe that power posing releases 
performance-enhancing hormones. That’s the idea behind FF2.  
  
3. Why Believe the Future Will Be like the Past? 
What we have just seen is that your belief about tomorrow’s sunset is 
justified only if you’re justified in believing FLP, the Future Like Past 
principle. That means that, if I can establish that you’re not justified in 
believing FLP, it follows that your beliefs about tomorrow’s sunset aren’t 
justified either. So, let’s turn now to KF2, which says that you indeed aren’t 
justified in believing FLP.  
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 The idea behind KF2 is that there are only two possible ways for a belief 
in FLP to be justified, and it isn’t justified in either of those ways. Here is 
the argument: 
 
FLP is Unjustified 
(UJ1) If your belief in FLP is justified, then it is either justified by direct 
observation or by inductive reasoning 
(UJ2) Your belief in FLP isn’t justified by direct observation 
(UJ3) Your belief in FLP isn’t justified by inductive reasoning 
(KF2) So, your belief in FLP is unjustified 
 
I’ll quickly explain why we should accept UJ1 and UJ2, and then in section 
4 we’ll turn to UJ3.  
 Why accept UJ1? You might worry that direct observation and inductive 
reasoning aren’t the only possible sources of justification. For instance, your 
beliefs about your own mental life—that you’re having certain thoughts 
and feelings right now—aren’t based on any inference (inductive or 
otherwise) and also aren’t based on direct observation (using your sense 
organs). Rather, they seem to have some further source of justification, as 
do beliefs about nonphysical things like numbers (e.g., that 3+4=7).  
 I don’t deny that there are other possible sources of justification, for 
instance introspection or mathematical intuitions. Still, it is hard to see what 
other than direct observation and induction could justify the beliefs I am 
targeting here, namely beliefs about the external physical world. Introspection 
and mathematical intuitions can tell you about internal states like thoughts 
and feelings and nonphysical things like numbers, but they don’t by 
themselves tell us anything about the external physical world. (Of course, 
they can tell you something about the external world when combined with 
direct observation. For instance, if you saw three slices of pizza, and then 
you see two of them get eaten, mathematical intuition, together with these 
direct observations, can tell you that there’s one slice left.) And since FLP is 
a claim about the external physical world—it tells us that future physical 
states of the external world resemble past physical states of the external 
world—a belief in FLP would have to be justified by direct observation or 
inductive inference. Just as UJ1 says. 
 To see the idea behind UJ2, notice that FLP is a claim about similarity. 
It’s claiming that two things (the past and the future) are similar to one 
another. Plausibly, in order for direct observation to justify you in believing 
that two things are similar, you have to be able to directly observe both of 
them. But you can’t directly observe the future. (Maybe you could if you 
had a time machine but, drat, you don’t.) So, you can’t be justified in 
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believing that the future will be like the past on the basis of direct 
observation. That’s UJ2. 
 
4. No Inductive Argument for FLP 
All that remains to be done is to defend UJ3. If I can show that it’s true—
that FLP can’t be justified by inductive inference—then we have a well-
motivated argument that your belief in FLP isn’t justified, and an argument 
from there to the conclusion that you don’t know that the sun will set in the 
west tomorrow. The idea behind UJ3 is that any inductive justification for 
FLP would be circular, and circularity is bad. Unpacking that a bit:  
  
The Anti-Circularity Argument 
(AC1) All inductive reasoning about the future assumes the truth of FLP 
(AC2) If all inductive reasoning about the future assumes the truth of 
FLP, then any inductive reasoning about FLP is circular 
(AC3) No belief can be justified by circular reasoning  
(UJ3) So, FLP isn’t justified by inductive reasoning 
 
Let’s take it one premise at a time. 
 The case for AC1 is the same as the case for premise FF1 of the Faulty 
Foundation Argument. All inductive reasoning about what’s going to 
happen in the future either explicitly or at least implicitly relies on FLP. In 
the past the sun has set in the west, and future states of the world will be 
like past states of the world, so in the future it’ll set in the west. The laws of 
planetary motion have always been this way in the past, and future states 
of the world will be like past states of the world, so in the future they’ll be 
like this. In the past, beer before liquor makes you sicker, and the future 
states of the world will be like past states of the world, so… you get the 
idea. All of these lines of reasoning rely on FLP. That’s what AC1 says. 
 AC2 involves the notion of circularity. A circular line of reasoning is one 
whose conclusion also appears as a premise of that reasoning. To see the 
idea behind AC2, suppose it’s true that inductive reasoning about future 
states of the world always assumes the truth of FLP. Well, FLP itself is about 
future states of the world: it says that future states are going to be like past 
states. So, it follows that inductive reasoning about FLP assumes the truth 
of FLP. In other words, FLP will be both a premise and the conclusion of 
that line of reasoning, thus qualifying as circular.  
 To illustrate, the inductive defense of induction might look something 




In the past, each day greatly resembled the day that preceded it 
Future states of the world will be like past states of the world 
So, future days will resemble days in the past 
 
The conclusion of this line of reasoning, “Future days will resemble days in 
the past,” is just another way of saying “Future states of the world will be 
like past states of the world”, which is the second premise of the reasoning. 
That means that you’ve got one and the same claim showing up both as a 
premise and as the conclusion of the reasoning. That fits our definition of 
circularity. 
 As for AC3, it’s easy to see that circular reasoning is terrible reasoning. 
As an illustration, consider the following case, involving a Magic 8-Ball toy 
(which randomly displays answers like “Yes”, “No”, and “Maybe” when 
you shake it up): 
 
MAGIC 8-BALL  
Madhu shakes up his Magic 8-Ball, asks whether Smitha has a crush on 
him, and it issues its verdict: yes. Madhu’s excitement lasts only for a 
moment, as he suddenly realizes that he has no reason to believe that 
the 8-ball can be trusted. So, he decides to check. He shakes up the 8-
Ball, asks it whether it can be trusted, and it issues its verdict: yes. “That 
settles it,” Madhu thinks to himself, “the 8-ball can be trusted, and 
Smitha does have a crush on me!” 
 
Obviously, Madhu’s reasoning here is deeply problematic. The first time he 
shakes up the toy, he reasons from it said she has a crush on me to she does have 
a crush on me, implicitly relying on the assumption that the 8-Ball can be 
trusted—which he has no good reason to assume. The second time he 
shakes it up, he reasons from it said it can be trusted to it indeed can be trusted, 
again relying on the assumption that he can trust what it says. The first time 
was bad enough, since the assumption was unfounded. The second time is 
even worse, and the natural diagnosis of why that line of reasoning is so 
bad is that it’s circular: the 8-ball can be trusted appears both as the conclusion 
and as a premise of Madhu’s reasoning. Surely you can’t be justified in 
believing anything on the basis of reasoning like that. And that’s just what 
AC3 is saying.  
 This concludes my argument that you don’t know that the sun will set 
in the west tomorrow. But the example of tomorrow’s sunset was chosen 
more or less at random. I could have chosen virtually any belief you have 
about the future and used the same reasoning to show that it is justified 
only if your belief in FLP is justified. Accordingly, if KF2 is true—and I have 
just argued at length that it is true—then all of your beliefs about how things 
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will be in the future are unjustified. You don’t know what’s going to happen 
one year from now, one hour from now, or even one second from now.  
  
5. The Dreaming Argument 
We just saw that you don’t know anything at all about what the world is 
going to be like in the future. Now I want to turn to an even more radical 
conclusion, namely that you don’t know anything about what’s going on in 
the world at this very moment, not even what is going on right in front of 
your eyes. My argument will focus on one particular thing you take 
yourself to know about the world—that you’re sitting down reading—but 
it will be obvious how the argument generalizes to all your other beliefs 
about the world: the color of your chair, the number of people in the room 
with you, and so on. 
 My argument involves a certain hypothesis, which I’ll call the dreaming 
hypothesis, or TDH for short: 
 
(TDH) You are currently lying down in bed dreaming about sitting 
down reading a philosophy textbook 
 
With TDH in mind, here is how I’ll argue that you don’t know that you’re 
sitting down reading:  
 
The Dreaming Argument 
(DR1) If you have no way of knowing that TDH is false, then you don’t 
know that you’re sitting down reading 
(DR2) You have no way of knowing that TDH is false 
(DR3) So you don’t know that you’re sitting down reading 
 
Notice that TDH is not itself a premise of the argument. Accordingly, I don’t 
have to try to convince you that TDH is true, or even that it’s probably true. 
Indeed, I don’t need to give you any reason whatsoever for thinking it’s 
true, and it’s fine with me if you think that it’s incredibly unlikely that it’s 
true. All I need to show concerning TDH is that you have no way of 
knowing it’s false. And that I can do.  
  Let’s turn, then, to the defense of the premises. In section 6, I’ll present 
an argument for DR1. Then, in section 7, I’ll present an argument for DR2. 
Finally, in sections 8-9, I’ll conclude the discussion of the dreaming 
argument by addressing a likely objection to DR2, namely that you can tell 




6. Why You Have to Rule Out the Dreaming Hypothesis 
DR1 in effect says that you must be able to rule out the dreaming hypothesis 
in order to know that you’re sitting down reading. Why is that?  
 One way to think about it is that knowing that you’re sitting down 
reading entails that you have a way of ruling out the dream hypothesis. 
Accordingly, if you aren’t able to rule it out, it must be because you don’t 
know you’re sitting down reading after all. 
 We can develop this idea more explicitly using the notion of a deduction. 
A deduction is a certain kind of reasoning, where the conclusion of the 
reasoning is logically guaranteed by the premises. In other words, you 
would be contradicting yourself if you accepted all the premises and yet 
denied the conclusion. As an illustration, if you reason from the coin either 
landed heads or tails and it did not land heads to the conclusion it landed tails, 
that’s a deduction. You deduced that it landed tails from those other two 
beliefs. Using this notion of deduction, we can run the following argument: 
 
The Argument from Deduction 
(DE1) If you know you’re sitting down reading, you can deduce that 
TDH is false from things you know 
(DE2) If you can deduce something from things you know, then you 
have a way of knowing that thing 
(DE3) So, if you know you’re sitting down reading, then you have a way 
of knowing TDH is false 
 
 DE1 says that there’s a certain kind of deduction you’d be able to 
perform if you really did know that you were sitting down reading. 
Specifically, you’d be able to perform the following deduction: 
 
(i) I’m sitting down reading  
(ii) If I’m sitting down reading, then I’m sitting  
(iii) If I’m sitting, then I’m not lying down  
(iv) If I’m not lying down, then I’m not lying down dreaming 
(v) If I’m not lying down dreaming, then TDH is false 
(vi) So, TDH is false 
 
This is a way of deducing that TDH is false. Steps (ii), (iii), (iv), and (v) of 
the reasoning are easily known conceptual truths. For instance, you know 
(iii) just by observing that it follows from the definition of sitting that if 
you’re sitting you’re not lying down. So, if you know the first step as well—
that you’re sitting down reading—then what we have here is a way of 
deducing that TDH is false from things you know. That’s what DE1 says. 
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 The idea behind DE2 is straightforward. Suppose I tell you that I flipped 
a normal coin and that it didn’t come up heads. You tell me that it came up 
tails. How did you know?? Answer: by deducing it from things you know: 
that it was either heads or tails, and that it wasn’t heads. Of course, if you 
ran through that same deduction, but you didn’t actually know that it 
wasn’t heads—you were merely guessing it wasn’t heads, let’s say—we 
wouldn’t say that you knew it was tails. But when you deduce something 
from things you actually do know, then you know the thing you deduced 
as well. That’s what DE2 is saying. 
 DE1 and DE2 are both true, and they together entail DE3. But notice that 
DE3 says exactly the same thing as DR1: 
 
(DE3) If you know you’re sitting down reading, then you have a way of 
knowing TDH is false 
 
(DR1) If you have no way of knowing that TDH is false, then you don’t 
know that you’re sitting down reading 
 
To see that these say the same thing, notice that “if A is true then B is true” 
is just another way of saying “if B isn’t true, then A isn’t true”. These are 
simply two different ways of saying that you don’t get A without B. (An 
example: “if Farid is from Paris then he is from France” is exactly equivalent 
to saying “if Farid isn’t from France then he isn’t from Paris”.) And since 
DR1 and DE3 say exactly the same thing, the Argument from Deduction 
serves as an argument for DR1. 
 
7. Why You Can’t Rule Out the Dreaming Hypothesis 
Having shown that you have to be able to rule out TDH in order to know 
that you’re sitting down reading, I turn now to the second premise, DR2, 
which says that you can’t rule out TDH. Simply put, the argument is that 
you haven’t got any evidence against TDH, and you can’t know that a claim 
is false if you haven’t got any evidence against it. 
 
The No Evidence Argument 
(NE1) If you have no evidence against something, then you have no way 
of knowing it’s false  
(NE2) You have no evidence against TDH  
(DR2) So, you have no way of knowing that TDH is false 
 
 We can motivate NE1 by thinking about everyday examples. Suppose 
we hear some music, and you say it’s a Nickelback song. I ask how you 
know that and you say it’s because it’s loud and not very good. I point out 
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that lots of bands are loud and not very good, like Fall Out Boy, or Blink 
182. How do you know that it’s not Blink 182? Maybe you could know it’s 
not Blink 182 if you had some idea of what Nickelback’s lead singer sounds 
like, or if you recognize the song from a Nickelback album. But if literally 
all you know about Nickelback is that they’re loud and not very good, then 
you can’t know it’s not some other loud and not very good band. You have 
no way of knowing it’s not Blink 182. And that’s because you have no 
evidence against the hypothesis that it’s Blink 182, just as NE1 says.  
 The idea behind NE2 is that TDH is compatible with all your evidence. 
After all, what evidence do you have that you’re sitting down reading? 
Your evidence is that it looks to you like your legs are bent in a sitting 
position atop a chair (or couch), that it feels like you’re holding a book (or 
tablet or laptop), and so on. But that’s entirely compatible with TDH. 
Indeed, this is exactly how things would look and feel to you if you were 
merely dreaming that you were sitting down reading. So, the fact that it 
looks and feels like you’re sitting down reading is hardly evidence that you 
aren’t merely dreaming that you’re sitting down reading. In other words, 
it’s not evidence that TDH is false.   
 You might suspect at this point that my own argument can be turned 
against me. After all, you might insist, we don’t have any evidence for TDH 
either. So, it would seem that we can run a parallel argument for the 
conclusion that we can’t know that TDH is true: 
  
The Flipped Evidence Argument 
(FE1) If you have no evidence for something, then you have no way of 
knowing it’s true 
(FE2) You have no evidence for TDH  
(FE3) So, you have no way of knowing that TDH is true 
 
But this argument doesn’t worry me at all. It’s not that I have some objection 
to one of the premises. Indeed, I agree with both of the premises, and I 
happily accept the conclusion of the argument. As I already explained 
above (in section 5), my argument doesn’t require establishing that TDH is 
true, or even that TDH is probably true. All I need to establish is that you 
can’t know it’s false. And I have now done so, using the No Evidence 
Argument. 
 Still, you might wonder how I can accept both arguments. After all, 
don’t their conclusions contradict one another? Not at all: DR2 and FE3 are 
entirely compatible. It would be contradictory to say that TDH both is and 
isn’t true, or that you both can and can’t know that TDH is true. But that’s 
not what you get when you combine DR2 and FE3. Instead, what you get is 
a perfectly consistent claim with which I am in complete agreement: that 
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we have no way of knowing, one way or the other, whether TDH is true or 
false.  
 
8. Can You Tell You’re Not Dreaming? 
I can imagine someone objecting that there is a way to know you’re not 
dreaming: dreams are different from waking life in all sorts of ways, and 
you can know whether you’re dreaming by checking for those differences. 
For instance, you might point out that your present experiences are 
incredibly vivid and coherent, whereas dreams tend to be blurry nonsense. 
You might then claim that this undermines DR2: you can know that TDH 
is false by attending to the vividness of your experiences. And you might 
insist that NE2 of the No Evidence Argument is false as well, because the 
vividness of your experience counts as evidence against TDH. 
The easiest way to see why this objection won’t work is to slightly 
modify TDH as follows: 
 
(TDH+) You are currently lying down in bed dreaming about sitting 
down reading a philosophy textbook, and it’s the most 
incredibly vivid dream you’ve ever had 
 
You can’t know that TDH+ is false just by attending to the vividness of your 
experiences. Nor can the vividness be evidence against TDH+. Having 
vivid experiences is entirely compatible with TDH+; indeed, it’s exactly 
what TDH+ predicts your experiences will be like. What this shows is that 
I can sidestep this objection from vividness by simply replacing TDH with 
TDH+ in all the arguments. 
 Exactly the same point applies to other ways you might try to check 
whether you’re dreaming. For instance, you might point out that you’re a 
complete novice at philosophy, and that these are brilliant philosophical 
arguments that you never knew about before. But, you might insist, you 
can’t dream about an idea you’ve never heard before.  
 First of all, don’t sell yourself short: if Paul McCartney can compose the 
song Yesterday in a dream, then you can come up with the Dreaming 
Argument in a dream. (It’s not that brilliant, really.) Second, we can once 
again sidestep this concern by simply modifying TDH. For instance, we can 
modify it to say that you’re a brilliant philosophy professor, dreaming that 
you’re a student reading a philosophy textbook for the first time. Or that 
you’re dreaming about reading philosophical arguments that only seem 
brilliant but actually they’re complete gibberish.  
 (There’s an old joke about a guy who dreamed that he came up with a 
single objection that could refute every philosophical position. One by one, 
he approached every great philosopher in history, all of whom presented 
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their arguments but then admitted defeat upon hearing the objection. He 
woke up in a daze, scribbled the objection on a piece of paper so he 
wouldn’t forget it, and went back to sleep. When he awoke the next 
morning, he grabbed the piece of paper excitedly, and found that what he 
had scribbled down was: “that’s what you say!”)  
 
9. No Useful Tests for Dreaming 
It should be fairly clear that, for any test you come up with for checking 
whether you’re dreaming, I’ll be able to modify TDH to get around the test. 
Even better, though, if I can nip this sort of response in the bud by giving a 
more direct argument that no test can ever enable you to know whether 
you’re dreaming. Not pinching yourself and checking if you feel it, not 
flipping light switches and checking if the lighting changes, not—as a 
student of mine once argued in a term paper—peeing and checking if you 
still feel like you have to pee. (If you do, he argued, then you must have 
only dreamt that you peed.) 
 Let’s call a way of testing whether you’re dreaming a “dreaming test”. 
A reliable dreaming test is one that tells you you’re dreaming only when you 
really are dreaming, and that tells you you’re awake only when you really 
are awake. Here’s the argument: 
 
The No Useful Tests Argument 
(NU1) If you don’t know that a dreaming test is reliable, then you can’t 
know whether you’re dreaming by using it   
(NU2) You can never know that a dreaming test is reliable 
(NU3) So, you can never know whether you’re dreaming by using a 
dreaming test 
 
 NU1 says that, in order to know whether you’re dreaming by using a 
certain dreaming test, you have to know that the test actually works. 
Suppose I ask you how you know you’re awake and you say, “because I 
spun a top and it fell over instead of spinning forever.” Then I ask you how 
you know that’s a good test for whether you’re dreaming and you say, “oh, 
I have no idea if it works, I just saw it in a movie once.” If you don’t already 
somehow know that tops always spin forever in dreams and never spin 
forever in reality—that is, unless you know it’s a reliable test—then you 
can’t know you’re awake by using that test. 
 What about NU2? Why can’t you ever know that a dreaming test is 
reliable? Here’s why. Knowing a test is reliable is a matter of knowing that 
it’s worked in the past: those times you were dreaming, the test correctly 
said you were dreaming, and those times you were awake, it correctly said 
you were awake. So, for instance, to assure yourself that the pinching test 
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is reliable, you might reason as follows: “Yesterday, I pinched myself while 
I was awake at the gym and I felt it. Last night, I pinched myself while I was 
dreaming and I didn’t feel anything. This morning, right after I woke up, I 
pinched myself again and I felt it.”  
 But wait a minute. That line of reasoning presupposes that you really 
were awake on the first and third occasion. For all you know, maybe you 
merely dreamed that you woke up this morning. Maybe you are still 
dreaming, and the supposed awakening was merely a dream within a 
dream coming to an end. Perhaps for the last fifteen years you’ve been lying 
in bed in a coma, moving in and out of dreams in which you feel pinches 
and dreams-within-dreams in which you can’t feel them. You have no way 
of ruling that out. And if you can’t rule that out, then you can’t know that 
your rationale for thinking the pinching test is reliable is any good. And if 
you can’t know that your rationale for thinking the pinching test is reliable 
is any good, then you can’t know that the pinching test is reliable. And the 
same goes for all other dreaming tests. Just like NU2 says. 
 
10. Conclusion 
I’ve argued that you know nothing about the external world, either how it 
will be in the future or even how it is right now. You can’t know anything 
about future because all of your beliefs about the future are based on an 
assumption that you have no good reason to accept: that future states of the 
world will be like past states of the world. And you can’t know anything 
about the present because you have no way to rule out the possibility that 
all of your present experiences are part of an unusually vivid dream.   
 
Reflection Questions 
1. The argument in section 3 turns on the claim that induction and direct 
observation are the only ways of knowing about the world. Is that true? 
When a detective solves a crime unlike any crime she’s ever seen before, 
is she using resources other than induction and direct observation? If so, 
how might that help with resisting the argument? 
 
2. At the end of section 4, I say that the argument extends to all of your 
beliefs about the future. Is that true? Can it be used to undermine the 
belief that 1+1 will still be equal to 2 tomorrow? If not, why not?  
 
3. Are you convinced by the No Evidence argument in section 7? Can you 
sometimes dismiss a hypothesis out of hand, without any evidence 
against it? Which ones and why?  
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4. Do you have any evidence that the dreaming hypothesis is false? If so, 
what is it? If the evidence takes the form of a test, how would you 
respond to the No Useful Tests argument in section 9? 
 
5. Can you think of a way of modifying some of the arguments from this 
chapter to produce an argument that we can’t know anything about the 
past? 
 
6. I argued that no one knows anything about the world. Are my 
arguments self-defeating? Can they also be used to show that I don’t 
know that no one knows anything about the world? If so, is that a 
problem? If not, why not? 
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What Makes You You 
 
Views and arguments advanced in this chapter are not necessarily endorsed by the 
author of the textbook, nor are they original to the author, nor are they meant to be 
consistent with arguments advanced in other chapters. Different chapters represent 
different philosophical perspectives. 
 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I address the question of what makes you the person that 
you are. In particular, is it your physical aspects or, rather, your 
psychological aspects that make you the person that you are? I will argue 
that neither facts about your body, nor facts about your mental life, nor any 
combination of the two can answer the question of what makes you you, 
and that this remains an open and challenging—and perhaps 
unanswerable—question. 
 In section 2, I clarify the question that I mean to be asking, and I explain 
what a satisfactory answer would have to look like. In section 3, I present a 
variety of potential answers to the question, some more promising than 
others. In section 4, I closely examine an account according to which it is 
having the body that you do that makes you the person that you are, and I 
advance two arguments against that account: an argument from conjoined 
twins and an argument from the possibility of body swaps. In section 5, I 
show that psychological accounts of personal identity face problems of their 
own, involving abrupt changes to one’s mental life and cases in which one 
person’s psychology is replicated in two different bodies. In section 6, I 
address the suggestion that your soul is what makes you the person that 
you are. Finally, in section 7, I consider and reject the idea that the bodily 
and psychological accounts can somehow be combined to yield a satisfactory 
answer to the question of personal identity. 
 
2. Clarifying the Question of Personal Identity 
Let me begin by clarifying what it is that I am asking when I ask what makes 
you the person that you are. What I am looking for is a theory that will tell 
us who’s who at different times. Suppose we’re looking at a picture from a 
five-year-old’s birthday party. You point to one of the kids in the picture 
and tell me that it’s you. My question is: what makes that one you? There’s 
some resemblance, but on the whole you’re physically very different from 
that little kid. You’re also psychologically very different from the kid, who 
(judging from the picture) thinks crayons are the most incredibly 
interesting thing on the face of the earth. You probably have more in 
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common with the adults in the picture than with that kid. So, what is it 
about that kid that makes her (or him) you? 
 More precisely, an answer to the question I’m asking will provide a way 
to fill in the blank in the following sentence: 
 
Person A at time t is the same person as person B at time t* if and only 
if ______ 
 
In other words, when we’re looking at or thinking about a person at one 
time, under what conditions should we say that this person and a person 
who exists at another time are one and the same person? In section 3, we’ll 
consider a number of possible ways of filling in the blank, which will 
further clarify what it is I’m after. But before we get there, let me head off 
two potential confusions. 
 First, the word ‘same’ is ambiguous, and if you don’t keep an eye on the 
ambiguity you are liable to get very confused. To see the ambiguity, let’s 
think about a couple examples. Suppose that Jade buys a Honda Civic, and 
then Tanner goes out and buys one too. Is it true that Jade and Tanner drive 
the same car? There are multiple ways of taking that question. I could be 
asking whether the car that Jade drives and the car that Tanner drives are 
the same color and make and model, in which case the answer is yes. 
Alternatively, I could be asking whether there’s a single car that Jade and 
Tanner share and take turns driving, in which case the answer is no. 
Another example: Suppose you saw some shirt at the GAP, and you liked 
it so much that you bought two of them. You wore one yesterday, and the 
other today. I see you today and say: ‘isn’t that the same shirt you were 
wearing yesterday?’ In one sense, yes: they’re exactly the same design. In 
another sense, no: you have changed your shirt since I last saw you.  
 To put a label on it, I’ll say that two things, A and B, are qualitatively the 
same when A and B are very similar to one another. I call this sort of 
sameness ‘qualitative’ because the idea is that A and B have a lot of the same 
qualities (color, shape, design, etc.). A and B are numerically the same when 
A is B. I call this sort of sameness ‘numerical’ because it’s saying that A is 
the same as B in the way that numbers are sometimes said to be the same 
number. ‘22 = 4’ isn’t just saying that the number 22 and the number 4 are 
incredibly similar; it’s saying that ‘22’ and ‘4’ are two names for one and the 
same number. The cars Jade and Tanner drive are qualitatively the same, 
but not numerically the same. The shirts you bought are qualitatively the 
same, but not numerically the same.  
 The same ambiguity arises when talking about whether two people are 
the same. When we’re looking at identical twins and say “you two are 
exactly the same”, what we mean is that they’re qualitatively the same, not 
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that they’re one and the same person. But when we say that Marilyn 
Monroe is the same person as Norma Jean Baker, or that Muhammad Ali is 
the same person as Cassius Clay, we are saying that they are one and the 
same person; they’re numerically the same.  
 The question I am asking in this chapter is a question about numerical 
sameness, not qualitative sameness. So, whenever I say “A is the same 
person as B,” that means that A and B are numerically the same. When I do 
want to talk about qualitative sameness, I’ll describe things as “very 
similar” or “exactly alike” or “indistinguishable”. 
 Here’s how failing to track the distinction between numerical and 
qualitative sameness is going to get you in trouble. You might think: “Wait 
a minute! I’m not the same as that kid in the photo. We’re different in all 
sorts of ways. In fact, I’m changing every second, so I’m not even the same 
from one moment to the next. I’m not even the same person as the person 
who was sitting here one second ago!” The problem with this line of 
reasoning is that it runs together qualitative and numerical sameness. Yes, 
the way you are now isn’t the way the kid in the picture was, and isn’t even 
exactly the way you were a moment ago. You are not (qualitatively) exactly 
the same as you were before. But it’s you that was one way then and is a 
different way now. There’s numerical sameness despite the lack of perfect 
qualitative sameness from one time to the next.  
 The second thing I want to clarify is that I’m looking for an answer that’s 
more than just a mere rule of thumb for telling who’s who. If that were all 
that I wanted, then answering the question of personal identity would be 
easy: A at t is the same person as B at t* when A’s fingerprints and B’s 
fingerprints are exactly alike. But since I want something absolutely 
exceptionless, this Fingerprints Account won’t do. To see why that is, 
consider the following case: 
 
LEAVE NO TRACE  
After robbing the mansion, Bekah realizes that she may have left some 
fingerprints behind. To help ensure that the police can’t prove that she 
was the burglar, she soaks her fingers in acid, completely searing off her 
fingerprints. The police track her down and, just as she hoped, they are 
unable to prove that she committed the burglary. 
 
It’s the same person, Bekah, both before and after the fingerprints are seared 
off. But the Fingerprints Account gets it wrong: it says that the 
fingerprintless person with the seared fingertips is not the same person as 
the person who burglarized the mansion. 
 Moreover, because I’m after an account of what makes people at different 
times the same person, it’s not enough for an account of personal identity 
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just to get the right result in all actually existing cases. Here’s an analogy to 
help see why that is. Suppose I wanted to know what makes someone a 
bachelor, and you say: Person A is a bachelor if and only if A is an 
unmarried man who is under eighty feet tall. That would not be an accurate 
account of what a bachelor is. And yet it’s true that every actually existing 
unmarried man under eighty feet is a bachelor, and every actually existing 
bachelor is an unmarried man under eighty feet tall. So, what’s wrong with 
your account? The problem is that being under eighty feet tall clearly isn’t 
required for being a bachelor; height has nothing to do with what makes 
someone a bachelor. The in-principle, hypothetical possibility of a ninety-
foot-tall bachelor is enough to show that this is not a satisfactory account of 
bachelorhood.  
 Likewise, even if no one has actually ever successfully burned off their 
fingerprints, the mere possibility of a case like LEAVE NO TRACE is enough 
to show that the Fingerprints Account is no good. That’s because what 
we’re looking for is an account of personal identity which has no exceptions 
even in principle. The same is true for other accounts which we will 
consider below: even merely hypothetical examples can serve as 
counterexamples to those accounts.  
 
3. Some Promising and Unpromising Answers 
 
3.1 Physical Answers 
We have already seen one possible answer to the question of personal 
identity, the Fingerprints Account: 
 
 The Fingerprints Account 
A at time t is the same person as B at time t* if and only if A and B have 
indistinguishable fingerprints 
 
And we have already seen one good reason to reject the Fingerprints 
Account: someone with fingerprints can be the same person as someone (at 
a later time) with no fingerprints at all. That shows that having 
indistinguishable fingerprints isn’t necessary for being the same person, 
which makes this a counterexample to the Fingerprints Account.  
 Another reason for rejecting the Fingerprints Account is that, at least in 
principle, two different people could have indistinguishable fingerprints—
by sheer coincidence or, more gruesomely, because one person grafts 
another person’s fingerprints onto their fingers for some nefarious purpose. 
That shows that having indistinguishable fingerprints isn’t even sufficient 
for being the same person. 
 What if we focused on DNA instead of fingerprints?   
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The DNA Account 
A at t is the same person as B at t* if and only if A and B have 
indistinguishable DNA  
 
The DNA Account does get around some of the problems that arise for the 
Fingerprints Account. Bekah’s DNA doesn’t change at all before and after 
searing off her fingerprints, so the DNA Account delivers the correct verdict 
that pre-searing Bekah is the same person as post-searing Bekah.  
 But the DNA Account has problems of its own. Identical twins have 
indistinguishable DNA, but this doesn’t make them the same person. (Any 
identical twins reading this are now nodding along vigorously. In unison.) 
So, having indistinguishable DNA isn’t sufficient for being the same 
person. Nor is it necessary. There could, at least in principle, be a 
medication or performance-enhancing drug you can take that would make 
some small change to the DNA in every cell of your body. But it would still 
be you after you took the medication, even though your DNA would be 
somewhat different. 
 Still, these answers may be on the right track by focusing on some 
physical aspect of you. Perhaps, instead of focusing on some small part of 
your body, like your fingerprints or DNA, we would do better to focus on 
the body as a whole: 
  
The Same Body Account 
A at t is the same person as B at t* if and only if A has the same body as 
B 
 
‘Body’ is sometimes used to mean just the torso, not including the head and 
limbs. That’s not how I’m using it. When I say ‘body’, I mean the whole 
body, including the head and all the other body parts. And when I say that 
A and B have the same body, I mean that they have numerically the same 
body. Bodies obviously can change over time—indeed, your body was 
composed of entirely different cells seven years ago—but that’s not to deny 
that the body you have now is numerically the same as the body you had 
seven years ago. It’s not as if you used to have some other arms and legs 
and now you have entirely new ones! 
 The Same Body Account is going to avoid all the other problems we 
mentioned, since you have the same body even if your fingerprints or DNA 
change, and separate people with indistinguishable DNA or fingerprints 
don’t have numerically the same body. It’s true that your body won’t be 
exactly the same qualitatively after your DNA changes, but what’s required 
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by the Same Body Account is numerical sameness, not qualitative 
sameness. The body is numerically the same after the DNA changes. 
 
3.2 Psychological Answers 
We’ll see in the next section that the Same Body Account has problems of 
its own. But before getting there, we should also consider a different sort of 
account, one framed in terms of people’s psychological features as opposed 
to their physical features. By “psychological features”, I mean to include 
any features of a person’s mental life: their memories, their personality, 
their likes and dislikes, their beliefs, their emotions, and even their current 
perceptual experiences (how things look, sound, smell, and feel to them).  
 So how should we formulate an answer to the question of personal 
identity in terms of psychological features? As a first stab, we might 
consider the following account: 
 
Psychological Matching Account 
A at t is the same person as B at t* if and only if A’s psychological 
features are exactly the same as B’s psychological features 
 
But this Psychological Matching Account is obviously far too demanding. 
Every second that passes, you are forming new memories. For instance, you 
now have a memory of reading the previous sentence, but you had no 
memory of it a minute ago (since you hadn’t yet read it a minute ago). You 
also have slightly different visual experiences now than you had a minute 
ago, since you’re now looking at different words on the page. Accordingly, 
the Psychological Matching Account is going to say that the person sitting 
in your chair a minute ago and the person sitting in your chair now are two 
different people. But that’s absurd! It was you that was sitting in the chair a 
minute ago. 
 To get around this problem, we might try to loosen things up, so that 
the account doesn’t require people at different times to have all the same 
psychological features, but only that they have mostly the same 
psychological features. 
 
Psychological Overlap Account 
A at t is the same person as B at t* if and only if A’s psychological 
features are mostly the same as B’s psychological features 
 
The Psychological Overlap Account avoids the previous problem. You may 
not have all the same psychological features you had a moment ago, but 
you do have mostly the same psychological features (beliefs, memories, 
personality, etc.). 
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 But the Psychological Overlap Account gets the wrong results when we 
reach back further into the past. You and that kid in the photo are the same 
person. That’s you in the photo. But your current psychological features 
and the kid’s psychological features when the photo was taken aren’t mostly 
the same. The kid’s personality and likes and dislikes are completely 
different from yours. You have very few of the same memories, since 
you’ve forgotten much of what the kid remembers at that time, and the kid 
at that time hasn’t yet formed most of the memories you now have. So, the 
Psychological Overlap Account is going to yield the wrong verdict: it says 
that the kid in that photo isn’t you. 
 What we need is something even more flexible, something that can 
accommodate the fact that, over a long period of time, a person can 
gradually undergo a massive change in their psychological features. But we 
don’t need to abandon the notion of psychological overlap entirely. Rather, 
we can use it to define the new, flexible notion that we need. 
 To see the way forward, notice that, even though there isn’t much 
overlap between your current psychological features and your 
psychological features at the time the photo was taken, there is a great deal 
of psychological overlap between you now and you a year ago. And there’s 
a great deal of overlap between you a year ago and you two years ago. And 
between you two years ago and you three years ago. And so on, going all 
the way back, year-by-year, to you at age six and the five-year-old in the 
photo. We can picture this as a long chain—running from you now to that 
five-year-old—where each link represents a “snapshot” of your 
psychological features at some time, and each link in the chain has mostly 
the same psychological features as the links immediately before and after 
it. And the chain needn’t be year-by-year; it can be day-by-day or even 
moment-by-moment.   
 When there is such a moment-by-moment chain of overlap linking a 
person at one time to a person at a later time, I’ll say that the person at the 
earlier time is a psychological ancestor of the person at the later time, and that 
the person at the later time is a psychological descendant of the ancestor. This 
gives us:  
 
The Psychological Descendant Account 
A at t is the same person as B at t* if and only if A is either a 
psychological ancestor or a psychological descendent of B.  
 
This gives us the right results in all of the cases we have been considering. 
You are a psychological descendant of the kid in the photo, despite sharing 
very few psychological features with that kid; Bekah pre-searing is an 
ancestor of Bekah post-searing; and so on. 
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 We now have two different, initially promising answers to the question 
of personal identity: the Same Body Account and the Psychological 
Descendant Account. It may seem like an embarrassment of riches. They 
both look great, so how are we supposed to choose between them? As we 
are about to see, however, both answers are deeply flawed, and we should 
not accept either of them. 
 
4. Against the Same Body Account 
According to the Same Body Account, having the same body is sufficient 
for being the same person. In other words, it is impossible for two different 
people to have the same body. The account also entails that having the same 
body is necessary for being the same person. In other words, it is impossible 
for the same person to have different bodies at different times. In what 
follows, I develop two arguments against the Same Body Account: an 
argument from the actual case of conjoined twins, which shows that the 
having the same body isn’t sufficient for personal identity, and an argument 
from the hypothetical case of swapping bodies, which shows that it isn’t 
necessary either. (For more on how merely hypothetical cases can still be 
relevant when assessing philosophical claims, see section 7 of the 
Introduction.) 
 Some may be tempted by a different kind of argument against the Same 
Body Account, an argument from dissociative identity disorder, a.k.a. 
“multiple personality disorder”. Isn’t this a case of more than one person 
having numerically the same body? Perhaps. But it’s not entirely clear to 
me that that’s right way to understand multiple personalities. Another way 
of thinking about such cases is that there is a single person with a highly 
disunified mind, a single person who feels and behaves dramatically 
differently at different times. In any event, I would want to know a lot more 
about what it is like “from the inside” for those suffering from this disorder 
before I was prepared to say that such cases involve multiple people 
inhabiting a single body. For that reason, I will set such cases aside and 
focus on cases that much more clearly pose a problem for the Same Body 
Account. 
 
4.1 Conjoined Twins 
The first objection I’ll raise against the Same Body Account involves 
conjoined twins. Abby and Brittany Hensel are dicephalic parapagus twins, 
which means there are two heads on a single torso. They are alive and well 
and are currently 31 years old. It’s easy to see why conjoined twins pose a 
problem for the Same Body Account. We would naturally describe Abby 
and Brittany as two people sharing a single body. But the Same Body 
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Account rules that out, since it says that sharing a body is sufficient for 
being the same person. 
 We can make the argument more explicit as follows: 
 
The Conjoined Twins Argument 
(CT1) If the Same Body Account is true, then either Abby and Brittany 
have different bodies or Abby and Brittany are the same person 
(CT2) Abby and Brittany have the same body 
(CT3) Abby and Brittany are not the same person  
(CT4) So, the Same Body Account is false 
 
 CT1 is merely reporting an implication of the Same Body Account. If 
same body entails same person, then that either means that Abby and Brittany 
are two different people in two different bodies or the same person in the 
same body. Those are the only two ways it can be according to the Same 
Body Account. CT2 seems true: what we have here is a single, two-headed 
human organism. (Indeed, a popular documentary on Abby and Brittany is 
titled, “The Twins Who Share a Body”.) And CT3 seems right as well: Abby 
and Brittany are different people. Among other things, they have different 
preferences in food and they excelled in different subjects in school. I bet 
you didn’t even flinch when I said ‘they’ as opposed to ‘she’. 
 I can imagine someone denying CT2 and insisting that, actually, there 
are two bodies there, split down the middle. First, there’s Abby’s body, 
consisting of the right arm, right leg, right lung, the right head (the one that 
says “my name is Abby”) and so on. Second, there’s Brittany’s body, 
consisting of the left arm, left leg, left lung, left head, and so on.  
 I find that completely implausible. For one thing, it would entail that 
Brittany has no liver (since the liver is on the right side). But surely the 
correct thing to say is that they share a liver, which requires that the body 
parts on right side are also parts of Brittany’s body. Additionally, upon 
encountering a two-headed snake or a two-headed turtle, you would never 
say that there were two bodies there. There’s just a single animal with two 
heads; it’s a single, two-headed body. Since that’s what we’d say about 
nonhuman animals, we should say the same about human animals. To be 
clear, I am not saying there is only one person there; indeed, I say just the 
opposite in premise CT3. Rather, the claim is that there’s a single, two-
headed body inhabited by both Abby and Brittany.  
 What about denying CT3 and saying that Abby and Brittany are the 
same person? That’s certainly a strange thing to say. But maybe what I said 
above about multiple personalities can be applied to the case of conjoined 
twins as well: there is just one person there, but her mind is disunified and 
as a result she behaves in peculiar ways, for instance saying (out of one of 
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her mouths) “I’m good at math” and then saying (out of her other mouth) 
“I’m terrible at math”.  
 But this seems entirely implausible when applied to Abby and Brittany. 
To see this, consider the following case: 
 
CONJOINED DRAMA  
Abby is dating Arie. Abby’s conjoined twin Brittany is secretly in love 
with Arie and has always been jealous of their relationship. One night, 
while Abby is sleeping, Brittany confesses her feelings to Arie, and Arie 
kisses her. Later, when Abby finds out, she strangles Brittany. 
 
Here’s how we’d naturally describe what happened: Arie cheated on Abby 
and then Abby killed Brittany. Yet someone who denies CT3, and therefore 
says that Abby and Brittany are the same person, would have to say that 
this description is completely inaccurate. Arie didn’t cheat on anyone, since 
the person he was kissing that night was his own girlfriend Abby (a.k.a. 
Brittany). Furthermore, the CT3-denier would have to say that Abby didn’t 
kill anyone, because no one was killed: she strangled herself and she 
survived (albeit with one fewer functioning head). But surely that’s not the 
right way to describe what happened.  
 
4.2 Body Swaps 
Here’s a second argument against the Same Body Account. This one 
involves an imaginary case, one which may seem familiar if you’ve read 
John Locke’s chapter on Identity and Diversity in his Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding. Or if you’ve seen Freaky Friday on the Disney 
Channel. The case is far-flung, but the fact that nothing like it has ever 
actually happened and perhaps never will (though I wouldn’t be so sure) is 
neither here nor there. For, as I explained in section 2, an account of 
personal identity cannot admit of any exceptions, even in principle.  
 Now for the case:  
 
BODY SWAP 
Rachel is a neurotechnologist. Using an fMRI, a supercomputer, and 
advanced laser technology, she has devised a way to get a complete 
neuron-for-neuron scan of one person’s brain, and then rewire a second 
person’s brain to be an exact duplicate of it. She recruits a pair of 
volunteers to have their wiring “swapped” for a day: a man named Raúl 
and a woman named June. Rachel’s team performs the procedure on 
Tuesday night, and the volunteers are awakened on Wednesday. Both 
stare down at their bodies in disbelief. The person with the male body 
says ‘my name is June’ and can recount all of June’s memories but 
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knows nothing at all about Raúl’s past. The person with the female body 
says ‘my name is Raúl’ and can tell you all about Raúl’s past but nothing 
about June’s.   
 
I think we can all agree on how we ought to describe what is happening on 
Wednesday. June is now walking around with a male body, and Raúl is 
walking around with a female body. The alternative would be to say that 
June is still the person with the female body but that she has gone crazy: 
she mistakenly thinks her name is ‘Raúl’, and recalls doing all sorts of things 
that she has never actually done (but all of which Raúl has done). But that’s 
not what happened. No one has gone crazy. Rather, two people have 
switched bodies. 
 If that’s right, then the Same Body Account is incorrect. Before stating 
the argument against the Same Body Account, it will be helpful to introduce 
some terminology to help us talk and think clearly about the case. I’ll use 
“MaleT” to refer to the person with the male body on Tuesday; “FemaleT” 
for the person with the female body on Tuesday; “MaleW” for the person 
with the male body on Wednesday, and “FemaleW” for the person with the 
female body on Wednesday. Here, then, is the argument: 
 
The Body Swap Argument 
(BS1) MaleT and MaleW have the same body 
(BS2) If MaleT and MaleW have the same body, then: if the Same Body 
Account is true, then MaleT and MaleW are the same person 
(BS3) MaleT and MaleW are not the same person 
(BS4) So, the Same Body Account is false 
 
 BS1 is true: it’s the same male body that enters the lab on Tuesday and 
leaves the lab on Wednesday. No doubt, rewiring its brain to resemble a 
woman’s brain is going to affect the chemistry of that body in all sorts of 
ways. But that doesn’t make it a numerically different body, any more than 
medically modifying all your DNA gives you a numerically different body 
(see section 3.1). BS2 is just reporting an implication of the Same Body 
Account: having the same body suffices for being the same person. And BS3 
is reporting what we all find perfectly obvious when we think about this 
case or when we watch a movie like Freaky Friday. 
 The Same Body Account yields the wrong verdict about who’s who in 
BODY SWAP. It wrongly entails that MaleT is the same person as MaleW. It 
also wrongly entails that MaleT (i.e., the one who was calling himself ‘Raúl’ 
on Tuesday) and FemaleW (i.e., the one insisting “I’m Raúl!” on Wednesday) 
are different people. So, the Same Body Account must be rejected.  
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 The Psychological Descendant Account, by contrast, gets the right 
answers in this case. FemaleW is a psychological descendant of MaleT: there 
is massive overlap between the psychological features of the person who 
woke up with a female body on Wednesday and the person who walked in 
with a male body on Tuesday. Additionally, MaleW is not a psychological 
descendant of MaleT: MaleT has virtually nothing in common 
psychologically with MaleW, nor is there any gradually changing chain of 
overlap (of the sort described in section 3.2) linking MaleT to MaleW. So, the 
Psychological Descendant Account again gives us the right result, that 
MaleT is not MaleW. 
 Getting one wrong result is enough to show that the Same Body Account 
is false. But getting a couple correct results is not enough to show that the 
Psychological Descendant Account is true. So, let us turn now to see 
whether the Psychological Descendant Account has some problematic 
consequences of its own. (Spoiler: it does.) 
 
5. Against the Psychological Descendant Account 
 
5.1 Arguments from Discontinuity 
According to the Psychological Descendant Account, A is the same person 
as B only if one is a psychological descendant of the other. One way to put 
pressure on this account is to look at cases involving dramatic psychological 
discontinuities, breaks in the moment-by-moment “chain” of overlapping 
psychological features. I’ll look at two such cases: one that I don’t think is 
conclusive against the Psychological Descendant Account, and then a 
second case that does seem to be conclusive. 
  Our first case involves dramatic memory loss: 
 
TOTAL AMNESIA  
Jiwoo is stranded on a deserted island. Adding injury to insult, a 
coconut fell on Jiwoo’s head at noon today, instantly resulting in total 
amnesia. She can’t remember how she got on the island or anything else 
about her past. She can’t even remember her own name.  
 
To see why this case is supposed to pose a problem for the Psychological 
Descendant Account, notice that the non-amnesiac immediately before the 
coconut strike has very different psychological features from the amnesiac 
immediately after the coconut strike. This would seem to imply that the 
amnesiac is not a psychological descendant of the non-amnesiac, in which 
case the Psychological Descendant Account implies that the amnesiac isn’t 
the same person as the non-amnesiac. But the amnesiac clearly is the same 
person as the non-amnesiac. After all, the coconut doesn’t kill Jiwoo. But if 
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she’s still around after noon, that means someone on the island after noon 
must be the same person as her. And the only person on the island after 
noon is the amnesiac. Jiwoo is the amnesiac. 
 I’ve just argued that TOTAL AMNESIA is a counterexample to the 
Psychological Descendant Account. But I can imagine a plausible reply 
from a defender of the Psychological Descendant Account. Such a defender 
might say that the amnesiac is a psychological descendant of the non-
amnesiac. Being a descendant, the idea goes, requires only that their 
psychological features be “mostly the same” before and after the coconut 
strike. But, differences in memory notwithstanding, there is still a great deal 
of overlap. The amnesiac and the non-amnesiac both love crossword 
puzzles, both are afraid of sharks, both have slightly blurry vision (since 
both are near-sighted), both have an easygoing temperament and enjoy 
long walks on the beach, and so on. All this similarity in their other 
psychological features, the idea goes, is enough for their psychological 
features to count as “mostly the same”. 
 Rather than trying to challenge the claim that there is sufficient overlap 
in TOTAL AMNESIA to count as a case of descendance, I’ll instead shift to a 
new case, one in which there is no overlap in the mental states, thus 
rendering this response unavailable. Here is the new case: 
 
TOTAL BLACKOUT  
Minjun is stranded on a deserted island. Adding injury to insult, a 
coconut fell on Minjun’s head at noon today, temporarily knocking him 
unconscious. While unconscious, he is not dreaming, nor does he have 
any thoughts or experiences or any physical sensations whatsoever. He 
is completely blacked out. When he finally awakens hours later, it will 
feel as if no time has passed. 
 
 Here is how to turn the case into an argument against the Psychological 
Descendant Account: 
 
The Blackout Argument 
(BL1) The unconscious man is not a psychological descendant of the 
conscious man 
(BL2) If the unconscious man is not a psychological descendant of the 
conscious man, then: if the Psychological Descendant Account is 
true, then the conscious man is not the same person as the 
unconscious man 
(BL3) The conscious man is the same person as the unconscious man 
(BL4) So, the Psychological Descendant Account is false 
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The idea behind BL1 is that the conscious man has a wealth of sensations 
and emotions and thoughts and desires, whereas the unconscious man has 
no mental states at all. So, there is no overlap whatsoever in their 
psychological features. BL2 is reporting an implication of the Psychological 
Descendant Account: in order to be the same person, on this account, one 
must be a psychological descendant of the other. And BL3 seems obviously 
true. One would be right to point to the unconscious man lying on the 
island and say: that’s Minjun, the very person who was wandering the 
island earlier today. 
 
5.2 The Argument from Fission 
I turn now to a second argument against the Psychological Descendant 
Account, for which I will once again recruit the help of our 
neurotechnologist from section 4.2:  
 
DOUBLE TROUBLE  
Rachel’s rewiring program has been tremendously successful, and she 
is now performing dozens of body swaps a day. But she’s starting to get 
a little sloppy. Today, after rewiring Chad’s brain to duplicate JoJo’s, 
Rachel then accidentally rewires Alex’s brain to duplicate JoJo’s as well. 
As a result, both the person with Chad’s original body and the person 
with Alex’s original body wake up and say ‘my name is JoJo’. Both can 
tell you all about JoJo’s past; neither can tell you anything about Chad 
or Alex’s past. Rachel’s team also accidently obliterates JoJo’s original 
body.  
 
Figuratively speaking, JoJo’s mind has “fissioned” like an amoeba, into two 
separate bodies. But strictly speaking, how are we supposed to describe 
what’s happened? In particular, who’s who after the procedure, and which 
person (if any) is JoJo? 
 I’m honestly not sure what to think about the case. But one thing I am 
sure of is that the Psychological Descendant Account provides us with an 
incoherent account of what’s happened, and therefore must be incorrect. 
The problem, in short, is that both of the people who wake up after the 
procedure are psychological descendants of JoJo. If the Psychological 
Descendant Account is right, then that means that both of them are JoJo. But 
that, I contend, is impossible.  
 Before we state the argument more explicitly, it will again be helpful to 
introduce some abbreviations. Let’s use “ChadRW” to refer to the person 
with the rewired brain in Chad’s original body and “AlexRW” for the person 
with the rewired brain in Alex’s original body. Now we can state the 
argument against the Psychological Descendant Account as follows:  
 90 
 
The Fission Argument 
(FS1) If the Psychological Descendant Account is true, then JoJo is the 
same person as ChadRW and is the same person as AlexRW 
(FS2) If JoJo is the same person as ChadRW and the same person as 
AlexRW, then ChadRW is the same person as AlexRW 
(FS3) So, if the Psychological Descendant Account is true, then ChadRW 
is the same person as AlexRW 
(FS4) ChadRW is not the same person as AlexRW 
(FS5) So the Psychological Descendant Account is false 
 
Let’s take the premises one at a time. 
 FS1 is indisputable. The psychological features of ChadRW and AlexRW 
when they first wake up are virtually indistinguishable from those of JoJo, 
that is, the woman calling herself ‘JoJo’ just prior to the rewiring. In the 
minutes and hours that follow, ChadRW and AlexRW will of course begin to 
diverge psychologically from one another. Indeed, they’ll likely begin 
diverging from one another the moment they wake up! But they will remain 
psychologically descendants of JoJo, linked by an ever-growing, moment-by-
moment chain, with each “link” in the chain exhibiting massive 
psychological overlap with the preceding link. And that’s all we need in 
order to get FS1. For so long as each is a psychological descendant of JoJo, 
the Psychological Descendant Account will entail that each of them is the 
same person as her. 
 FS2 follows from a highly plausible logical principle: the transitivity of 
identity. According to this principle, if A = B and B = C, then it follows that 
A = C. (Here, the ‘=’ symbol signifies numerical sameness.) That’s true no 
matter what you plug in for ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’. Suppose you find out that 
Chadwick Boseman is the actor who played the Black Panther, and you also 
find out that the actor who played the Black Panther was the star of Ma 
Rainey’s Black Bottom. You wouldn’t (and couldn’t) then wonder whether 
Chadwick Boseman is the same person as the star of Ma Rainey’s Black 
Bottom. That’s because you already have all the information you need in 
order to deduce that it’s the same guy: if Chadwick Boseman = the actor who 
played the Black Panther, and the actor who played the Black Panther = the 
star of Ma Rainey’s Black Bottom, then (by the transitivity of identity) 
Chadwick Boseman = the star of Ma Rainey’s Black Bottom. By that same 
indisputable logic, if ChadRW = JoJo and JoJo = AlexRW, then ChadRW = 
AlexRW. That’s what gives us FS2. 
 Premise FS4 is motivated by a different logical principle, which I’ll call 
the “No Difference Principle”, or “NDP” for short: 
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(NDP) If A is numerically the same as B, then at any given time, 
anything that’s true of A at that time is also true of B at that time 
 
To illustrate the principle, consider Cassius Clay and Muhammad Ali. 
Cassius Clay is Muhammad Ali, they’re numerically the same. Here’s 
something that was true of Ali: he was in a boxing ring on October 30, 1974 
at 10pm. So, by NDP, the same must be true of Clay: he too was in a boxing 
ring at that time. And that’s just as it should be. ‘Cassius Clay’ and 
‘Muhammad Ali’ are just two names for one and the same guy, so it can’t 
very well be that “one of them” is in the boxing ring and “the other one” 
isn’t. There’s just the one guy, and he either was or wasn’t in the boxing 
ring at that time. 
 This principle, NDP, can also serve as a useful tool for demonstrating 
that two people aren’t numerically the same. NDP tells us that if, at any 
time, you can find even a single difference between A and B, then A and B 
cannot be numerically the same. If you’re wondering whether Emily and 
Haley are the same person, just notice that Emily is skydiving right now 
and Haley isn’t, and that settles it: they must be two different people. If they 
were numerically the same, then anything true of the one would have to be 
true of the other. But it’s true of Emily that she’s skydiving and that isn’t 
true of Haley. So, by NDP, they must be two different people.  
 The same logic applies in the case at hand. If you’re wondering whether 
ChadRW and AlexRW are the same person, just notice that ChadRW is currently 
walking down the street and AlexRW isn’t currently walking down the 
street. (AlexRW is still in the lab, staring at the ceiling.) That settles it: no one 
person can both be and not be walking down the street. So ChadRW and 
AlexRW must be two different people, just as FS4 says. 
 I can imagine someone objecting to FS4 by saying that after the rewiring, 
JoJo is a single person with two bodies. If that were true, that would mean 
that she has four eyes, two of which are looking down at the sidewalk and 
two of which are looking up at the ceiling. If you ask her “are you walking 
down the street right now?” she might say yes or she might say no, 
depending on which of her two bodies you ask. But when Alex’s original 
body (which is in the lab) answers “no”, that’s a mistake according to the 
view in question. For on this view, AlexRW is walking down the street, since 
AlexRW—the person with Alex’s original body—is a person who has two 
bodies, one of whose bodies—the one that used to belong to Chad—is 
walking down the street. So, the idea goes, we don’t have a case of a single 
thing with conflicting properties after all, thus clearing the way to denying 
FS4 and insisting that ChadRW and AlexRW are the same person, namely JoJo. 
 This is an incredibly weird way of thinking about the DOUBLE TROUBLE 
case. And it can’t be right, for the very same reasons that it can’t be right to 
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say that conjoined twins Abby and Brittany are the same person (see section 
4.1). Suppose that ChadRW goes on to marry a man named ‘Emir’. Emir later 
kisses AlexRW (without ChadRW’s consent), and then kills ChadRW so he can 
be with AlexRW. If ChadRW and AlexRW were the same person, then Emir isn’t 
cheating on ChadRW, since Emir was kissing ChadRW (a.k.a. AlexRW); and 
Emir didn’t kill anyone, since ChadRW is AlexRW, and ChadRW is still alive 
(all Emir did, on this view, is destroy one of ChadRW’s two bodies). But 
surely that’s wrong. Emir did cheat on ChadRW, and the district attorney 
would be right to charge him with homicide—all of which presupposes that 
FS4 is right, and that ChadRW and AlexRW are two different people. 
 
6. Souls 
Some may feel that I have overlooked an obvious answer to the question of 
personal identity, namely that it’s your soul that makes you the person that 
you are. In other words, one might embrace the Same Soul Account of 
personal identity: 
 
The Same Soul Account 
A at t is the same person as B at t* if and only if A has the same soul as 
B 
 
The Same Soul Account could then be put to work in addressing the various 
challenging cases we have been discussing. Abby and Brittany, one might 
say, are different people because they have two different souls. The 
conscious and unconscious man on the island are the same person because 
they have the same soul. MaleT and MaleW in the BODY SWAP case are 
different people because Raúl’s soul left the male body and now inhabits 
the female body. 
 But what exactly is “a soul”? I suspect that when people talk about their 
souls, this is just a roundabout way of talking about themselves. For 
instance, if you’re talking about souls in the first place, you probably think 
that your soul is something that will eventually come apart from your body 
and that will (if you have behaved yourself) go to heaven. Certainly, 
though, you don’t think it’s something other than you that goes to heaven. 
It’s you yourself who will go to heaven. In that case, saying “my soul will 
go to heaven” is just another way of saying “I will go to heaven”, and maybe 
calling yourself “a soul” is just a way of signaling that you take yourself to 
be a ghostly thing that merely inhabits—but isn’t the same thing as—your 
physical body.  
 Let’s suppose that’s what you mean: you are your soul. But then the 
Same Soul Account doesn’t actually answer the question of personal 
identity. For suppose that “A’s soul” is just a fancy way of referring to A 
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herself, and “B’s soul” is just a fancy way of referring to B herself. In that 
case, all that the Same Soul Account is saying is: A is the same person as B 
if and only if A is the same person as B. And while that’s true, it’s also 
completely trivial and uninformative. It’s like answering the question of 
what makes someone a bachelor by saying that A is bachelor if and only if 
A is a bachelor. That’s true, but it’s trivial, and it certainly doesn’t tell us 
anything about what makes someone a bachelor.  
 Nor, in that case, does the Same Soul Account actually shed light on the 
cases we have been discussing. You say that Abby and Brittany are different 
people because they have different souls. But that’s just a fancy way of 
saying that Abby and Brittany are different people because they’re different 
people, which isn’t much of an explanation at all. The same goes for TOTAL 
BLACKOUT: saying that the conscious and unconscious man are the same 
person because they have the same soul is just a roundabout way of making 
the utterly uninformative claim that they are the same person because 
they’re the same person. The Same Soul Account is particularly unhelpful 
in DOUBLE TROUBLE. The Same Soul Account says that whether JoJo is 
ChadRW or AlexRW depends on which of those two people has JoJo’s soul. 
But that just means that whether JoJo is ChadRW or AlexRW depends on 
which of them is JoJo—which is exactly what we’re trying to figure out! 
 Perhaps you don’t want to say that a person is the same thing as their 
soul. Suppose, instead, you want to say that the soul is merely one part of 
the person (their body being the other part). In that case, saying that Abby 
and Brittany are different people because they have different souls would be 
saying something nontrivial, namely that they are different people in virtue 
of failing to share a certain special immaterial part. Still, there are problems 
with the account, so understood.  
 The first problem is that it’s still entirely unhelpful for settling questions 
of personal identity. Even if you think JoJo and her soul are two different 
things, what could possibly determine whether JoJo’s soul went into 
ChadRW’s body or AlexRW’s body? Both of them think and act just like JoJo, 
so there would seem to be nothing at all to settle the question of which one 
acquired her soul. Indeed, the account leaves us with no way to assure 
ourselves that we persist from one moment to the next. You can check 
whether you are a psychological descendant of the person who was reading 
this page a moment ago, or whether you have the same body as that person, 
but there’s no way to check whether you have the same immaterial part as 
that person—and therefore (if the Same Soul Account is right) no way to 
know that you are the same person who was reading this page a moment 
ago!  
 The second problem involves the separability of the soul from the body. 
If these really are different parts of a person, there should be nothing in 
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principle to stop the immaterial part of one person from coming apart from 
that person and combining with another body at a later time. Suppose it 
turns out that your immaterial part (your “soul”) is the same one that used 
to be part of Harriet Tubman. You don’t look like her. You didn’t inherit 
any of her memories and personality traits. All that’s happened is that an 
immaterial thing that used to be part of her is now a part of you. Certainly, 
we shouldn’t say in that case that you are Harriet Tubman. Finding out that 
your immaterial part used to be a part of her may be exciting, just as it 
would be exciting to find out that a large number of carbon atoms in your 
body used to be part of her. But neither of these would show that you’re the 
same person as her.  
 For these reasons, I don’t think that the Same Soul Account is any 
improvement on the physical and psychological accounts we have already 
considered and dismissed. 
 
7. Combining the Psychological and Bodily Accounts 
I argued in sections 4 and 5 that neither the Same Body Account nor the 
Psychological Descendant Account can serve as an adequate theory of 
personal identity. One might suspect that we ran into all this trouble 
because we were focusing too narrowly on just physical aspects or just 
psychological aspects. Perhaps the problems can all be avoided if we had 
considered hybrid theories of personal identity that involve a combination 
of physical and psychological factors. To quiet these concerns, I’ll conclude 
this chapter by considering two ways of incorporating physical and 
psychological considerations into a single account: a Body-And-Mind 
Account and a Body-Or-Mind Account. 
 
The Body-And-Mind Account 
A at t is the same person as B at t* if and only if A has the same body as 
B and A is a psychological ancestor or descendant of B 
 
The Body-Or-Mind Account 
A at t is the same person as B at t* if and only if A has the same body as 
B or A is a psychological ancestor or descendant of B 
 
 Let’s begin with the Body-And-Mind Account. This account does have 
certain advantages over the earlier accounts. For instance, whereas the 
Same Body Account wrongly entails that conjoined twins Abby and 
Brittany are the same person, the Body-And-Mind Account rightly entails 
that they’re two different people, since Abby isn’t a psychological 
descendant of Brittany (or vice versa). And whereas the Psychological 
Descendant Account gets into trouble with DOUBLE TROUBLE on account of 
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having to say that JoJo is numerically the same as two separate people, the 
Body-And-Mind Account is able to avoid the problem by denying that JoJo 
is numerically the same as either of those people (since neither has the same 
body as JoJo). 
 But the Body-And-Mind Account does fall victim to some of the other 
objections we considered. For instance, it gets the wrong result in TOTAL 
BLACKOUT. The conscious man at the earlier time is neither a psychological 
ancestor nor a psychological descendant of the unconscious man at the later 
time. So trivially, it’s not true that the conscious man both has the same body 
and is an ancestor or descendant of the unconscious man. The Body-And-
Mind Account therefore wrongly says that he isn’t the same person as the 
unconscious man. Or take BODY SWAP. The person with the male body 
before the rewiring is the same person as the person with the female body 
after the rewiring. But they don’t have the same body, and thus the Body-
And-Mind Account wrongly implies that they aren’t the same person.  
 How about the Body-Or-Mind Account? Here we get exactly the 
opposite results: the Body-Or-Mind Account escapes the problems that 
plagued the Body-And-Mind Account but is plagued by the problems that 
the Body-And-Mind Account does escape. The Body-Or-Mind Account 
correctly says that the conscious man is numerically the same as the 
unconscious man, since they do at least have the same body, and it correctly 
says that in BODY SWAP the person with male body on Tuesday is 
numerically the same as the person with the female body on Wednesday, 
since the one is at least a psychological descendant of the other. But now we 
get the wrong results in DOUBLE TROUBLE. The Body-Or-Mind Account says 
that being a psychological ancestor is enough for personal identity, which 
is all we need to get the problematic result that JoJo is the same person as 
two separate people. And it says that having the same body is enough for 
personal identity, which is all we need to get the problematic result that 
Abby and Brittany are the same person. 
 In a way, it’s no surprise that neither of these hybrid accounts work. The 
Body-And-Mind Account says that both sameness of body and 
psychological descendance are necessary for personal identity, but we 
already knew (from BODY SWAP and TOTAL BLACKOUT) that neither is 
necessary. The Body-Or-Mind Account says that sameness of body and 
psychological descendance are each sufficient for personal identity, but we 
already knew (from CONJOINED TWINS and DOUBLE TROUBLE) that neither is 
sufficient. It’s no wonder that these hybrid accounts inherit the problems of 





We have seen that neither physical factors, nor psychological factors, nor 
appeals to souls can yield a satisfactory answer to the question of personal 
identity. And that’s puzzling, since it is hard to see what else could be 
involved in making a person the person that they are.  
 Not only is it puzzling; it’s also troubling. For there are pressing ethical 
and life-and-death issues that seem to turn on the question of what makes 
you you. Is it true that a person’s life begins at conception? In other words, 
was that fertilized egg cell in your mother’s womb you? If you are in a 
horrific accident, is that brain-dead person on life support in the hospital 
bed you? And let’s not kid ourselves: we will get to a point, possibly even 
in your own lifetime, where we have the technology to replicate a person’s 
mind in a computer simulation. Would that simulated person—with all of 
your memories, preferences, and personality traits—be you? Would 
uploading your consciousness into such a simulation be a way of surviving 
the death of your body, or would that be a numerically different person—
very much like you, but not actually you? It is hard to see how to answer 




1. Can you defend the Same Body Account against the Conjoined Twins 
argument from section 4.1?  
 
2. Would a Same Brain Account be any improvement on a Same Body 
Account? Why or why not? 
 
3. Can the Psychological Descendant Account be defended against the 
Blackout Argument (section 5.1)? If so, how? 
 
4. In section 7, I considered two different hybrid accounts of personal 
identity and raised problems for both. Can you articulate a superior 
hybrid account that avoids some of these problems? 
 
Sources 
The debate over personal identity largely traces back to John Locke’s Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, which advances a psychological account 
of personal identity and presents a version of the body swap argument as 
well as an argument against the Same Soul Account. See Tim Campbell and 
Jeff McMahan’s “Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning” and 
Alexandria Boyle’s “Conjoined Twinning and Biological Individuation” for 
discussion of conjoined twins. See Derek Parfit’s “Personal Identity” for a 
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classic discussion of fission cases, and see Heather Demarest’s “Fission May 
Kill You” for an exploration of the “one person, two bodies” strategy. Here 
are some additional resources:  
 
• “The Twins Who Share a Body” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K57IcN9DWXo 
• Elizabeth Camp: Personal Identity (The Narrative Self):  
http://www.wi-phi.com/video/personal-identity-narrative-self 
• Robert Casati and Achille Varzi: Insurmountable Simplicities (pp.17-23)  
• Crash Course Philosophy: Personal Identity 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=trqDnLNRuSc 
• Clarence Darrow: The Myth of Immortality 
• Michael Della Rocca: Locke on Personal Identity 
http://www.wi-phi.com/video/locke-personal-identity-part-1 
http://www.wi-phi.com/video/locke-personal-identity-part-2 
• Daniel Dennett: Where Am I? 
• Amy Kind: Persons and Personal Identity 
• Ifeanyi A. Menketi: Person and Community in African Traditional 
Thought 
• John Perry: A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality 
• Marya Schechtman: Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, 
and the Unity of the Life  




Don’t Fear the Reaper 
 
Views and arguments advanced in this chapter are not necessarily endorsed by the 
author of the textbook, nor are they original to the author, nor are they meant to be 
consistent with arguments advanced in other chapters. Different chapters represent 
different philosophical perspectives. 
 
1. Introduction 
My aim in this chapter is to argue for the surprising conclusion that you 
shouldn’t fear death. In short, the idea is that the only things that can be 
bad for you, ultimately speaking, are pains and other such unpleasant 
sensations. Accordingly, since you won’t be experiencing any unpleasant 
sensations once you’re dead, being dead isn’t bad for you, and you 
shouldn’t fear things that aren’t bad for you. In other words: 
 
Against Fearing Death 
(FD1) You cease to be conscious when you die 
(FD2) If you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead is not 
bad for you 
(FD3) So, being dead is not bad for you 
(FD4) If being dead is not bad for you, then you should not fear death 
(FD5) So, you should not fear death 
 
 I should emphasize that I am not denying that dying is bad. The process 
of dying can of course be quite painful—both physically and emotionally—
and, thus, bad for you. If you’re going to be torn apart by piranhas 
tomorrow, that’s certainly bad for you and something to be afraid of. But 
you should fear it because the dying will be painful, not because you will 
be dead at the end of it. On the other hand, if you are about to be 
anaesthetized for some surgery and there is a very good chance that you 
will die painlessly while under anesthesia, this is not bad for you and there 
is nothing to fear. 
 I’ll defend the opening premises in reverse order, first arguing (in 
sections 2-3) that if it’s true that you cease to be conscious when you die then 
being dead is not bad for you, and then arguing (in sections 4-5) that it 
indeed is true that you cease to be conscious when you die. Then, having 
established that being dead isn’t bad for you, I defend FD4 (in section 6) on 





My argument for FD2 turns on the idea—sometimes known as 
“hedonism”—that, ultimately speaking, experiencing pleasant sensations is 
the only thing that’s good for you, and experiencing painful sensations is 
the only thing that’s bad for you. And when I say ‘painful’, that should be 
understood in a broad sense, to include psychological and emotional pain, 
in addition to physical pain and discomfort.  
 It’s easy to see the appeal of hedonism. Why is it bad for you if someone 
kicks you? Because it’s painful. Why it is bad for you not to brush your 
teeth? Because you might get plaque. Why is that bad for you? Because 
plaque leads to cavities. Why is that bad for you? Because cavities are 
painful. 
 Still, we must be careful in how exactly we formulate our hedonistic 
account of what’s bad for you. For instance, suppose we tried to following: 
 
(HD) Something is bad for you if and only if it’s painful  
 
There are multiple problems with HD. First, there are all sorts of things that 
are bad for you that aren’t themselves painful. For instance, eating a whole 
large pizza in one sitting isn’t painful, but it is bad for you. Second, there 
are all sorts of painful things that aren’t bad for you. For instance, a deep-
tissue massage isn’t bad for you, but it can be somewhat unpleasant while 
it’s happening. 
 Thinking a bit more about these examples can help us see what’s 
missing from HD. Why is eating the whole pizza bad for you? Because, later 
in the day, you’ll have a painful stomach ache. Why isn’t the deep-tissue 
massage bad for you? Because working out the knots in your muscles 
results in your having less discomfort later on. What we’re seeing is that 
what makes something bad for you isn’t just whether it itself is painful but 
also its connection to the presence or absence of future pains. With this in 
mind, we can restate the principle as follows: 
 
(HD*) Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain than 
you would otherwise have had  
 
This is still true to the core hedonist insight stated above. Eating the whole 
pizza in one sitting is bad for you because it results in a painful stomach 
ache that you wouldn’t otherwise have had. Massages aren’t bad for you 
because, even if they’re painful in the moment, they eliminate future pains 
that you would otherwise have had. Ultimately speaking, what is or isn’t 
bad for you is still just a matter of what is or isn’t painful for you. 
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3. The Argument from Hedonism 
With HD* in hand, we can now run an argument for FD2 of the Against 
Fearing Death argument.  
 
The Argument from Hedonism 
(AH1) If you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead 
doesn’t result in more pain than you would otherwise have had 
(AH2) Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain than 
you would otherwise have had  
(FD2) So, if you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead 
isn’t bad for you 
 
Premise AH1 is trivial. Pain is a conscious state, so if you aren’t conscious 
while you’re dead, then you don’t have any pain while you’re dead. And 
the second premise is just our modified hedonist principle, HD*. 
Accordingly, one might try to resist the argument by attacking HD*. I’ll 
consider three sorts of attacks.  
 First, one might point to people who suffer from what’s called 
“congenital analgesia”, a rare condition which involves an inability to 
experience pain. While this may at first seem like a good thing, it’s easy to 
see on reflection why this is actually very bad for those who have it. They 
might, for instance, place their hand in a fire and not realize it before their 
hand is irreparably damaged. But (the idea goes) HD* seems to entail that 
this condition can’t be bad for those who have it, nor for that matter can 
anything bad ever befall them, since nothing can be painful for them.  
 In response, I deny that HD* entails any such thing. Remember that 
‘pain’ isn’t restricted to unpleasant physical sensations. It also includes the 
sort of emotional distress that one would have from irreparably damaging 
one’s hand, and those suffering from this condition are entirely capable of 
experiencing these sorts of psychological pains.  
 Second, one might object to HD* on the grounds that something can be 
entirely pleasurable and yet still be a bad thing to do. Consider the 
following case: 
 
STOLEN CRUISE  
Brendan is about to go on a week-long cruise, and his girlfriend Pieper 
serves him undercooked chicken, in hopes that he’ll get food poisoning 
and will let her go in his place. Pieper’s plan succeeds, and she has a 
great time on the cruise. She comes back refreshed, relaxed, and feeling 




What Pieper did is bad, and yet it didn’t lead to her having any unpleasant 
sensations.  
 Is that a problem for HD*? No. One must be careful to distinguish 
between something being bad for you and something being bad to do. HD* is 
only about the former and has nothing to say about the latter. If giving 
Brendan food poisoning doesn’t end up being unpleasant for Pieper, then 
it isn’t bad for Pieper that Brendan got food poisoning. But that’s not at all 
to deny that giving him food poisoning was a bad thing to do (which of 
course it was). 
 Now for the third objection to HD*. Here the idea is to grant that 
hedonism is basically right, but to insist upon further changes to its 
formulation. Specifically, one might suggest that something can be bad for 
you not just by giving you painful sensations but also by depriving you of 
pleasant sensations:  
 
(HD**) Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain or 
less pleasure than you would otherwise have had   
 
In short, the idea is that what’s bad for you is what—in one way or 
another—makes you worse off in terms of pleasure and pain. If HD** is 
right, then we won’t be able to get the argument from hedonism off the 
ground. After all, it’s true (for most people) that they would have had more 
pleasure had they not died when they did, in which case HD** entails that 
being dead is bad for them.  
 The problem with HD** is that it is open to counterexamples like the 
following: 
 
UNREAD MAIL  
Carly meets Evan, and they immediately fall in love. Because things are 
going so well with Evan, Carly stops checking her online dating app. 
They have a long and entirely happy life together. It so happens that 
Jami had sent Carly a message shortly after Carly met Evan. If she hadn’t 
met Evan, she would have seen Jami’s message, fallen in love with her, 
and she and Jami would have had a long and happy life together. As a 
matter of fact, she would have been a little tiny bit happier with Jami 
than with Evan. 
 
Carly would have been a tiny bit better off if she hadn’t met Evan. Does that 
mean that it was bad for her that she met Evan? Of course not. Yet HD** 
wrongly implies that it is bad for her that she met Evan. After all, she would 
have had more pleasure in her life had she not met him.  
 This gives us a compelling argument against HD**: 
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The Unread Mail Argument 
(UM1) Carly would have had more pleasure had she not met Evan 
(UM2) If Carly would have had more pleasure had she not met Evan, 
then: if HD** is true, then meeting Evan was bad for her 
(UM3) Meeting Evan was not bad for her 
(UM4) So, HD** is false 
 
Thus, one shouldn’t prefer HD** to my formulation of the principle of 
hedonism, HD*, and we have not found any good reason to reject HD*, the 
second premise of the Argument from Hedonism. 
  
4. Against Post-Mortem Consciousness 
We’ve just seen an argument for the conditional premise that if you cease 
to be conscious when you die, then being dead is not bad for you. But why 
think that you do cease to be conscious when you die? In other words, why 
accept premise FD1 of the Against Fearing Death argument?  
 Some readers likely already accept it: when you die, you cease to exist 
and your consciousness is snuffed out completely. After all, your brain 
stops working and that’s the source of all conscious experience. Others, 
however, may need some convincing. They may think that, after death, we 
continue to have conscious experiences in some sort of afterlife, perhaps in 
heaven or hell. Or they may be agnostic: we can’t know what happens after 
we die, and we just have to wait and see. 
 I say we don’t have to wait and see. We can settle the matter right now. 
Start by noticing that, right where you are, there is a living, breathing, flesh-
and-blood human animal. For simplicity, I’ll refer to it as “Animal”. Here, 
then, is the argument that you will permanently cease to be conscious once 
you die:  
 
Against Post-Mortem Consciousness 
(PC1) If Animal ceases to be conscious when you die and you are 
Animal, then you cease to be conscious when you die 
(PC2) Animal ceases to be conscious when you die 
(PC3) You are Animal 
(FD1) So, you cease to be conscious when you die 
 
First, I’ll explain the idea behind PC1 and PC2, which are both 
straightforward. Then I’ll argue for PC3, which admittedly is more 
controversial. 
 PC1 is extremely plausible once you wrap your mind around what it’s 
saying. PC1 is not saying that you are Animal, nor is it saying that Animal 
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ceases to be conscious when you die. Rather, it’s saying that if both of these 
things are true, then you (yourself) cease to be conscious when you die. Why 
is that? Suppose that you are literally the same thing as Animal. In that case, 
you and Animal are one thing, not two; ‘you’ and ‘Animal’ are just two 
ways of referring to one and the same thing. If you and Animal truly are 
one and the same thing, then anything that’s true about Animal is also true 
of you. It can’t be that Puff Daddy goes to heaven and Sean Combs doesn’t, 
since Puff Daddy is Sean Combs. (‘Puff Daddy’ is Sean Combs’s stage 
name.) There is only one individual there to go or not go to heaven. By the 
same reasoning, if Animal ceases to be conscious when you die, then—
supposing you are Animal—you must also cease to be conscious when you 
die. That’s PC1. 
 Now for PC2. Set aside for a moment whether you cease to be conscious 
when you die, and just focus on Animal. Why think that Animal isn’t 
conscious after you die? When you die, Animal will still be here on earth, 
as a dead animal, waiting to be buried or cremated. It will have no brain 
function whatsoever. We can poke and prod it, and it won’t feel anything. 
Even if you think there might be a conscious afterlife, you certainly don’t 
think that it’s the rotting human animals in the cemetery (a.k.a. corpses) 
that are having the conscious experiences. In other words, even if you think 
there will be or might be a conscious afterlife, you should still accept PC2: 
you shouldn’t think that Animal itself will be conscious after you die. 
  
5. The Too Many Thinkers Argument 
If you think that you will (or might) go on to enjoy a conscious afterlife, 
what you’ll probably want to say is that you and Animal part ways after 
death: Animal ceases to be conscious at that point, but you go on having 
conscious experiences in the afterlife. But, as I have already argued, you 
and Animal can part ways only if you and Animal are two different things. 
Accordingly, you’ll have to deny PC3, which says that you and Animal are 
one and the same.  
 And yet there is a simple and powerful argument for this premise. 
You’ll want to sit down for this. (Seriously, sit down. And sit by yourself—
if you’ve got a cat in your lap, shoo it away.) Here is the argument: 
 
The Too Many Thinkers Argument 
(TT1) Animal is in your chair and is thinking  
(TT2) You are the only thing in your chair that is thinking  
(PC3) So you are Animal 
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Let’s take the premises one at a time. If both TT1 and TT2 can be 
successfully defended, then I will in turn have defended PC3, the crucial 
premise of the argument that you will cease to be conscious when you die. 
 At least on the face of it, TT1 is incredibly plausible. Your head is part 
of Animal and so is your brain. And this brain of yours is a fully functioning 
brain. Of course, it won’t be a fully functioning brain after you die. But 
that’s irrelevant, because TT1 doesn’t say that Animal will be thinking after 
you die. It says that that Animal is thinking right now. And that seems 
undeniable, given that it now has a fully functioning brain as a part. 
 You may be tempted to object that it’s not Animal itself that’s thinking. 
Animal, you’ll say, is a mere vessel, and it’s you—a distinct, perhaps ghostly 
“soul” that inhabits the animal—that’s doing all the thinking. Here’s why 
you should resist the temptation. Certainly, you’ll admit that other animals, 
like squirrels or dogs, are capable of thinking. (If you don’t admit that, you’d 
have to say that squirrels and dogs have no intelligence whatsoever; after 
all, something can’t very well be intelligent if it doesn’t think.) But once you 
admit that these animals have thoughts, it would be absurd to deny that 
human animals, with their far more advanced brains, have thoughts. 
 How about TT2? TT2 says that you are the only thinking thing in your 
chair. To see the idea behind this premise, just think about what would be 
involved in denying it. You’d have to say that something other than you is in 
your chair right now with you, and it’s thinking. But that seems absurd.  
 You might try to lessen the absurdity by saying that, yes, you and 
Animal are two different things, both in your chair, both thinking, but 
you’re thinking about different things. You’re thinking about abstract 
philosophical matters, and it’s thinking about bodily concerns like eating 
lunch or taking a nap. But that can’t be right. It’s got the same brain as you, 
which means that it’s thinking exactly the same thoughts as you. For 
instance, if you’re thinking to yourself right now, “I’m a person, not a mere 
animal”, it’s because your brain is in a certain specific state. But Animal’s 
brain is in exactly that same state. After all, it’s got the same brain as you! 
So, it must be thinking exactly the same thing: “I’m a person, not a mere 
animal”. The same goes for absolutely anything you and Animal are 
thinking. And that’s completely absurd: surely there aren’t two different 
things in your chair, simultaneously thinking all the same thoughts.  
 TT1 and TT2 together entail PC3. What that means is that if you don’t 
want to accept PC3, you must reject one of these two premises. But, as we 
just saw, the premises are hard to deny, and in any case PC3 is already 




6. Irrational Fears 
I have thus far argued that being dead is not bad for you. The first premise, 
FD1, was that you cease to be conscious when you die, and I argued for this 
premise on the grounds that the human animal that’s where you are ceases 
to be conscious when you die, which in turn means that you cease to be 
conscious when you die (since you are that animal). The second premise, 
FD2, was that death is bad for you only if you continue to be conscious after 
you die; after all, the only things that are bad for you, ultimately speaking, 
are pains and things that lead to pain. But the claim that being dead is not 
bad for you (FD3) is merely a subconclusion of the argument. The ultimate 
conclusion (FD5) is that you shouldn’t fear death, and for that we need one 
more premise. 
 The final premise of the Against Fearing Death argument, FD4, says that 
if being dead isn’t bad for you, then you shouldn’t fear death. To see why 
we should accept that, we need to think more generally about what makes 
a fear rational or irrational. Suppose a tarantula crawls onto your hand. 
Really, it’s not all that dangerous. It’s pretty unlikely to bite you, and even 
if it did it actually wouldn’t be any more painful or harmful than an 
ordinary bee sting. But even knowing how harmless they are, you might 
still be utterly terrified of a tarantula crawling onto you. And that would be 
irrational. Why? Because that amount of fear is disproportionate to the 
likelihood of something bad happening to you and how bad it would be if 
it did.  
 Still, it could bite you, so it’s rational to be a little bit afraid of the 
tarantula, just like it’s rational to be a little bit afraid of honeybees. But there 
are other things that it is irrational to fear to any degree. Take ablutophobia, 
the fear of bathing. Ablutophobia is completely irrational because bathing 
is not bad for you, not even a little bit. Or take lepidopterophobia, the fear 
of butterflies. This is irrational too, and it’s irrational because having an 
encounter with a butterfly is not in any way bad for you. Or take 
podophobia, the fear of seeing feet (including one’s own). What makes all 
of these irrational fears so irrational is precisely that the object of the fear 
isn’t in any way bad for the person who fears it. You shouldn’t fear things 
that aren’t bad for you. So, if indeed being dead isn’t bad for you, you 
shouldn’t fear it at all, just as FD4 says.  
 One might object that it’s unnatural to fear all these other things, whereas 
it’s completely natural to fear death. Fair enough. I’m not denying that 
fearing death is natural. I’m denying that fearing death is rational. Just 
because it comes naturally to us to act or react in a certain way, that doesn’t 
mean it’s rational. (Google “cognitive biases”, and you’ll see what I mean.) 
And in any case, it just isn’t true that all of those other fears are unnatural. 
It’s entirely normal for people to experience excessive fear of spiders and 
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other creepy crawlies. And we can all recognize, on reflection, that this 
degree of fear is excessive and irrational, despite being our natural reaction. 
 Thus, I conclude that death isn’t bad for you and you shouldn’t fear it. 
This is a surprising result, but not necessarily a bad one. After all, 
fearfulness is emotionally painful, and if this argument helps you do 
without that pain, that’s good for you! 
 
Reflection Questions 
1. Can you think of any counterexamples to the hedonist principle HD* 
from section 2? Could such an example give us reason to prefer HD** 
from section 3? 
 
2. Do the hedonist principles discussed in sections 2 and 3 imply that being 
born into this world was bad for you? Why or why not? If they do, can 
they be modified to avoid this implication? 
 
3. Are you convinced by the Against Post-Mortem Consciousness 
argument in sections 4-5? In particular, are you convinced by the 
argument that you and Animal are one and the same thing? 
 
4. In the final section, I suggested that it can never be rational to fear 
something that is not bad for you. Is that true? Can it be rational to fear 
something because it’s bad for others? Do we fear death because (and 
only because) of how our deaths will affect other people? 
 
Sources 
The argument advanced here originates with the ancient Greek philosopher 
Epicurus, in his “Letter to Menoeceus”. See Fred Feldman’s Confrontations 
with the Reaper for a more in-depth discussion of philosophical questions 
about death, and in particular chapter 8 of his book for a defense of the idea 
that death is bad because it deprives one of good things. The Too Many 
Thinkers argument in section 5 is drawn from Eric Olson’s “An Argument 
for Animalism”. Here are some additional resources: 
 
• Jorge Luis Borges: The Immortal 
• Ben Bradley: Existential Terror 
• Dorothy Grover: Posthumous Harm 
• Lori Gruen: Death as a Social Harm 
• A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley: The Hellenistic Philosophers vol 1 (sec 24) 
• Shelley Kagan: Death (https://oyc.yale.edu/death/phil-176) 
• Thomas Nagel: Death 
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• Richard Rowland: Hedonism and the Experience Machine 
• Lynne Rudder Baker: Death and the Afterlife 









Taxation is Immoral 
 
Views and arguments advanced in this chapter are not necessarily endorsed by the 
author of the textbook, nor are they original to the author, nor are they meant to be 
consistent with arguments advanced in other chapters. Different chapters represent 
different philosophical perspectives. 
 
Governments sometimes do things that are morally questionable, for 
instance instituting drug laws that disproportionately punish low income 
and minority groups, or distributing tax dollars to controversial 
organizations. What I aim to show here is that even some of the most basic 
and seemingly uncontroversial functions of government are morally 
questionable. Specifically, I will argue that it is morally wrong for 
governments to tax or imprison their citizens at all. 
 In section 1, I advance my argument against taxation and imprisonment, 
which turns on the idea that there is no relevant difference between taxation 
and extortion, or between imprisoning and kidnapping. In section 2, I 
consider and dismiss some preliminary attempts to justify taxes and prison. 
In sections 3-4, I criticize the most promising attempt to resist the argument, 
according to which we consent to this treatment by entering into a “social 
contract” with their government. Finally, in section 5, I show how my 
argument can be adapted to establish that it’s impermissible to place 
restrictions on immigration.  
 
1. Taxation and Extortion 
Maybe it seems obvious to you that the government has every moral right 
to imprison and tax its citizens. To begin to see why it’s not so obvious, 
notice how morally problematic it would be for an ordinary citizen to do 
more or less the same thing.  
 
VIGILANTE  
Jasmine discovers that some con men have set up a fake charity and are 
conning some people in her neighborhood. She captures them at 
gunpoint, takes them to her basement, and plans to keep them there for 
a year as punishment. Quickly realizing how expensive it is to take care 
of them, Jasmine goes to her neighbors and demands $50 from each of 
them, at gunpoint. She explains that half the money will go towards 
taking care of her prisoners and that the rest will go towards a gym she 
is building to help keep troubled kids off the street. Those who do not 




I’m going to go out on a limb here and say that what Jasmine is doing is 
wrong. When she demands money from her neighbors at gunpoint, that’s 
called extortion. When she takes those who refuse to pay and locks them up 
in her basement, that’s called kidnapping. It is wrong to kidnap people, and 
it is wrong to extort people, even when it’s for a good cause. 
 My argument against taxation and imprisonment is going to turn on the 
idea that there’s no morally relevant difference between what Jasmine does 
and what the government does. So, let me begin by saying something about 
what that means. Suppose I walk into my house, raid my fridge, sit down 
on my couch, and flip on my TV. There’s nothing wrong with that. Now 
suppose that I walk into your house (without permission), raid your fridge, 
sit down on your couch, and start watching TV. That isn’t morally okay. 
Why is it morally okay in the one case but not in the other? Here’s the 
obvious difference: my house belongs to me, and your house doesn’t belong 
to me. In other words, the fact that my house and fridge belong to me and 
yours don’t is a difference between the actions that explains the moral 
difference between them, why the one is morally okay and the other isn’t. 
This difference in ownership is an example of what I’m calling a morally 
relevant difference. More precisely, a morally relevant difference between 
two things is a difference between them that can explain why they differ 
morally. 
 Not just any difference will count as a morally relevant difference. To 
see this, suppose I’m in my car and I run over a person who’s jogging past, 
and compare this to a case in which I run over a cockroach that’s crawling 
past. The cases differ in multiple ways. In the one case, the thing I ran over 
was jogging and in the other case the thing I ran over was crawling. But 
that’s not what explains the moral difference between the two actions, why 
I did something immoral in the one case but not the other. Rather, the 
morally relevant difference is that in the first case it’s a person I ran over 
and in the second case it’s a cockroach. What this shows is that just because 
you’ve identified a difference between two cases, it still may not be a 
morally relevant difference. Indeed, it may be that two cases differ in all 
sorts of ways, and yet none of the differences are morally relevant. 
 Now that I have explained the notion of a morally relevant difference, 




Against Taxation and Imprisonment 
(TX1) If there is no morally relevant difference between two actions A 
and B, then: if A is wrong, then B is wrong 
(TX2) It is wrong for Jasmine to extort and kidnap her neighbors 
(TX3) There is no morally relevant difference between Jasmine extorting 
and kidnapping her neighbors and the government taxing and 
imprisoning its citizens 
(TX4) So, it is wrong for the government to tax and imprison its citizens 
 
 The idea behind TX1 is that, whenever there is some moral difference 
between two cases, there must always be some further difference between 
them to explain why they differ morally. Absent some such difference, it 
would be arbitrary to say that the one action is wrong and the other isn’t—
just as it would be arbitrary for me to bump some students who earn an 
86% up to a B+ but not others. As for TX2, my hope is that it will strike you 
as obvious. I’m not sure what more I could say to convince you that 
extortion and kidnapping are wrong.  
 TX3, by contrast, probably doesn’t strike you as obvious. Maybe you’ve 
already thought of multiple differences between what Jasmine does and 
what the government does that could potentially explain why what she 
does is wrong but what the government does isn’t. The following three 
sections will be devoted to defending the argument by addressing such 
putative differences. 
 
2. Identifying Morally Relevant Differences 
In this section, I’ll consider six putative morally relevant differences 
between what Jasmine does and what the government does, and I’ll show 
that they do not undermine the argument—either because they are not 
morally relevant after all, or because we can adjust the VIGILANTE case to 
make the differences go away. 
 First, one might suggest that the morally relevant difference is that what 
Jasmine does is illegal, whereas what the government does is not illegal. It’s 
true that it’s not illegal when the government does it. And since it’s the 
government that makes the laws, it’s no surprise that it permits itself to tax 
and imprison people. Yet plenty of immoral things aren’t illegal, for 
instance cheating on your partner or on a midterm exam. And plenty of 
illegal things aren’t immoral, for instance underage drinking, or driving 
without a seatbelt. So, it’s far from clear why this difference in legal 
permissibility would be a morally relevant difference.  
 Second, one might observe that, unlike Jasmine, the government doesn’t 
come to your door and demand money at gunpoint when taxes are due. 
That’s true. Though let’s not forget that they will eventually come to your 
 111 
door with guns to take you to jail if you ignore their polite reminders for 
long enough. With that in mind, let’s revise the Jasmine case to tighten the 
analogy: 
 
BUREAUCRATIC VIGILANTE  
Jasmine sends an email to all of her neighbors, informing them that they 
must each send her $50 by April 15; that if they don’t, they’ll 
automatically be granted an extension, but will be charged a small late 
fee; and that if they still don’t pay, she will lock them in the basement 
with her other prisoners. Some don’t pay even by the extended deadline, 
and she shows up at their door, escorts them to her home at gunpoint, 
and locks them in her basement. 
 
By revising the story so that Jasmine doesn’t take their money at gunpoint—
but instead leads them to her basement at gunpoint when they consistently 
fail to pay—we have eliminated the alleged morally relevant difference 
between the two cases. We no longer have an objection to TX3. Of course, 
now that we have changed the details of the case, we need to make sure 
that TX2—which says that Jasmine is doing something wrong—is still 
plausible. But surely it is, even when we modify the procedure by which 
she extorts and kidnaps her neighbors. 
 Third, one might point out that government officials have been elected 
to serve as representatives of our interests, whereas Jasmine was not 
elected. This may indeed be a morally relevant difference, but we can again 
revise the case so as to circumvent it. 
 
ELECTED VIGILANTE  
Jasmine plans to start taking prisoners and demanding $50 at gunpoint 
from each of her neighbors to pay for the prisoners and a gym. Zhiwen 
thinks it would be better to demand $75, with the additional $25 going 
towards hiring a nurse to provide free medical care to anyone in the 
neighborhood. Jasmine and Zhiwen let their neighbors vote on which of 
them should get to set the policies for kidnapping and extortion. Many 
don’t vote but, of those who do, the majority prefer Jasmine. Zhiwen 
accepts the results of the election, and Jasmine begins kidnapping and 
extorting her neighbors. 
 
It still seems as if Jasmine is doing something wrong. So TX2 remains true. 
And since Jasmine is elected in this revised case, the proposed objection to 
TX3 fails. Nor should it be any surprise that holding an election doesn’t 
make a difference. Suppose I order pizza for the whole class, and when it 
arrives we vote on who pays the bill. The majority of the students vote that 
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you should pay, and so I point a gun at you and demand that you pay. That 
would be wrong, even though we voted on it. 
 Fourth, one might insist that it’s okay for the government to imprison 
criminals because it’s public knowledge what the laws are and what the 
penalties are for violating them, whereas Jasmine just starts kidnapping and 
extorting people out of nowhere. There’s an easy fix here as well. We simply 
build it into the story that, before she starts kidnapping people and 
demanding money at gunpoint, she posts a large, laminated poster in the 
center of town, labeled “Jasmine’s Rules”, and once everyone has had a 
chance to read it, she begins locking up violators in her basement and 
demanding money from her neighbors on threat of imprisonment. 
 Fifth, one might insist that taxation and imprisonment are morally 
justified because we would all be so much worse off without them. That’s 
almost certainly true, but it’s irrelevant. Jasmine’s kidnapping and extortion 
are also making things better in her neighborhood. There are fewer con 
men, and the gym really is helping keep troubled kids off the street. So, this 
isn’t even a difference between the cases, let alone a morally relevant one.  
 Furthermore, just because something would make the world a better 
place, that doesn’t necessarily mean it’s morally permissible for someone to 
bring it about. To see this, consider the following case: 
 
SAINT AND SINNER  
A saint and a sinner both need a kidney transplant, but there is only one 
kidney available. The saint refuses it and insists that it be given to the 
sinner. The doctor, knowing that the world will be better off if the saint 
survives than if the sinner survives, anaesthetizes the saint and gives 
her the kidney against her wishes and without her consent. The saint 
(who would otherwise have died) goes on to live a long life and does 
many saintly things. 
 
Clearly, what the doctor did was morally impermissible, even though the 
doctor’s actions made the world a better place on the whole. Likewise, even 
if the world would be a worse place without someone locking up criminals 
and forcing the rest of us to help pay for it, that doesn’t mean it’s morally 
okay for anyone to actually do it. 
 Sixth, one might insist that the country belongs to the government, 
whereas the neighborhood does not belong to Jasmine, and that this is why 
the government but not Jasmine is allowed to do these things. But I see no 
more reason to think that the country literally belongs to the government 
than that some street corner literally belongs to the drug dealers that have 
claimed it. It’s true that the government acts like they own the place, and 
that they have enough power to cow people into letting them do what they 
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want. But there’s no good reason to think that some patch of the surface of 
the earth is literally owned by the government. It’s just not plausible that 
the country and the neighborhood differ in this way. 
 
3. The Social Contract 
What we have just seen is that, while there are plenty of differences between 
what Jasmine does in VIGILANTE and what the government does in taxing 
and imprisoning its citizens, many of those differences don’t have what it 
takes to undermine TX3 of the argument. I turn now to a somewhat more 
promising proposal, but we will see that it ultimately fails as well.   
 Here, the idea is that we have entered into a sort of contract with the 
government. They provide us with things like roads, fire departments, 
national parks, and protection from criminals and hostile governments. In 
return, we agree to pay taxes and obey the laws of the land. And contracts 
can make a moral difference. It would be wrong for me to let myself into 
your home… unless you are subletting it to me, since in that case we have 
a contract permitting me to enter. Accordingly, this could potentially be the 
morally relevant difference we’ve been looking for. 
 Have we entered into such a contract with our government? Unlike a 
typical contract, you never explicitly agreed to this arrangement, either 
verbally or in writing. But that doesn’t necessarily mean you haven’t 
consented to the arrangement. After all, there is such a thing as tacit (or 
implicit) consent, where one consents through one’s conduct, without any 
stated agreement. How does that sort of thing happen? 
 It can happen in all sorts of ways. I’ll mention three. First, one can 
sometimes tacitly consent to something by accepting certain kinds of 
benefits. When you get into a taxi and give the driver an address, you 
thereby consent to paying the fare when you arrive. When you order food 
at a restaurant, you thereby consent to paying the bill; when the bill arrives, 
you don’t get to say “hey wait, I never said I was going to pay for any of 
this!” Second, you can tacitly consent to something by sticking around. If I 
make it clear that anyone who is still at my party after midnight has to help 
clean up, and you stay past midnight, you’ve consented to helping clean 
up. That’s so even if you never explicitly said you were willing to help. 
Third, it’s possible to tacitly consent to something by passively going along 
with it without objection. For instance, if your professor says “I’m planning 
to move the exam to 9am, is that a problem?”, and no one says anything, 
you’ve all tacitly consented to the exam being held at 9am. 
 Notice that every one of these potential sources of tacit consent is 
present in our relationship with the government. First, we accept all sorts 
of services that the government provides. We use the roads and public 
parks, for instance, and benefit from the (relative) lack of crime provided 
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by police departments. Second, we choose to stick around in the country, 
knowing full well that we’ll be expected to follow the laws and pay some 
taxes. Third, we passively accept the laws and taxes without objection. We 
may gripe about them, but we don’t explicitly refuse to obey the laws or 
pay our taxes.  
 
4. No Social Contract 
We have just seen reason to think that we have entered into an unspoken 
contract with the government. We also saw that the existence of a contract 
can make a moral difference, as in the case of subletting. Is this, finally, the 
morally relevant difference we need in order to resist TX3? No, it’s not.  
 To see why not, notice that we haven’t actually identified a difference 
between our relationship with the government and Jasmine’s relationship 
with her neighbors. First, even if they didn’t ask for it, they too are enjoying 
the benefits of having fewer con men and other criminals running around. 
Second, they too choose to stay in the neighborhood even though they 
know that Jasmine is going to demand money from them. Who could blame 
them? They’ve lived their whole lives in that neighborhood. That’s where 
all their family and friends are, that’s where their job is, and they couldn’t 
afford to up and move to a new neighborhood even if they wanted to. Third, 
they don’t vocally object to what Jasmine is doing. After all, it’s unlikely to 
make any difference, and she’s clearly a very dangerous person.  
 What this all shows, I think, is that—despite receiving benefits, sticking 
around, and being passive—her neighbors have not consented to living by 
Jasmine’s rules. But then, by parity of reason, we haven’t tacitly consented 
to living by the government’s rules just by virtue of receiving benefits, 
sticking around, and being passive. (Similar remarks apply to sexual 
consent. Just because someone comes home with you after accepting the 
benefits of being taken out for dinner, doesn’t try to leave, and doesn’t 
vocally object to your advances, that doesn’t mean that they have consented 
to having sex with you.) And if we haven’t thereby tacitly consented to 
living by the government’s rules, then there’s no good reason to think we 
have entered into any “social contract” with the government.  
 We are, however, still left with the question of why these behaviors 
don’t constitute tacit consent in the case of Jasmine and the government and 
yet do constitute tacit consent in the other cases: getting into a taxi, sticking 
around the party, and not objecting to the time change. The answer is that 
there are certain further conditions that have to be met in order for these 
types of behaviors to constitute tacit consent. I’ll mention two. 
 The first condition is that there has to be a reasonable way of opting out 
of the arrangement. In those other cases, there is a reasonable way of opting 
out: you could just pass on the taxi and walk home, leave the party before 
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midnight, or speak up and say that the time change doesn’t work for you. 
By contrast, there’s no reasonable way to opt out of the services the 
government provides. For instance, you can’t get anywhere without using 
their roads. Additionally, you’d have to leave the country to stop 
benefitting from the protection that the government provides, and most 
people can’t afford to leave the country even if they wanted to. And even if 
they could afford to leave, it would require completely uprooting their 
lives. And even if they did that, it wouldn’t do any good, because there’s 
virtually nowhere on the planet for them to go that doesn’t have taxes and 
prisons. There is no reasonable way to opt out. 
 The second condition that has to be met in order for those behaviors to 
constitute tacit consent is that explicit refusal to opt in has to be recognized. 
Suppose you go to a restaurant and they bring you food and charge you for 
it even though you explicitly said you didn’t want any. Or suppose that the 
professor was clearly going to move the exam to 9am even if you and others 
did object to the time change. In that case, you haven’t tacitly consented, 
because explicit refusal to opt in is not recognized. The same is true of our 
arrangement with the government. Here is what happens when people try 
to live “off the grid” and explicitly refuse to pay taxes: government agents 
show up with guns and take them to prison. Explicit refusal to opt in is not 
recognized.  
 We can turn these observations into an argument that we have not 
tacitly consented to paying taxes and following the laws: 
 
No Consent 
(NC1) Someone tacitly consents to an arrangement only if (i) there is a 
reasonable way to opt out and (ii) explicit refusal to opt in is 
recognized 
(NC2) There is no reasonable way to opt out of paying taxes and 
following laws, and explicit refusal to opt in is not recognized 
(NC3) So, we have not tacitly consented to paying taxes and following 
laws 
 
Since we have not tacitly consented to following the laws or being subjected 
to taxation and imprisonment, there is no good reason to think that we have 
entered into an unspoken contract with the government. But that was 
supposed to be the morally relevant difference between what Jasmine does 
and what the government does. Thus, we are back where we started, with 
no morally relevant difference to wield against TX3 of the Against Taxation 





We have seen that governmental practices of taxation and imprisonment 
are immoral. It would be wrong for an ordinary citizen to do these sorts of 
things—even for a good cause—and the government isn’t different from an 
ordinary citizen in any way that makes for a moral difference between the 
two. This same style of argument can be put to work to undermine other 
governmental practices as well. Let’s look at just one example: immigration. 
 Once again, we’ll start with a Jasmine case, and argue from there to a 
conclusion about immigration policy. Here is the case: 
 
UNWANTED VISITORS  
Jasmine and her friends arrive at their neighborhood park for their 
weekly soccer game, only to find a large group from another 
neighborhood already using the park for a game of their own. Guns 
drawn, she directs them into her van, drives them back to their own 
neighborhood, and threatens to lock them in her basement if they ever 
return without first getting her permission. Many do ask for her 
permission, and most of the time she refuses. Some return without her 
permission, and she locks them in her basement. 
 
And here is the argument: 
 
The Argument for Open Borders 
(OB1) If there is no morally relevant difference between two actions A 
and B, then: if A is wrong, then B is wrong 
(OB2) It is wrong for Jasmine to restrict access to the park 
(OB3) There is no morally relevant difference between Jasmine 
restricting access to the park and the government restricting 
access to the country 
(OB4) So, it is wrong for the government to restrict access to the country 
 
OB1 is the same as TX1, so no further defense is needed. OB2, I hope, is 
obvious. So, as before, the main question is whether we should accept OB3. 
Is there a morally relevant difference between Jasmine closing off the park 
and the government closing off its borders?  
 The difference can’t be that the park doesn’t belong to her, since (as 
argued in section 2) it’s equally true that this portion of the earth’s surface 
doesn’t belong to the government. Nor is the difference that people who 
come into the country without permission reap the benefits of tax dollars 
without paying any taxes themselves. For the same is true in Jasmine’s case. 
The visitors are enjoying the benefits of a crime-free park, and the lack of 
crime is subsidized by Jasmine’s extorted neighbors. Indeed, it’s precisely 
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because it’s crime-free that the visitors have come to her park rather than 
using the one in their own neighborhood.  
 
6. What is the Government Permitted to Do? 
We have seen that ordinary governmental practices of taxing citizens, 
imprisoning criminals, and restricting immigration are all morally 
problematic. Is there anything the government can do that isn’t wrong? The 
reasoning I’ve been using above suggest the following answer: it is morally 
acceptable for a government to do a certain thing only if it would be morally 
acceptable for Jasmine to do the same sort of thing.  
 With that in mind, here is one thing the government is permitted to do: 
use weapons and threat of imprisonment to prevent imminent threats from 
foreign countries. This passes the “Jasmine Test” since it also wouldn’t be 
wrong for Jasmine to use guns and threat of imprisonment to deter 
someone who is actively trying to kill her neighbors. I am skeptical, 
however, that the Jasmine Test can be used to justify much else that the 
government does. For instance, it wouldn’t be okay for Jasmine to extort 
her neighbors in order to stockpile weapons in preparation for a purely 
hypothetical future threat to her neighborhood. Accordingly, the Jasmine 
Test can’t be used to justify governmental practices of taxing people in 
order to build up the military in preparation for hypothetical attacks from 
other countries.  
 Let me close by once again emphasizing that the conclusion of this 
chapter is not that the world would be better off without taxation and 
imprisonment. It almost certainly wouldn’t be. The point, rather, is that 
these practices are immoral. Sometimes, as in the SAINT AND SINNER case, 
there is something that could make the world a better place, but no one is 
morally permitted to do it.  
 
Reflection Questions 
1. It was claimed in section 2 that the government doesn’t own the country. 
But how does anyone come to own anything? Try to think of a plausible 
general account of how people come to own things, and see what it 
implies about whether the government owns the country. 
 
2. Is it possible to justify taxation on the grounds that much of the wealth 
that people enjoy is wealth that they are not really entitled to, for 
instance because they acquired it in some unjust way? 
 
3. At the end of the chapter, we used the “Jasmine Test” to show that some 
functions of the government could still be legitimate. What does this test 
say about other government functions that we haven’t considered here? 
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Is this the right test for evaluating whether governmental practices are 
right or wrong? 
 
Sources 
The arguments against political authority and the social contract are drawn 
from Michael Huemer’s The Problem of Political Authority, chapters 1-2. For 
classic defenses of the social contract theory, see Thomas Hobbes’s 
Leviathan, John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s The Social Contract. For a more contemporary defense of a social 
contract theory, see John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. I learned the SAINT AND 
SINNER example from David Boonin. Here are some additional resources:   
 
• Luvell Anderson: The Original Position 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nO5me_5c8dM 
• David Boonin: The Problem of Punishment 
• Steven M. Cahn: Political Philosophy: The Essential Texts 
• Margaret Gilbert: A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, 
Commitment and the Bonds of Society 
• Jean Hampton: The Moral Education Theory of Punishment 
• Jean Hampton: Political Philosophy 
• Michael Huemer: Is Taxation Theft? 
https://www.libertarianism.org/columns/is-taxation-theft? 
• Cynthia Stark: Hypothetical Consent and Justification 
• Christopher Heath Wellman and A. John Simmons: Is There a Duty to 







Abortion is Immoral 
 
Views and arguments advanced in this chapter are not necessarily endorsed by the 
author of the textbook, nor are they original to the author, nor are they meant to be 
consistent with arguments advanced in other chapters. Different chapters represent 
different philosophical perspectives. 
 
1. Preliminaries 
My ultimate aim in this chapter is to argue that abortion is immoral, at least 
in typical cases. But my broader aim is to show that those looking to defend 
the immorality of abortion need to be discerning. Not every argument 
against abortion is a good argument. With this end in mind, I begin by 
considering a number of common arguments and showing that they all fall 
short. I then consider a more promising line of argument for the immorality 
of abortion—turning on the claim that the embryo has a right to life—and I 
argue that it too is ultimately unsatisfactory. Finally, I advance a more 
resilient argument against abortion, which turns on the claim that killing an 
embryo is immoral because the embryo is thereby deprived of a future full 
of valuable experiences, projects, and activities. 
 Some preliminary points before we proceed. We should begin by noting 
that one can think that abortion is immoral in some cases but not others. For 
instance, one might think it’s permissible to abort a pregnancy after six 
weeks but not after six months. Or one might think it’s immoral to abort a 
healthy pregnancy but permissible to abort a pregnancy that is very likely 
to kill the mother. To help anchor our discussion, it will be useful to focus 
on a specific case. 
 
UNWANTED PREGNANCY  
Taylor just discovered that she is pregnant with Emm, a six-week-old 
embryo. The pregnancy resulted from consensual, casual sex. Taylor 
didn’t want to get pregnant, and her partner wore a condom, but they 
were aware that condoms sometimes break, which is what happened in 
this case. Both Taylor and Emm are healthy, and carrying out the 
pregnancy will not pose any threat to Taylor’s life. Even so, Taylor 
knows that going through with the pregnancy will be a huge burden—
physically, emotionally, and financially. So, Taylor decides to have an 
abortion, killing Emm. 
 
Take a moment to Google six week old embryo to get an accurate picture of 
what Emm would look like.  
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 I focus on the case of Emm because it is both a typical case—most 
abortions occur within the first eight weeks and involve failed 
contraception—as well as being a case that parties to the debates typically 
disagree about. So, if we can resolve the question of whether it was immoral 
to kill Emm, we will have made great progress on the morality of abortion. 
 I will use the usual labels of “pro-life” and “pro-choice” to characterize 
the different sides of the debate. A pro-lifer holds that it was immoral to 
abort Emm at six weeks. A pro-choicer holds that it was morally permissible 
to abort Emm at six weeks. But one must be cautious not to read too much 
into these labels. As I use the labels here, they’re specifically about Emm. 
One cannot infer that someone thinks that aborting a life-threatening 
pregnancy is immoral just because they are pro-life (in my sense), nor that 
someone thinks it is permissible to abort a planned pregnancy just because 
they are pro-choice (in my sense).  
 Additionally, I want to separate the question of whether abortion is 
immoral from the question of whether abortion should be illegal. One can 
think that abortion is immoral without thinking that it should be against 
the law, just as one can think that adultery is immoral without thinking that 
it should be against the law. So, one should not assume that those who are 
pro-life (in my sense) think that women should be legally prohibited from 
having an abortion. One can think that abortion is immoral while also 
supporting a woman’s legal right to choose.  
 Finally, notice that very minor transgressions are sometimes immoral, 
for instance shoplifting a pack of gum. Even pro-choicers may agree that 
aborting Emm is at least somewhat immoral, perhaps to a relatively minor 
degree. To sharpen the debate between pro-lifers and pro-choicers, then, I’ll 
focus on the question of whether aborting Emm is “seriously immoral”, by 
which I mean: approximately as immoral as killing a typical human adult. 
 
2. Identifying Wrong-Making Features 
A useful strategy for trying to make headway on the ethics of abortion is to 
try to identify some feature that embryos have or lack that seems relevant 
to the permissibility of abortion. The pro-lifer, for instance, tries to find 
some feature to fill in for X in this argument schema: 
 
 Emm is (or has) X 
 So, it’s seriously immoral to kill Emm 
 
For instance, she may point to the fact that Emm is alive, or that she has 
human DNA, or that she has a beating heart. 
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 The pro-choicer, by contrast, tries to find some feature to fill in for Y in 
this argument schema: 
 
 Emm isn’t Y 
 So, it isn’t seriously immoral to kill Emm 
 
For instance, she may point to the fact that Emm isn’t rational, or that she 
isn’t self-sufficient, or that she isn’t wanted.   
 We’ll need to evaluate each of these ways of developing the argument 
separately. But first notice that the argument schemas above aren’t yet 
complete. What’s needed is some moral principle that can take us from the 
observation that Emm has or lacks a certain property to the conclusion that 
it is or isn’t seriously immoral to abort her. What’s needed is a principle that 
tells us that being or having X makes killing wrong or that lacking Y makes 
killing permissible. In other words, the complete schema for the pro-life 
arguments will look like this: 
 
The X-Schema 
(X1) Emm is (or has) X 
(X2) It’s always seriously immoral to kill something that is (or has) X 
(X3) So it’s seriously immoral to kill Emm 
 
And the complete schema for the pro-choice arguments will look like this: 
 
The Y-Schema 
(Y1) Emm isn’t Y 
(Y2) It’s seriously immoral to kill something only if it is Y 
(Y3) So it’s not seriously immoral to kill Emm 
 
Let us see, then, which (if any) of the various features that Emm has or lacks 
can yield a satisfying argument for or against the permissibility of killing 
Emm.  
 
3. Some Bad Pro-Choice Arguments 
We’ll begin by examining some ways of generating pro-choice arguments 
from the Y-schema, starting with the observation that Emm isn’t rational. 
In other words, she isn’t capable of conscious self-reflection or using reason 




The Argument from Rationality 
(YR1) Emm isn’t rational 
(YR2) It’s seriously immoral to kill something only if it is rational 
(YR3) So it’s not seriously immoral to kill Emm 
 
YR1 is clearly true: Emm is a very simple creature indeed. But, just as 
clearly, YR2 is false. After all, a healthy newborn infant also lacks rationality 
in this sense. So YR2 entails that it isn’t seriously immoral to kill such an 
infant. But obviously it is. So YR2 is false, and the argument fails. 
 Other instances of the Y-schema fail for the same reason. You might 
think that it isn’t seriously immoral to kill Emm because Emm isn’t self-
sufficient: she is entirely dependent on Taylor and wouldn’t be able to 
survive on her own. This yields the following argument: 
 
The Argument from Self-Sufficiency 
(YS1) Emm isn’t self-sufficient 
(YS2) It’s seriously immoral to kill something only if it is self-sufficient 
(YS3) So it’s not seriously immoral to kill Emm 
 
But YS2 is open to the same counterexample as YR2: healthy newborn 
infants also aren’t self-sufficient, and yet it clearly is seriously immoral to 
kill them. The same goes for some elderly and severely disabled people. YS2 
is false. 
 Nor is the fact that Taylor doesn’t want to have a child sufficient to show 
that it isn’t seriously immoral to kill Emm. Here’s what that argument 
would look like: 
 
The Argument from Being Unwanted 
(YU1) Emm isn’t wanted 
(YU2) It’s seriously immoral to kill something only if it is wanted 
(YU3) So it’s not seriously immoral to kill Emm 
 
This one fares a little better than the previous arguments. YU2 doesn’t entail 
that it’s okay to kill just any healthy newborn infant. But consider a healthy 
newborn infant who isn’t wanted by her parents, and let’s suppose no one 
else even knows about her. In that case, no one in the whole world wants 
her. YU2 entails that it wouldn’t be seriously immoral to kill that infant. But 
it would be seriously immoral. Counterexample. (YU2 also has the absurd 
consequence that it wouldn’t be seriously immoral to kill an extremely 
annoying, friendless adult who everyone hates having around.) 
 What pro-choicers need is some wrong-making feature that licenses 
killing Emm without also licensing killing healthy newborn infants. 
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Accordingly, they need to find some difference between Emm and an 
infant, and exploit that in their defense of aborting Emm. One difference 
that immediately spring to mind is that, unlike an infant, Emm is physically 
attached to someone (namely, Taylor). Putting that to work in the 
argument: 
 
The Argument from Attachment 
(YA1) Emm is attached to another human  
(YA2) It’s seriously immoral to kill something only if it isn’t attached to 
any other human 
(YA3) So it’s not seriously immoral to kill Emm 
 
 YA2 says that it can’t ever be seriously immoral to kill something when 
it’s attached to another human. To get a counterexample to that, we need 
an example of something that it is seriously immoral to kill and that is 
physically attached to some human. Healthy newborn infants—even 
unwanted ones—aren’t physically attached to other humans, so they are no 
counterexample to YA2. Well… except for the ones being carried around in 
a baby wrap. That’s a way of attaching an infant to your body. So YA2 
implies (absurdly) that it is okay to kill infants in baby wraps.  
 You might object that I’ve been unfair here. The difference between 
Emm and the infant in the baby wrap is that there’s a body part connecting 
Emm to Taylor, namely an umbilical cord. They are, let’s say, “bodily-
attached”. The idea then would be to revise the Argument from Attachment 
as follows: 
 
The Argument from Bodily Attachment 
(YA1*) Emm is bodily-attached to another human  
(YA2*) It’s seriously immoral to kill something only if it isn’t bodily-
attached to any other human 
(YA3) So it’s not seriously immoral to kill Emm 
 
The infant in the wrap isn’t a counterexample to YA2*, since that’s the 
wrong kind of attachment. But one needn’t look far for other 
counterexamples. Take a healthy newborn who has just entered the world 
and whose cord still hasn’t been cut. Certainly, it would be seriously 
immoral to kill that newborn. Or take conjoined twins. Since they’re 
attached to one another, YA2* says that it isn’t seriously immoral to kill one 
of them. But clearly that would be seriously immoral. 
 Finally, the pro-choicer might try a different tactic, pointing to the fact 
that Emm is not conscious. That’s true: Emm won’t become conscious until 
five months into the pregnancy at the earliest. Moreover, this avoids all the 
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counterexamples we have seen thus far. After all, even normal, healthy, 
unwanted conjoined twins in baby wraps are conscious. So, we get what 
might seem to be a more promising argument:  
 
The Argument from Consciousness 
(YC1) Emm is not conscious 
(YC2) It’s seriously immoral to kill something only if it’s conscious 
(YC3) So it’s not seriously immoral to kill Emm 
 
Alas, there are counterexamples to YC2 as well. Normal human adults in 
deep, dreamless sleep or who are heavily sedated aren’t conscious. But it is 
seriously immoral to kill such people. So YC2 is false. 
 We have examined a number of pro-choice arguments and found them 
all to be inadequate. Let us turn now to some of the usual pro-life 
arguments and see whether they fare any better. (Spoiler: they don’t.) 
 
4. Some Bad Pro-Life Arguments 
Arguments from the pro-life position can be constructed by identifying 
some features that Emm has, and filling it in for X in the X-Schema (from 
section 2). Let’s begin with the proposal that killing Emm is seriously 
immoral because Emm is alive: 
 
The Argument from Life  
(XL1) Emm is alive 
(XL2) It’s always seriously immoral to kill something that’s alive 
(XL3) So it’s seriously immoral to kill Emm 
 
This perhaps captures the common pro-life slogan, “life begins at 
conception”, which is meant to serve as a reason to think that aborting an 
embryo like Emm is seriously immoral. Is this a good argument?  
 No doubt XL1 is true: Emm is a living organism. But what about XL2? 
To show that it’s false, one would only need to identify a case in which it’s 
permissible to kill a living thing. Pro-choicers might be tempted to reach for 
cases in which it’s morally okay to kill a person, like the death penalty or 
physician-assisted suicide. But, in fact, we can see that XL2 is false without 
even touching such controversial cases. The fact that it’s not seriously 
immoral to kill a living blade of grass is already enough to show that XL2 
is (hopelessly) mistaken. Thus, the pro-choicer can resist the Argument 
from Life without having to deny that life begins at conception. She can 
grant that it does, but then deny XL2. 
 The pro-lifer might instead point to the fact that Emm has human DNA: 
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The Argument from Human DNA 
(XD1) Emm has human DNA 
(XD2) It’s always seriously immoral to kill something that has human 
DNA 
(XD3) So it’s seriously immoral to kill Emm 
 
XD2 is immune to the previous counterexamples: blades of grass don’t have 
human DNA. Human skin cells do, though, as do human cancer cells. So, if 
XD2 is true, then it’s seriously immoral to kill those things. But it obviously 
isn’t seriously immoral to kill human cancer cells and skin cells. So, XD2 is 
false.  
 Next, one might point to the fact that Emm has a beating heart. This 
suggests another line of argument: 
 
The Argument from Hearts 
(XH1) Emm has a beating heart 
(XH2) It’s always seriously immoral to kill something that has a beating 
heart 
(XH3) So it’s seriously immoral to kill Emm 
 
XH1 is true: like most embryos at six weeks, Emm does have a beating heart. 
And XH2 avoids the previous counterexamples. Neither blades of grass nor 
human cells have beating hearts, so XH2 won’t wrongly entail that it is 
seriously immoral to kill them. But you know what does have a beating 
heart? A worm! XH2 therefore implies that it is seriously immoral to kill 
worms. And surely that’s not seriously immoral. So, XH2 is false.  
 Finally, let’s consider the suggestion that it’s seriously immoral to kill 
Emm because she has the potential to become a person: 
 
The Argument from Potentiality 
(XP1) Emm is a potential person 
(XP2) It’s always seriously immoral to kill a potential person 
(XP3) So it’s seriously immoral to kill Emm 
 
XP1 is true. It’s a healthy pregnancy and, if brought to term, Emm will be a 
full-fledged person. Additionally, since neither worms nor skin cells nor 
blades of grass have the potential to become people, XP2 is immune to all 
the previous counterexamples. Indeed, it is hard to think of any 
uncontroversial counterexample to XP2. 
 Still, it is hard to see why we should accept XP2. Even supposing that 
it’s always seriously immoral to kill a person because (say) they have a right 
to life, it’s hardly obvious that something that merely has the potential to 
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become a person has those same rights. I have the potential to become a US 
president, but that doesn’t mean that I now have all the rights of a president 
(the right to pardon criminals, veto legislation, etc.). Likewise, there is no 
reason to think that Emm has all the rights of a person simply by virtue of 
potentially being a person. Furthermore, as we are about to see (in sections 
5-8), even if Emm does have same moral right to life as an adult human, that 
may not be enough to establish that it’s immoral to kill her. 
 None of these arguments for the immorality of abortion is successful, 
and no one—pro-lifers included—should be convinced by them. One must 
look elsewhere for a satisfying argument against abortion.   
 
5. The Right to Life Argument 
Let’s turn now to a somewhat different pro-life argument. Here the idea is 
that it’s seriously immoral to kill Emm because she’s a person with a right 
to life. We can frame the argument like this: 
 
The Right to Life Argument 
(RL1) Emm has a right to life 
(RL2) If Emm has a right to life, then it is seriously immoral to deprive 
Emm of Taylor’s womb 
(RL3) So, it’s seriously immoral to deprive Emm of Taylor’s womb 
 
Since abortion deprives Emm of Taylor’s womb, it follows trivially from 
RL3 that aborting Emm is seriously immoral.   
 What’s nice about the appeal to a right to life is that it avoids the 
problems that plagued the arguments from sections 3-4. Worms, skin cells, 
and blades of grass clearly don’t have a right to life, while infants, conjoined 
twins, and heavily sedated people do all have a right to life. Plus, at least 
on the face of it, it seems immediately obvious why something’s having a 
right to life makes it wrong to kill that thing, while it is somewhat obscure 
why merely having a beating heart or a certain kind of DNA makes it wrong 
to kill something. 
 Still, there are two major problems with the argument. The first (which 
I won’t pursue here) is that pro-choicers are likely just to reject RL1 out of 
hand. “Sure,” they’ll say, “Emm potentially has a right to life, but why think 
she has one already?” More would need to be said in defense of RL1 if the 
argument is to have any hope of persuading pro-choicers.  
 The second problem is that even if the pro-lifer is right that Emm has a 
right to life—and even if she can somehow convince the pro-choicer of 
this—the argument still doesn’t work. Or so I shall argue. And if I’m right 
about this, then the pro-lifer must again look elsewhere for a viable 
argument against abortion. 
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6. The Violinist Argument 
To see what the problem is for RL2, let’s take a closer look at why we are 
supposed to accept that premise in the first place. Here is how one might 
try to argue for RL2: 
 
The Requirements of Life Argument 
(RQ1) If something (or someone) has a right to life, and it needs a certain 
something in order to survive, then it is seriously immoral to 
deprive it of that thing 
(RQ2) Emm needs Taylor’s womb in order to survive 
(RL2) So, if Emm has a right to life, then it is seriously immoral to 
deprive Emm of Taylor’s womb 
 
RQ2 is uncontroversial. For a six-week old embryo like Emm, remaining in 
the womb is a basic necessity of life. RQ1 seems pretty plausible as well: 
having a right to life would seem to entail having a right to such basic 
necessities of life. 
 Surprisingly, though, RQ1 is demonstrably false. To see why, consider 
the following two cases: 
 
THE VIOLINIST 
During his morning jog, Riley is drugged and kidnapped. When he 
comes to, he finds himself lying in a hospital bed, connected by some 
blood-filled tubes to a woman in a separate bed. His kidnappers explain 
that the woman, Maurissa, is a world-famous violinist. She was found 
unconscious, and they are trying to save her life. Maurissa is in need of 
a complete blood transfusion—already underway, using Riley’s 
blood—which will take nine months. Riley is told that if he unplugs 
himself from Maurissa at any time in the next nine months, she will die 
immediately. When the kidnappers leave the room, Riley sees his 
chance to escape. So, with a heavy heart, he unplugs himself and sneaks 
away, and Maurissa dies as expected.   
 
THE ROCK  
You have become completely obsessed with People Magazine’s 2016 
Sexiest Man of the Year, Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson. So obsessed, in 
fact, that the thought of living without him makes you physically ill. 
Deathly ill. At this point, the only thing that can save your life is the 
touch of The Rock’s cool hand on your fevered brow. The Rock is 
notified, and told that you will die if he does not come visit you in next 
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few days. But The Rock is a busy man and he sends his regrets. You die, 
as expected.  
 
No doubt, it would have been morally praiseworthy of Riley to remain 
plugged into Maurissa, or for The Rock to drop what he was doing and 
come visit you in your sickbed. And place his cool hand on your fevered 
brow. But do either of them have a moral obligation to make these 
sacrifices? By refusing to help, have they done something seriously immoral? 
Surely not.  
 These cases are therefore counterexamples to RQ1. You have a right to 
life and The Rock is depriving you of something that (strange but true) you 
need in order to survive, but he does not thereby do anything seriously 
immoral. Maurissa has a right to life, and Riley is depriving her of 
something she needs in order to survive (his blood), but Riley does not 
thereby do anything seriously immoral. We can make the latter argument 
against RQ1 explicit, as follows: 
 
The Violinist Argument 
(VA1) Maurissa has a right to life and needs Riley’s blood in order to 
survive 
(VA2) It is not seriously immoral for Riley to deprive Maurissa of his 
blood 
(VA3) So, it is not always seriously immoral to deprive someone with a 
right to life of something they need in order to survive 
 
 One might point out that there are disanalogies between these cases and 
the UNWANTED PREGNANCY case. Riley’s predicament, for instance, resulted 
from being kidnapped against his will, whereas Taylor’s resulted from 
consensual sex. We’ll see later how that might be relevant. But, analogous 
or not, THE VIOLINIST and THE ROCK are enough to show that RQ1 is false, 
and without RQ1 we are left without any argument for RL2, a crucial 
premise of The Right to Life Argument.  
 
7. The Entitled Requirements Argument 
You may be thinking that, even if RQ1 is false, something in the vicinity must 
be true. If you die because I steal your parka in the middle of an Antarctic 
expedition, or because I take away your inhaler when you’re in the middle 
of an asthma attack, I’ve done something seriously immoral. Sometimes it’s 
seriously immoral to deprive someone of something they need in order to 
survive. Why is it seriously immoral in these cases but not in the case of 
THE VIOLINIST and THE ROCK? 
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 Here’s a natural explanation. The difference is that it’s your parka and 
your inhaler. In addition to needing them in order to survive, they’re your 
property and you have a right to them. By contrast, Maurissa doesn’t have 
any right to Riley’s blood. It doesn’t belong to her and she isn’t entitled to 
it. Likewise for you and The Rock’s hand.  
 This suggests a way of revising the Requirements of Life argument to 
sidestep the counterexamples:  
 
The Entitled Requirements Argument 
(RQ1*) If something (or someone) has a right to life, and it needs a 
certain something in order to survive, and it has a right to that 
thing, then it is seriously immoral to deprive it of that thing 
(RQ2) Emm needs Taylor’s womb in order to survive  
(RQ3) Emm has a right to Taylor’s womb  
(RL2) So, if Emm has a right to life, then it is seriously immoral to 
deprive Emm of Taylor’s womb 
 
With the revised premise, RQ1*, two conditions must be met in order for us 
to conclude that it’s seriously immoral to deprive someone with a right a 
life of something: first that they need that thing for survival and second that 
they have a right to that thing. Since you and Maurissa don’t have a right 
to The Rock’s hand and Riley’s blood (respectively), THE ROCK and THE 
VIOLINIST are not counterexamples to this modified premise RQ1*. 
However, the argument now needs an additional premise, RQ3, stating that 
Emm meets the second condition. And, as we will see, the new premise is 
indefensible. 
 
8. The Right to the Womb 
Let’s turn, then, to this new premise that Emm has a right to Taylor’s womb. 
Why think that? A natural answer suggests itself: because, by engaging in 
consensual sex, Taylor thereby consented to Emm being in there. If I offer 
to let you use my spare sleeping bag, I can’t then demand it back from you 
when we reach the campsite. When I consent to you using it, you acquire a 
right to it. Or suppose Riley had volunteered to be plugged into Maurissa, 
knowing that prematurely unplugging himself would kill her. In that case, 
it would arguably be seriously immoral for him to unplug himself, because 
he consented to her using his blood and she thereby acquired a right to it.  
 So, if the pro-lifer can establish that Taylor consented to Emm using her 
womb, then we can use that to establish that Emm has a right to use her 
womb. That said, Taylor didn’t exactly volunteer to have Emm in her 
womb. Quite the opposite: she took deliberate steps to avoid it by having 
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protected sex. So what reason could there be to think that Taylor consented 
to Emm using her womb?  
 One might suggest that Taylor consents to it by freely choosing to have 
sex, which is something she knows might lead to pregnancy (even with the 
precaution of a condom). Even though she didn’t want to get pregnant, she 
knew the risk she was taking. Putting the pieces together, the argument for 
RQ3 would go something like this:  
 
The Known Risk Argument 
(KR1) Taylor freely chose to have sex and knew that this could lead to 
Emm using her womb 
(KR2) Whenever someone freely does something and knows that it 
could lead to certain consequences, one consents to those 
consequences 
(KR3) So, Taylor consented to Emm using her womb 
(KR4) If Taylor consented to Emm using her womb, then Emm has a 
right to Taylor’s womb 
(RQ3) So, Emm has a right to Taylor’s womb  
 
You might worry a bit about KR4. Just because Taylor at one point 
consented to Emm being in her womb, perhaps she can later withdraw 
consent, thereby depriving Emm of the right to her womb. (Certainly one 
can withdraw consent in other cases, for instance after initially consenting 
to sex.) But whatever one thinks of KR4, there is an even more glaring 
problem with the argument. 
 The problem is that KR2 is a ludicrous theory of consent. To see this, 
consider the following case: 
 
OPEN WINDOW  
Astrid lives in a dangerous neighborhood with lots of hooligans. She has 
bars on her windows and keeps the windows closed and latched as an 
extra precaution. One hot summer day, she opens the windows to get 
some cool air, trusting that the bars will keep the hooligans out (though 
knowing that they are not 100% reliable). Unfortunately, the bars are 
defective. Some hooligans pull them off, climb through the window, 
plant themselves on her couch, and start playing her PlayStation. 
 
Astrid freely chose to open the windows and knew this could lead to 
hooligans entering her house. Certainly they don’t have any right to be in 
there and certainly she did not consent to them being in there just by 
opening her windows. But KR2 absurdly implies that she did consent to 
them being in there.   
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 Consent requires something more robust than simply taking actions that 
open one up to the risk of some unwanted consequences. Accordingly, 
there would seem to be no way of getting anything like the present 
argument for RQ3 off the ground. It would be a different story if Taylor had 
“invited” Emm into her womb, for instance if she hadn’t used protection 
and had been trying to get pregnant. Perhaps in that case the Right to Life 
Argument could be made to work. But it seems hopeless in the more typical 
case where the pregnancy is the unwanted consequence of protected sex. 
 
9. The Future Like Ours Argument 
Not all pro-life arguments are created equal, and we have seen that a 
number of common arguments are fatally flawed, including the Right to 
Life argument. Let us turn now, finally, to what I take to be a successful 
argument for the pro-life position. 
 This superior argument turns on the idea that, if the pregnancy were 
carried to term, Emm would have had a future filled with valuable 
experiences, including valuable activities, relationships, projects, 
achievements, and pleasurable sensations. She has a future like ours, or 
“FLO” for short. That doesn’t necessarily mean exactly like ours, but like 
ours in that it’s filled with valuable experiences. 
 Aborting Emm deprives her of FLO and this, I contend, is what makes 
the abortion seriously immoral: 
 
The Simple FLO Argument 
(SF1) It is seriously immoral to kill something (or someone) if killing it 
deprives it of a future like ours 
(SF2) Killing Emm deprives Emm of a future like ours 
(SF3) So, it is seriously immoral to kill Emm 
 
I call this “The Simple FLO Argument” because, as we’ll see in section 11, 
we will need to complicate it a bit in order to handle a certain range of 
objections. But for the moment, it will be useful to focus on this somewhat 
oversimplified version of the argument. 
 SF1 is initially quite plausible. To see this, ask yourself why it is wrong 
to murder a normal, healthy human adult. Why is killing someone one of 
the worst things (if not the worst thing) one can do to a person? The natural 
answer is that it’s because one thereby deprives them of all the things that 
make life so valuable. That’s why it seems even more horrific to kill an 
infant, for one thereby deprives them of a whole life’s worth of valuable 
things. SF1 seems to put its finger on precisely the thing that makes these 
other killings seriously immoral. 
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 How about SF2? Even supposing that her life gets off to a rocky start—
as a result of being put up for adoption or being raised by an overworked 
single mom—Emm still would have had a full lifetime of achievements, 
friendships, and other such valuable experiences.  
 You might wonder how I know that Emm would have had FLO, and 
won’t for instance be born with some terrible birth defect and die before 
she’s a year old. The short answer is that it’s my example: I can fill in details 
however I like, and I’m telling you that she would have had a happy, 
fulfilling life had she not been aborted. Of course, for any actual pregnancy, 
we can never be 100% sure that the embryo has FLO, even if medical tests 
suggest that it’s a healthy pregnancy. Still—with some exceptions, which 
we’ll discuss in section 12—you can usually be reasonably confident that 
the embryo will have FLO. That, together with SF1, tells us that you can be 
reasonably confident you’d be doing something seriously immoral by 
aborting the pregnancy. And if you can be reasonably confident that an 
action is seriously immoral, you shouldn’t do it—even if there’s some small 
chance that what you’re doing isn’t immoral.  
 (I’m reminded of a scene in a movie you’ve never heard of called Adam’s 
Apples. One character shoots another in the head. Not only does the gunshot 
victim survive, the bullet also obliterates his brain tumor and saves his life. 
This could in principle happen in real life too. But that doesn’t mean it’s 
okay for you to go around shooting people in the head. Why not? Because, 
even though there’s some small chance you’ll actually be helping them, you 
can be reasonably confident that in fact you’d be killing them and doing 
something seriously immoral.) 
 For these reasons, it’s no use challenging SF2, and critics of the argument 
should focus instead on SF1. So let’s turn to four objections one might raise 
against SF1: three that won’t work at all (section 10) and one that does work 
but that can be avoided by revising the argument (section 11).  
 
10. Bad Objections to the FLO Argument 
First, one might think that the following sort of case is a problem for SF1: 
 
HOPEFUL GONER  
Guillermo has accidentally ingested a deadly poison and is in horrible, 
debilitating pain. He thinks he’ll get better, but he’s wrong: the poison 
is quickly spreading through his body and will kill him within a few 
hours. Isabella, who hates Guillermo and would like to see him dead as 
soon as possible, is attempting to inject Guillermo with a substance that 
will kill him instantly and painlessly. Guillermo resists and pleads for 
Isabella to stop. But Isabella gives Guillermo the injection, despite his 
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protests, and Guillermo dies mere hours before the poison would have 
killed him anyway. 
 
What Isabella did seems to be seriously immoral, and yet she didn’t deprive 
Guillermo of FLO. Guillermo’s future would have contained only a few 
hours of horrible pain and no valuable experiences. 
 Here is why this is not a problem for SF1. SF1 says that depriving 
someone of FLO always makes it seriously immoral to kill them. In order 
words, depriving someone of FLO is sufficient for a killing to be seriously 
immoral. SF1 doesn’t say that depriving someone of FLO is the only way 
for a killing to be seriously immoral. That is, it doesn’t say that depriving 
someone of FLO is necessary for a killing to be seriously immoral. Since SF1 
leaves it open that there are other ways for a killing to be seriously 
immoral—perhaps by failing to respect the victim’s desire to stay alive—
HOPEFUL GONER is no counterexample to SF1. 
 Second, one might object that SF1 absurdly implies that ordinary 
contraception is seriously immoral. After all, the idea goes, when one uses 
condoms or spermicide, one is depriving millions of sperm cells of FLO. 
The argument would go like this: 
  
The Contraception Argument 
(CC1) Killing sperm deprives them of a future like ours 
(CC2) If killing sperm deprives them of a future like ours, then: if SF1 is 
true, then it is seriously immoral to kill sperm 
(CC3) It isn’t seriously immoral to kill sperm 
(CC4) So, SF1 is false 
 
 The problem with this argument is CC1. No sperm cell has FLO, not even 
a sperm cell that successfully fertilizes an egg. It is not as if the sperm cell 
enters the egg and then grows into an embryo. Rather, it enters the egg, 
releases a tiny amount of genetic material, and then the sperm cell dissolves 
and ceases to exist altogether, never to have any valuable experiences. 
(How about the egg? It’s an interesting question whether it has FLO, but it 
is not a question we need to answer. After all, SF1 only prohibits killing 
things with FLO, and using a spermicide-coated condom doesn’t kill the 
egg.) 
 Even if sperm cells don’t have FLO, what is true is that the spermicide 
prevents a being with FLO from coming into existence. Is that enough to 




The Revised Contraception Argument 
(CC1*) Killing sperm prevents the creation of a being with FLO 
(CC2*) If killing sperm prevents the creation of a being with FLO, then: 
if SF1 is true, then it is seriously immoral to kill sperm 
(CC3) It isn’t seriously immoral to kill sperm 
(CC4) So, SF1 is false 
 
We have only moved the bump in the rug, for now the problem is the 
second premise, CC2*. SF1 doesn’t say that it’s seriously immoral to prevent 
things with FLO from coming into existence. It only says that it’s immoral 
to take an already-existing thing with FLO and deprive it of FLO by killing 
it. So CC2* misrepresents what is implied by SF1.  
 Let’s look at one more unsuccessful objection to SF1. Recall that SF1 was 
motivated by the idea that it provides the best explanation of what makes 
seriously immoral killings—like killing a normal human adult—seriously 
immoral. One way of challenging SF1, then, is to reject the proposed 
explanation of the serious immorality of killing an adult. But one would 
then need to provide some alternative explanation of why it is seriously 
immoral to kill an adult.  
 Here’s an initially attractive proposal: what makes it seriously immoral 
to kill normal human adults is that they desire a future full of valuable 
experiences. If that’s right, then all that is supported by the proper 
explanation of the immorality of killing is the weaker premise SF1*: 
 
(SF1*) It is seriously immoral to kill something (or someone) if killing it 
deprives it of a future like ours that it desires 
 
But unlike SF1, SF1* does not imply that it is seriously immoral to kill Emm. 
Emm is a very simple creature, which does not even have a brain, let alone 
desires. Killing her does deprive her of FLO, but it does not deprive her of 
anything she desires.  
 The problem with this line of reasoning is that the proposed alternative 
explanation of the wrongness of killing human adults is deeply flawed. 
Consider a heavily sedated adult, who (like Emm) has no desires, or any 
other conscious mental states for that matter. Or consider a overwhelmed 
teenager experiencing his first heartbreak: he genuinely doesn’t want to go 
on living, but these feelings will pass in a week or so. It is seriously immoral 
to kill these people, and the original future-like-ours account has no trouble 
explaining why: because they have FLO. By contrast, the competing 
account that we are now considering fails to explain why it is seriously 
immoral to kill them. After all, they do not desire a future like ours. The 
desire account of what makes killing wrong that underwrites SF1* is 
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therefore inferior to the FLO-account that underwrites SF1. Accordingly, 
we should reject SF1* and stick with SF1. 
 
11. FLO-Overriding Factors 
There is, however, a more serious style of objection to SF1, one that will 
require us to revise the argument. Suppose that someone is trying to kill 
you and you can save your own life only by killing them first. One can 
imagine having qualms about killing them, but certainly it’s not seriously 
immoral to do so. Or take the following case.  
 
CRUEL GAME  
M’Baku is preparing to detonate an atomic bomb in the heart of a 
densely populated city. He has kidnapped two innocent people, Okoye 
and Shuri, and he commands Okoye to kill Shuri. If she complies, he 
will release Okoye and won’t detonate the bomb. If she refuses, he will 
release both of them and detonate the bomb, killing hundreds of 
thousands of people. Okoye tries to find a way to stop the detonation 
without killing Shuri, but M’Baku has thought of everything. So, with a 
heavy heart, Okoye kills Shuri.  
 
Given the circumstances, what Okoye did isn’t seriously immoral, despite 
the fact that Shuri has FLO. Unlike HOPEFUL GONER, this is a genuine 
counterexample to SF1. So, the Simple FLO Argument must go. 
 What cases like CRUEL GAME demonstrate is that, in certain situations, 
there are factors in play that can justify killing normal adults—even 
innocent adults—who have FLO. Let’s call these “FLO-overriding factors”, 
which I’ll define as follows: a killing involves a FLO-overriding factor if and 
only if that killing involves the sort of factors that could justify killing a 
normal human adult with FLO. So a FLO-overriding factor is a special kind 
of mitigating factor.  
 Here is one example of a FLO-overriding factor: that killing a person is 
necessary for preventing the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. 
That’s a FLO-overriding factor because, as reflection on CRUEL GAME 
reveals, it’s the sort of factor that can justify killing Shuri, a normal human 
adult with FLO. But the following would not be a FLO-overriding factor: 
that a person is incredibly annoying. If I want to kill someone with FLO, the 
fact that he is incredibly annoying is not reason enough to kill him. Being 
incredibly annoying is not the sort of factor that could justify killing a 
normal human adult.  
 Using the notion of a FLO-overriding factor, we can patch up the Simple 
FLO Argument as follows: 
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The Modified FLO Argument 
(MF1) It is seriously immoral to kill something (or someone) if killing it 
deprives it of a future like ours and the killing does not involve 
any FLO-overriding factors 
(MF2) Killing Emm deprives Emm of a future like ours 
(MF3) Killing Emm does not involve any FLO-overriding factors 
(MF4) So, it is seriously immoral to kill Emm 
 
MF1 has all of the plausibility of SF1, without being open to 
counterexamples like CRUEL GAME. And MF2 is the same as SF2. But now 
that we have included an additional condition for a killing to be classified 
as seriously immoral, we need to include an additional premise, MF3, 
affirming that killing Emm meets that condition.  
 To evaluate MF3, we have to consider various candidate FLO-
overriding factors that might be present in the case of Emm. To check 
whether a factor is FLO-overriding, remember, we have to check whether 
it’s the sort of factor whose presence could justify killing a normal human 
adult. So let’s look at some possible candidates. 
 One might point to the fact that seven or eight more months of 
pregnancy places a major burden on Taylor—financially, physically, and 
emotionally. That’s true. But is it a FLO-overriding factor? To answer that, 
we need to ask whether such burdens would justify killing a normal human 
adult. And certainly they wouldn’t. Some parents who would rather not 
continue to care for their broke, freeloading adult son can’t just kill him, 
regardless of the financial, physical, or emotional toll it takes on their life. 
This is not to say that that case is entirely analogous to the case of Emm. It’s 
not. The point is just that such burdens do not meet the conditions for being 
FLO-overriding factors. 
 Relatedly, one might point to the way in which keeping the pregnancy 
would have seriously disrupted Taylor’s life plans, perhaps forcing her to 
quit her job or drop out of school. But this too is no FLO-overriding factor. 
To see this, consider the following case. 
 
RUNNER-UP  
Krystal has struggled for years to make it as an actress, and finally gets 
her big audition. If she gets the role, it will catapult her into fame and 
fortune. As it turns out, Jacqueline gets the role. But Krystal is the 
runner-up and is told that if anything should happen to Jacqueline, the 
role will go to her. So Krystal discreetly kills Jacqueline and gets the role. 
 
Having Jacqueline around was severely disruptive to Krystal’s life plans 
and was depriving her of significant opportunities. Still, that was not 
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enough to justify killing Jacqueline, even supposing that Jacqueline’s 
presence completely derails and ruins Krystal’s life. So the disruption to 
Taylor’s life plans, substantial as it is, is no FLO-overriding factor and no 
reason to reject MF3.  
 
12. Can Pro-Lifers Make Exceptions? 
I have argued that, in typical cases, aborting an unwanted but healthy 
embryo early on in the pregnancy is seriously immoral. I also argued that a 
pro-lifer must be discerning: some pro-life arguments are utterly 
unconvincing, including those that turn on the idea that life begins at 
conception, that the embryo has a right to life, or that the mother is 
responsible for the pregnancy by choosing to have sex in the first place.   
 What about less typical cases of abortion? Can pro-lifers allow that, in 
certain cases, abortion isn’t seriously immoral? Yes, but they must do so in 
a principled way. We have only been able to find one good argument for 
the immorality of abortion. Those who oppose abortion in typical cases on 
the strength of my FLO argument—let’s call them “FLO-lifers”—will have 
to check which exceptions the FLO-account permits them to make. So let’s 
see what the FLO-account says about three potential exceptions: unhealthy 
embryos, life-threatening pregnancies, and pregnancies resulting from 
rape. 
 Can the FLO-lifer make an exception for an unhealthy embryo? That 
depends entirely on how unhealthy the embryo is and, in particular, 
whether it has FLO. An embryo that is certain to die in the womb or to die 
within a year after being born has no FLO, and the FLO-lifer can allow 
abortion in such cases compatibly with the FLO-account. What it won’t 
allow is the abortion of an embryo that is known to have some serious 
disability, like blindness or Down syndrome. For such embryos certainly 
do have FLO. Perhaps they don’t have a future exactly like ours, but it’s still 
a future full of valuable experiences. 
 Can the FLO-lifer make an exception if it is known that keeping the 
pregnancy will kill the mother? Certainly she can make an exception if the 
unborn child will die as well, for in that case the child has no FLO. But 
suppose the mother is expected to die during childbirth, while the baby can 
be saved. In that case, the embryo does have FLO. So, by MF1, the abortion 
is permissible only if the threat to the mother’s life is a FLO-overriding 
factor, the sort of factor that would justify killing a normal human adult.   






Ahmed is drowning in quicksand. He has gotten ahold of Omar’s 
pantleg, and is frantically trying to pull himself out. But in doing so he 
is pulling Omar into the quicksand. Ahmed is in such a panicked state 
that he doesn’t realize what he is doing, and Omar’s pleas fall on deaf 
ears. Unless Omar stops him by pushing him under, Ahmed will pull 
him in and scramble out over Omar’s subsumed body, killing him. So, 
with a heavy heart, and in order to save his own life, Omar kills Ahmed 
by pushing him under. 
 
What Omar had to do may be horrifying, but it is not seriously immoral. 
The fact that Ahmed’s continued existence is a threat to Omar’s life justified 
him in killing Ahmed. Accordingly, the fact that a certain embryo’s 
continued existence is a threat to the mother’s life is a FLO-overriding 
factor, and the FLO-lifer can consistently grant that abortion is permissible 
in such cases.  
 Can a FLO-lifer grant that abortion is permissible in the case of a healthy 
pregnancy that results from rape? In such cases, the embryo does have FLO, 
so the FLO-lifer can and should make this concession so long as such cases 
involve a FLO-overriding factor. What might that FLO-overriding factor 
be? Here, the FLO-overriding factor is that the embryo’s dependence on the 
mother was a consequence of violent actions or events that she was not able 
to control. To see that this is a FLO-overriding factor, one need only recall 
THE VIOLINIST from section 6. In that case, we judged that it was permissible 
to kill a normal adult (Maurissa). And one plausible explanation of why it 
was permissible for Riley to kill her is that her dependence on him was a 
consequence of violent actions (by the kidnappers) that he was not able to 
control. 
 What we have just seen is that the best argument against abortion cannot 
be used to show that aborting pregnancies resulting from rape or 
pregnancies that threaten the life of the mother are seriously immoral. Pro-
lifers who do not want to make an exception even in these special cases 
must look elsewhere for an argument to support this position. And it is hard 
to see what such an argument would look like, since the obvious 
candidates—for instance that such embryos have a right to life or are 
potential people—were shown above to be deeply inadequate.   
  
Reflection Questions 
1. Can you find a way to rescue the Right to Life argument in sections 5-8 
from my objections? For instance, can you find a more promising way 
to argue that the embryo has a right to womb? 
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2. Can the case of THE VIOLINIST from section 6 be used to resist MF3 of the 
Modified FLO Argument in section 11? 
 
3. In section 10, I considered a competing account of what makes killing 
wrong. Can that account be defended against my objections? 
 
4. We saw that the Modified FLO-argument cannot be used to show that 
abortion is immoral in the case of rape or life-threatening pregnancies. 
Can you think of an argument that does cover these cases, and that does 
not fall victim to the objections raised in sections 4-8?  
 
5. Consider the key idea behind the FLO-arguments: that Emm, the 
embryo itself, would have had a future full of valuable experiences had 
it not been killed. What does this assume about personal identity? Is the 
Psychological Descendant Account (discussed in chapter 5) compatible 
with the idea that fully-grown people used to be embryos? Is your 
preferred response to the Too Many Thinkers Argument (discussed in 
chapter 6) compatible with the idea that we used to be embryos? 
 
Sources  
The Violinist case and the critique of the Right to Life argument are drawn 
from Judith Jarvis Thomson’s “A Defense of Abortion”. The FLO-argument 
is drawn from Don Marquis’s “Why Abortion is Immoral”, as are many of 
the criticisms of bad pro-life and pro-choice arguments discussed in 
sections 3 and 4. See David Boonin’s A Defense of Abortion for a more 
detailed discussion of Marquis and Thomson’s arguments, and a defense of 
a version of the Desire Account of the wrongness of killing discussed in 
section 10. Here are some additional resources: 
 
• David Boonin: Beyond Roe: Why Abortion Should Be Legal Even if the Fetus 
is a Person 
• Sidney Callahan: “Abortion and the Sexual Agenda: A Case for Pro-Life 
Feminism” 
• Ann E. Cudd: “Enforced Pregnancy, Rape, and the Image of a Woman” 
• Jane English: “Abortion and the Concept of a Person” 
• Elizabeth Harman: “Creation Ethics: The Moral Status of Early Fetuses 
and the Ethics of Abortion” 
• Elizabeth Harman: “The Potentiality Problem” 
• George W. Harris “Fathers and Fetuses” 
• Margaret Olivia Little: “Abortion, Intimacy, and the Duty to Gestate” 
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• Alastair Norcross: “Killing, Abortion, and Contraception: A Reply to 
Marquis” 
• Michael Tooley: “Abortion and Infanticide” 
• Mary Anne Warren: “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion”  
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CHAPTER 9 
Eating Animals is Immoral 
 
Views and arguments advanced in this chapter are not necessarily endorsed by the 
author of the textbook, nor are they original to the author, nor are they meant to be 
consistent with arguments advanced in other chapters. Different chapters represent 
different philosophical perspectives. 
 
1. Introduction 
In what follows, I will defend the view that, in most cases, buying and 
eating meat is morally impermissible. First, I will argue that there is no good 
reason to think that eating meat is morally permissible. In particular, I 
address three common reasons for thinking that it’s not wrong to eat meat: 
that it is natural to eat meat, that it is necessary to eat meat, and that people 
have always eaten meat. Second, I argue directly for the immorality of 
buying and eating meat, by developing an analogy in which puppies are 
subjected to much the same treatment as farm animals (sections 5-6). I then 
defend my argument from analogy against various objections (sections 7-
8).  
 In defending the claim that it is morally impermissible for you to eat 
meat, I will be making some assumptions about you. First, I am assuming 
that you know that the meat you eat is the flesh of slaughtered animals. A 
friend of mine once had the following conversation with her children at the 
dinner table: 
 
 Them [eating chicken]: “Mom, where does chicken come from?” 
 Her: “Well… it comes from chickens. You’re eating a chicken.” 
 Them: “C’mon, mom!! Seriously, where does chicken come from?” 
 
Perhaps you didn’t know. Now you know.  
 Second, I am assuming that the meat you eat was killed in order to be 
eaten. Perhaps you eat only dead animals you find in the road. In that case, 
go for it; my arguments do not apply to you.  
 Third, I am assuming that you do not live in some faraway land, where 
you have to eat meat because there is no way to get your hands on tofu, 
broccoli, oatmeal, avocados, almonds, beans, pumpkin seeds, hummus, 
lentils, quinoa, tempeh, peanut butter, veggie burgers, or other such 
alternative sources of protein. I am assuming that you are not stranded on 
a deserted island with nothing to eat but wild boar. Perhaps I’m wrong. If 
you are currently stranded on a deserted island, go ahead and eat the boar.  
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 More generally, just because you can imagine some possible situation in 
which it’s morally okay to do a certain thing, that doesn’t mean it’s morally 
okay to do that thing in ordinary situations. If a hiker gets caught in a 
blizzard and will freeze to death if he doesn’t break into someone’s empty 
cabin for the night, it’s morally okay for him to break in. That obviously 
doesn’t mean that it’s morally okay for you, right now, to break into a 
random person’s home. If the Nazis are at the good Samaritan’s door, it’s 
morally okay for her to lie to them to save the Jews hiding in her attic. That 
obviously doesn’t mean that it’s morally okay for you, right now, to lie to 
whomever you want, whenever you want. And just because it’s okay for 
certain people to eat certain types of meat in certain situations, that doesn’t 
mean that it’s okay for you—in the situation you currently find yourself 
in—to eat whatever meat you want whenever you want. 
 
2. The Argument from Precedent 
In the United States, we consume somewhere around ten billion farm 
animals per year. Eating lots of animals involves killing lots of conscious 
creatures, creatures that are capable of experiencing pain, discomfort, fear, 
and distress. Is there some good reason to think that eating meat is morally 
permissible, despite all the killing and suffering that is involved in getting 
the meat off of those animals and onto our plates? Sure, meat is delicious, 
and bacon is especially delicious. But the pleasure you get from eating 
bacon doesn’t make eating meat morally acceptable, any more than the 
pleasure a sadist gets from kicking puppies makes kicking puppies morally 
acceptable. So let us see if we can do better. 
 The first argument we’ll consider for the moral permissibility of meat-
eating is that there is such a strong precedent for eating meat. People have 
eaten meat all throughout human history. By eating meat, we aren’t doing 
anything different from what our ancestors have done.  
 The argument evidently runs as follows: 
 
The Argument from Precedent 
(PR1) There have been people who eat meat throughout human history 
(PR2) If there have been people doing a certain thing throughout human 
history, then it is morally permissible for you to do it 
(PR3) So, it is morally permissible for you to eat meat 
 
PR1 is indisputable. But PR2 is obviously false. People have murdered other 
people throughout human history as well. If PR2 were true, then that would 
mean that it’s morally acceptable for you to murder people. But, of course, 
it isn’t morally acceptable for you to murder people.  
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 You may object that while it’s true that there have always been 
murderers, it’s not true that most people have been murderers throughout 
human history. This suggests a way of reinstating the Argument from 
Precedent, without the overly strong premise PR2: 
 
The Argument from Majority Precedent 
(PR1*) Most people have eaten meat throughout human history 
(PR2*) If most people have done a certain thing throughout human 
history, then it is morally permissible for you to do it 
(PR3) So, it is morally permissible for you to eat meat 
 
Since it isn’t true that most people throughout human history have been 
murderers, PR2* (unlike PR2) doesn’t have absurd consequence that you 
are permitted to murder people. But other counterexamples are easy to 
find. For instance, there has been a widespread practice of people beating 
their children throughout human history. That certainly does not mean that 
it is morally okay for people now (or even back then) to beat their children.  
 Perhaps you doubt that child abuse was so prevalent through human 
history. But let me ask you this: in order to figure out whether it’s morally 
acceptable now for people to beat their children, do you first have to sort 
out how common it’s been in human history? Of course not. You already 
know it’s wrong, regardless of how many people have done in the past. 
Humans have a long history of all sorts of immoral practices: slavery, 
torture, persecution, and discrimination. What’s right or wrong has nothing 
to do with what sorts of practices our ancestors did or didn’t approve of, or 
how many of them engaged in those practices. There is no reason to accept 
anything like PR2 or PR2*. 
 I should emphasize that my objection to these arguments from 
precedent does not rest on the assumption that killing animals for meat is 
morally equivalent to these other objectionable practices. Everything I have 
said is compatible with thinking that child abuse is far worse than killing 
animals for meat. Maybe it is, maybe it isn’t. My point is just that, as with 
these other practices, the long history of meat-eating doesn’t by itself give 
us any reason to think that meat-eating is morally acceptable. 
 
3. The Argument from Naturalness 
Let’s turn to a second possible defense of meat-eating. Here, the idea is that 
eating meat is natural. This could mean a couple of different things, so we’ll 
need to look at different ways of clarifying this appeal to naturalness.  
 First, the idea might be that it’s part of the natural order of things for 
animals to eat other animals. Cheetahs eat gazelles. Sharks eat seals. We eat 
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chickens and pigs and cows. This is just part of nature. The argument 
evidently runs as follows: 
 
The Natural Order Argument 
(NO1) Other animals eat meat 
(NO2) If other animals do something, then it’s morally permissible for 
you to do it 
(NO3) So, it’s morally permissible for you to eat meat 
 
There is no denying NO1. But just like PR2 above, NO2 is open to endless 
counterexamples. Other animals engage in cannibalism, force themselves 
sexually upon unwilling partners, kill the weakest members of their groups, 
chew off the heads of their partners during intercourse, and kill innocent 
humans. Needless to say, these are not things that it would be morally 
acceptable for you to do. And yet, if NO2 is true, then it follows 
straightaway that it is morally acceptable for you to do these things. So, 
NO2 must be false. Yet without NO2, it is unclear how to get from the 
indisputable truth of NO1 to any interesting conclusion about the moral 
acceptability of eating meat. 
 (Does this mean that it’s immoral for cheetahs to eat gazelles? Of course 
not. Because they’re incapable of moral thinking, and thus incapable of 
recognizing actions as moral or immoral, cheetahs aren’t morally 
accountable for their actions. But since we are capable of recognizing actions 
as moral or immoral, we can be held morally accountable when we perform 
those same actions.) 
 A theme is emerging. Defenses of meat-eating cite some uncontroversial 
fact about eating meat, for instance that humans or nonhuman animals 
regularly eat meat. A conclusion is then drawn about the moral 
permissibility of eating meat. To get from the uncontroversial premise to 
the moral conclusion, however, we need to assume that we have identified 
some right-making feature: that, in general, the fact that our ancestors or 
nonhuman animals have done something makes it okay for us to do it. And 
that underlying assumption, on closer inspection, turns out to be grossly 
implausible. 
 Let’s see how this same problem arises for a second way of developing 
the idea that eating meat is natural. Here the idea is that we have a natural 
capacity for eating meat. Other animals have mouths and guts and taste 
buds specially made for a vegetarian diet. Not us. We have just the right 
kinds of teeth and digestive systems for getting nutrition from meat, and 
we naturally enjoy eating it. Therefore, the idea goes, it’s morally 
permissible for us to eat meat. 
 What is the argument here? It seems to be the following: 
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The Natural Capacity Argument 
(CP1) You are naturally capable of eating meat 
(CP2) If you are naturally capable of doing a certain thing, then it is 
morally permissible for you to do that thing  
(CP3) So, it is morally permissible for you to eat meat 
 
CP1 is of course true. But CP2 is obviously false. There are plenty of things 
that you are naturally capable of doing that are not morally permissible: 
lying, stealing, enslaving other human beings, torturing puppies, and so on. 
Just because nature has endowed you with the ability to do something—
and even if you find that doing that thing comes naturally to you—that 
hardly entails that it’s morally okay for you to do it. Indeed, morality is 
often a matter of overcoming our natural impulses. 
 
 4. The Argument from Necessity 
Perhaps the most common defense of the moral permissibility of meat-
eating is that eating meat is necessary. Necessary for what, though? 
Obviously it isn’t necessary for survival. You probably know some 
vegetarians, and you can check their pulse for yourself. 
 Maybe the idea is that, even if you can survive without eating meat, you 
can’t be healthy without eating meat. For instance, it is sometimes suggested 
that you can’t get the necessary amounts of protein without eating meat. If 
that’s right, then perhaps the following argument can be used to establish 
the permissibility of eating meat: 
 
The Necessity of Protein Argument 
(NP1) Eating meat is necessary for getting enough protein 
(NP2) If doing something is necessary for getting enough protein, then 
it is morally permissible for you to do it 
(NP3) So, it is morally permissible for you to eat meat 
 
 We already saw, however, that NP1 is false. I listed a number of 
alternative sources of protein in the opening section (broccoli, peanut 
butter, etc.), and it is well known that getting your protein from these 
sources is healthier than getting it from meat. There is no truth to claim that 
eating meat is necessary for getting enough protein. Indeed, a number of 
top athletes—some of the healthiest people on the planet—are vegetarians, 
including tennis pro Venus Williams, Olympic medalist Carl Lewis, and 
UFC fighters Nate Diaz and Colleen Schneider. So it undoubtedly is 
possible to have a healthy diet without meat. 
 146 
 Moreover, even if meat-eating were necessary for getting optimal 
amounts of protein, there would still be a question of whether meat-eating 
is permissible. Suppose you are a prisoner of war, and—while you are in 
absolutely no danger of dying—you are not as healthy as you could be 
because your captors aren’t giving you enough protein. Would it then be 
morally permissible for you to steal your fellow prisoners’ rations? Of 
course not. Morality doesn’t permit doing whatever it takes to get the FDA-
recommended amount of protein. So NP2 is demonstrably false as well.  
 
5. Meet Your Meat 
Thus far, all we have seen is that standard arguments in defense of meat-
eating all fail. In other words, we have no good reason to think that meat-
eating is morally acceptable. That’s not yet to say that eating meat is morally 
unacceptable. But I do want to draw this stronger conclusion. So let me turn 
now to an argument that eating meat is immoral. 
 Once again, though, I want to narrow the scope of my argument 
somewhat. I will not try to argue that eating meat is immoral in all cases, or 
even that it is immoral in all cases in which alternative sources of protein 
are readily available. Rather, I want to restrict my argument to cases in 
which the animals being eaten endured a great deal of suffering before 
ending up on your plate. If you frequent the pricier “pasture raised” portion 
of the meat aisle, there is some possibility that these animals were raised on 
a small family farm and treated kindly, that they goofed around with the 
children of the household, curled up at night with their animal families in 
a warm barn, and were treated to a painless death. I won’t try to argue that 
it is immoral to eat such animals.  
 Most of the meat consumed in the United States, however, comes from 
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs), also known as “factory 
farms”. This includes pretty much all the chicken, beef, and pork products 
you’re buying if you’re not making a concerted effort to seek out humanely 
raised meat. Animals in CAFOs spend much of their lives in cages or 
otherwise cramped conditions. They are regularly mutilated: chickens have 
portions of their beaks sliced off, cattle are dehorned and castrated, and pigs 
are castrated and have their tails cut off, typically without anesthesia. The 
slaughter, as you can imagine, is no picnic either. Animals typically aren’t 
slaughtered on site, but are instead transported—often long distances, in all 
kinds of weather—to slaughterhouses, and the slaughter is (let us say) an 
imperfect process, given the sheer number of scared and squirming animals 
coming through the slaughterhouse each day. 
 Needless to say, this is not cruelty for cruelty’s sake. Conditions in the 
farming industry have made it all but impossible to turn a profit from a 
small, idyllic farm, and farmers are forced to scale up in order to make ends 
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meet. Confining the animals to small spaces is necessary for keeping costs 
low, and the mutilations help curb the distraught animals’ tendency and 
ability to attack and harm one another. Farmers are not trying to harm the 
animals. They care about their animals’ well-being. Some even install 
“happy cow back scratchers” for their cattle. The suffering involved in 
CAFOs, by their lights, is a regrettable but unavoidable consequence of the 
industry. But this is their livelihood, and as long as you keep buying, they 
will keep supplying. 
 I should add that I am no expert on the meat industry, and it is difficult 
to find good information on the treatment of animals in CAFOs, due in part 
to “ag gag” laws and other efforts by agribusiness lobbyists to restrict access 
to these sites. One can find footage online of animals in CAFOs being 
treated horrifically, but of course animal welfare groups are going to 
highlight the most egregious cases of mistreatment they can find. One can 
also find footage of animals being treated humanely in CAFOs, but of 
course farmers are going to put their best foot forward. So we can’t expect 
videos from these sources to give us a representative look at the treatment of 
animals in CAFOs. My advice (as a non-expert) for getting at least some 
reliable sense of the present-day realities of animal farming is to track down 
and browse some online “how-to” guides for beak trimming, dehorning, 
castrating, and tail-docking, as well as online catalogs selling farmers 
equipment for performing these mutilations. 
 
6. Fred and His Puppies 
I will assume in what follows that when you eat meat, you are buying meat 
that came from a CAFO—which, as I said above, is almost certainly the case 
if you are not making a special effort and financial sacrifice to buy only 
humanely raised meat. (If you are making this effort, the argument does not 
apply to you.) I will argue that it is immoral for you to buy and eat that 
meat by presenting you with a fictional case involving the horrific treatment 
of puppies, and arguing that there is no morally relevant difference 
between what is done in this fictional case and what you are doing when 
you eat meat.  
  Here is the case: 
 
COCOAMONE FARM  
As a result of a head injury, Fred’s brain stops naturally producing 
cocoamone, the hormone that enables humans to taste chocolate. Fred 
discovers that the only way to obtain useable cocoamone is to distill it 
from the brains of puppies. (The science behind this is very complicated 
and you wouldn’t understand it.) So Fred buys twenty Labrador 
puppies from a local breeder. He slices off their tails, yanks out their 
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canine teeth, and castrates the males, all without anesthesia. He keeps 
them locked in small cages in his spare bedroom, slaughters them, 
grinds up their brains, and distills a month’s supply of cocoamone. He 
sips some cocoamone and—voilà—it works! So he buys twenty more 
puppies for the next month’s supply, mutilates them, and locks them 
up. 
 
And here is the argument: 
 
The Argument from Fred’s Puppies 
(FP1) If there is no morally relevant difference between two actions A 
and B, then: if A is immoral, then B is immoral 
(FP2) What Fred does is immoral 
(FP3) There is no morally relevant difference between what Fred does 
and you buying and eating meat 
(FP4) So, it is immoral for you to buy and eat meat 
 
 The idea behind FP1 is that, whenever there is some moral difference 
between two actions—for instance that one is immoral and the other isn’t—
there must always be some explanation of why they differ morally. Absent 
some such an explanation, it would be arbitrary to say that the one action 
is immoral and the other isn’t. 
 FP2 should strike you as obvious. Some, despite finding it obvious, may 
still wring their hands, remembering that in some cultures dogs are 
routinely killed and eaten for food. If you are wringing your hands, you 
should remind yourself that there are also cultures in which they routinely 
mutilate the genitals of young girls. Next, you should re-read section 2 
above and remind yourself that the fact that lots of people engage in some 
practice doesn’t make it morally permissible. The fact that some people 
mutilate their daughters’ genitals, raise dogs for food, or (for that matter) 
confine, mutilate, and slaughter farm animals, does not by itself settle the 
question of whether any of these practices are morally acceptable. Finally, 
with all this in mind, I invite you to re-read COCOAMONE FARM with fresh 
eyes, ask yourself whether Fred’s actions seem immoral, find your moral 
compass, and admit that FP2 is something that you agree with. 
 How about FP3? I don’t expect this premise to strike you as obvious. 
Indeed, you’ve probably already thought of several differences between 
what Fred is doing and what you do when you buy and eat meat. So let us 





 7. Morally Relevant Differences 
There are plenty of differences between the case of Fred and his puppies 
and the case of you and the farm animals whose flesh you are buying and 
eating. Labrador puppies are cute and cuddly, for instance, whereas 
chickens and pigs are ugly and smelly. That’s a difference. But it isn’t a 
morally relevant difference. How cute or ugly something or someone is 
doesn’t make any difference to what we are morally permitted to do to 
them. 
 So, what might be a morally relevant difference between the cases, that 
is, a difference that could potentially make for a moral difference? I’ll 
consider five possibilities: that puppies aren’t bred to be consumed, that 
Fred’s cruelty is unnecessary, that meat (unlike chocolate) has actual health 
benefits, that Fred (unlike you) is directly harming the animals, and that 
Fred giving up cocoamone would have an actual impact on the amount of 
animal suffering whereas you giving up meat would have no impact. 
 First, one might point to a difference in what puppies and livestock are 
bred for. Puppies, the idea goes, are bred to serve as human companions, 
whereas chickens and pigs are bred for human consumption. But there is 
reason to doubt that this is a morally relevant difference. If someone were 
breeding human children specifically so they could be put to work as slaves, 
enslaving those children would be just as immoral as enslaving any other 
child.  
 Furthermore, we can simply revise the COCOAMONE FARM case so that 
this difference disappears. 
 
BRED FOR COCOAMONE 
Fred goes to a breeder and buys some dogs, some male and some 
female. Recognizing that these dogs were bred to be human 
companions, he treats them well. But he breeds the dogs, intending to 
use their puppies for cocoamone. Once they have their puppies—which 
weren’t bred for human companionship—he takes the puppies, locks 
them in cages, mutilates them, slaughters them, and distills their 
cocoamone. 
 
By revising the case in this way, we eliminate the difference that was 
supposed to be morally relevant. Yet what Fred does to these puppies still 
seems wrong, even though they were bred for the sole purpose of being 
slaughtered for their cocoamone. So FP2 remains true—despite changing 
the details of what Fred does—and the proposed objection to FP3 fails.  
  Second, one might contend that, whereas the farm animals’ suffering is 
unavoidable, Fred’s cruel treatment of the puppies is entirely unnecessary. 
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If all he needs is the cocoamone, why extract their teeth and cut off their 
tails and keep them in small cages?  
 Well, here’s the thing. Fred lives in a small two-bedroom apartment, and 
it would be complete chaos if he gave those twenty dogs the run of the 
house. There’s no reasonable alternative to keeping them in cages. Of 
course, being all cooped up like this makes them crazy and aggressive, and 
castrating them curbs their aggression, while removing their teeth and tails 
diminishes their ability to harm one another. Why not get a bigger 
apartment? And why no anesthesia? He can’t afford it! Why not extract the 
cocoamone from their brains without slaughtering them? One does not 
simply “extract the cocoamone”. It’s not as if there’s a little pouch in there 
filling up with the stuff. There’s no way to get at it without grinding up the 
brain and straining it out. So, we have failed to identify a difference 
between the cases, let alone a morally relevant difference. In both cases, the 
suffering is an unavoidable consequence of the only feasible and financially 
sound way of obtaining the relevant resource (be it meat or cocoamone). 
 Third, one might contend that the morally relevant difference is that 
meat, but not cocoamone, makes a positive contribution to one’s health. Not 
so fast. Cocoamone does make a positive contribution to Fred’s psychological 
health. He loves the taste of chocolate, and the thought of never tasting it 
again is very depressing for him. Perhaps you’ll object that meat doesn’t 
merely make a positive contribution to one’s health; meat (unlike 
cocoamone) is necessary for a healthy diet. But as we saw in section 4, that’s 
just false. There is nothing, protein included, that’s needed for survival or 
health and that can only be gotten from meat. 
 Fourth, one might say that Fred directly harms the puppies in 
COCOAMONE FARM, whereas you do not directly harm any farm animals. 
They have already been confined, mutilated, and slaughtered by the time 
you buy and eat the meat. (Notice, by the way, that this is the opposite of the 
common refrain that it’s okay to eat meat as long as you’re willing to kill it 
yourself. Here, the idea is that it’s okay precisely because you’re not killing 
it yourself.)  
 In response: the absence of direct harm doesn’t typically absolve 
someone of moral responsibility. If I hire a hitman to kill someone, 
intuitively what I have done is no less wrong than if I had committed the 
murder myself. In any case, we can revise the Fred story once more to 





Too squeamish to mutilate and slaughter the dogs himself, Fred hires 
Nysha to do it for him. She buys twenty dogs, mutilates them, keeps 
them confined in small cages, slaughters them, and provides Fred with 
one vial of cocoamone each month. He pays her for her services.  
 
Now, Fred is not directly harming the puppies. But his hands are not clean; 
it is immoral for him to hire Nysha to set up a cocoamone farm. So FP2 
remains true even when we revise the story to incorporate something more 
analogous the indirect harm of buying meat. The putative morally relevant 
difference between the cases disappears and can no longer serve as an 
objection to FP3. 
 
8. The No Impact Objection 
Let’s consider one last attempt to identify a morally relevant difference 
between you and Fred. Here, the idea is that if Fred stops what he’s doing—
whether that’s running a cocoamone farm himself or paying Nysha to do it 
for him—there will be a substantial decrease in the number of puppies 
confined, mutilated, and slaughtered for their cocoamone. That number 
will drop to zero. By contrast, if you stopped buying and eating meat, in all 
likelihood it would make no difference whatsoever to the number of farm 
animals confined, mutilated, and slaughtered for their meat.  
 Why think that your decision to stop buying meat will have no impact 
on animal suffering? The average meat-eater consumes the equivalent of 
twenty-five chickens per year. So suppose you give up meat for a whole 
year, and twenty-five chickens’ worth of meat goes unpurchased as a result. 
It is not as if the barons of the meat industry are going to take notice and 
say: “Egad! Last year we sold eight billion chickens, and this year we only 
sold 7,999,999,975. We’d better confine, mutilate, and slaughter twenty-five 
fewer chickens next year.” Demand is going to have to shrink by thousands 
of animals per year before anyone takes notice, and that’s not something 
you yourself can make happen just by giving up meat.  
 This does look like it has what it takes to be a morally relevant 
difference. If one action actually has an impact on the amount of suffering 
in the world, and another has no impact whatsoever, then that very 
plausibly makes for a moral difference between the two actions. 
 That said, this ultimately is not a convincing objection to FP3. For once 




SECOND DESSERT  
Fred decides not to start his own cocoamone farm, and has now gone 
months without tasting chocolate. Out to dinner, for old times’ sake, he 
orders a chocolate mousse for dessert. To his surprise, he is able to taste 
the chocolate. Elated, he calls the waiter over to order a second mousse 
and asks if there’s something special about it. The waiter explains that, 
yes, the mousse is infused with cocoamone from the brains of 
slaughtered, mutilated puppies that they keep caged up in the back. 
They go through twenty puppies a day, he says. Fred is horrified. But 
he does not cancel his order, and he enjoys a second cocoamone-infused 
mousse. 
 
It’s wrong for Fred to order a second mousse, now that he knows about the 
puppy suffering involved in making it. And yet canceling the order would 
have had no impact on the amount of puppy suffering. They slaughter all 
the puppies before dinner service even begins, and they’ll slaughter twenty 
more tomorrow even if they end up with some leftover cocoamone tonight. 
So there is no morally relevant difference between what Fred does in 
SECOND DESSERT and what you do when buying and eating meat. The 
objection to FP3 has been defused. 
 How, though, can Fred’s actions in SECOND DESSERT be immoral if they 
have no impact? The answer is that he is part of a group whose actions 
collectively do make an impact, namely the restaurant’s customers. The 
restaurant keeps mistreating the puppies only because customers keep 
ordering the mousse. The customers are doing something immoral, and 
Fred’s actions are immoral by virtue of contributing to the impact that the 
group as a whole has on puppy suffering. This is the same reason why it’s 
wrong to throw your plastic bottles in the garbage rather than recycling 
them, even though the results will almost certainly be the same even 
without your small contribution. And this is the same reason why it’s 
wrong to buy meat, even if your personal meat consumption doesn’t by 
itself make a difference. (Of course, the meat that you and others purchase 
today is from animals that are already dead, so you’re not contributing to 
the suffering of those animals. But you are affecting the next generation of 
farm animals, by incentivizing farmers to continue raising and mistreating 
them.) 
 I’ll close by considering a variation on the no-impact objection. It is 
sometimes objected that even if everyone switched to a vegetarian diet, that 
wouldn’t make any difference to the amount of animal suffering. After all, 
farming crops results in the death of countless mice and other field animals 
that get caught up in farm machinery. Cutting out meat would lead to less 
killing of livestock, but this would just be replaced with more crop farming 
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and thus more mouse killing. Since we have to eat something, the idea goes, 
and since animals are going to be dying either way, we may as well eat 
meat. 
 I find this unconvincing for several reasons. First, one must take into 
account not just the quantity of the deaths but also the quality of the lives. 
The mice killed in crop farming live normal lives up until they are killed by 
the farming equipment, whereas livestock in CAFOs are subjected to a 
lifetime of confinement with mutilated bodies. Second, it’s far from obvious 
that a worldwide switch to vegetarianism would result in any increase in 
the number of field animals killed. In the U.S., only about a quarter of 
farmed crops are directly consumed by humans, and more than half are 
grown and farmed to serve as animal feed. Replacing the latter with crops 
meant for human consumption would likely lead to an overall decrease in 
crop farming and mouse killings, as well as reducing the number of mice 
killed in laboratories while developing and testing antibiotics for farm 
animals. Third, there are feasible, nonlethal methods of driving mice from 
the fields before farming them, whereas there are no nonlethal methods of 
slaughtering animals for their meat. 
 
9. Beyond Factory Farming 
I have argued that eating meat cannot be justified on the grounds that 
people have been doing it for all of recorded history, or on the grounds that 
eating meat is necessary, or on the grounds that eating meat is “natural”. I 
also argued that it is immoral for you to buy and eat meat produced in 
CAFOs, which is pretty much all the meat you’ve been buying assuming 
that you haven’t been going out of your way to buy humanely raised meat. 
If I’m right about this, then my arguments are highly relevant to most 
people’s eating habits. If you have been casually buying meat at 
supermarkets, restaurants, and fast food establishments, then you are doing 
something immoral and ought to change your dietary practices. 
 Is it ever morally permissible to eat meat or other animal products? The 
Argument from Fred’s Puppies only establishes that eating meat from 
CAFOs is immoral, and not all meat comes from CAFOs. That said, the 
Argument from Fred’s Puppies can be adapted to shed light on other sorts 
of cases. 
 First, consider eggs and dairy products like cheese and milk. Just like 
the meat you buy, pretty much all of the eggs and dairy that you buy comes 
from CAFOs. Dairy cows and egg-laying chickens endure the same sorts of 
confinement and mutilations as the cows and chickens raised for meat. In 
light of that, we can revise Fred’s case to show that it is immoral to buy and 
consume eggs and dairy that come from CAFOs. 
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SWEATY PUPPIES  
Fred’s brain stops producing cocoamone, and the only way to obtain 
useable cocoamone is to distill it from the sweat of puppies. He asks his 
friends if he can collect sweat off of their puppies, but they think that’s 
creepy and won’t let him do it. So he buys twenty puppies, locks them 
in cages, mutilates them, collects their sweat, and distills a month’s 
supply of cocoamone.  
 
What Fred does is immoral. But there’s no morally relevant difference 
between him caging and mutilating the puppies for their cocoamone, and 
you buying and consuming eggs and dairy from CAFOs. (See section 7 for 
a reminder about why Fred has no choice but to cage and mutilate the 
puppies.) 
  How about meat from humanely raised animals? Here, again, we can 
look to Fred for guidance.   
  
PAINLESS DEATH  
Fred’s brain stops producing cocoamone, and the only way to obtain 
useable cocoamone is to distill it from the brains of puppies. So he buys 
twenty puppies, lets them run around free in his apartment, takes them 
for walks, buys them toys, and treats them well. Then, once they’re a 
year old, he sneaks up on them one by one, slits their throats, grinds up 
their brains, and distills a month’s supply of cocoamone.    
 
Is Fred doing something immoral? I would say so, though I’ll admit that 
what he does in PAINLESS DEATH isn’t nearly as bad as what he does in the 
original COCOAMONE FARM case. If you agree that it’s wrong for Fred to 
slaughter puppies for their cocoamone even if he otherwise treats them 
well, then you should agree that it’s wrong for you to buy meat even from 
humanely-raised farm animals. 
 How about eggs and dairy from humanely raised animals? For instance, 
supposed that someone keeps chickens and cows as pets, treats them well, 
never slaughters them, and sells their milk and (unfertilized) eggs. Would 
it be wrong to buy and consume their milk and eggs? To see this, let’s 
consider what would be the analogous case for Fred: 
 
HAPPY PUPPY SWEAT  
Fred’s brain stops producing cocoamone, and the only way to obtain 
useable cocoamone is to distill it from the sweat of puppies. So he buys 
twenty puppies, lets them run around free in his apartment, takes them 
for walks, buys them toys, and treats them well. He collects their 
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sweat—without killing them or harming them in any way—and distills 
a month’s supply of cocoamone. 
  
This case seems to combine all the best features of the previous two cases 
with none of their problematic features. Certainly Fred isn’t doing anything 
immoral. So, by parity of reason, there’s nothing immoral about buying 
eggs and dairy from humanely raised animals on a no-kill farm.   
 Finally, what about lab-grown meat? We currently have the technology 
to “grow” beef in a laboratory—just the meat, with no animal attached—
without any living animals being harmed in the process. Someday soon, 
you may be able to buy this lab-grown meat in stores and restaurants. 
Would that be immoral? Once again, we can answer the question by 
imagining Fred getting his cocoamone in an analogous way:  
 
COCOAMONE LAB  
Fred’s brain stops producing cocoamone. So he buys a hundred small 
clusters of brain cells that were painlessly extracted from living puppies 
without harming those puppies in any way. He keeps the cells alive in 
a chemical solution, and collects the cocoamone that they produce. 
 
When we drastically change the details of the case in this way, it no longer 
seems like Fred is doing anything immoral. No animals have to die or suffer 
in order for him to get his cocoamone. Since there is no morally relevant 
difference between what Fred does in COCOAMONE LAB and buying lab-
grown meat, and since Fred isn’t doing anything immoral in COCOAMONE 
LAB, there’s nothing immoral about buying and eating lab-grown meat.  
 What we’ve just seen is that the arguments of this chapter don’t support 
the extreme view that it’s never permissible to buy or consume meat or other 
animal products.  But even though I haven’t shown that eating meat is 
always immoral, I have shown that it’s immoral to buy any of the meat (and 
most of the eggs and dairy) that’s presently for sale in stores and 
restaurants. 
 Suppose you are convinced that you ought to stop buying and eating 
meat. But you can’t bring yourself to cut out meat completely, perhaps 
because you love Taco Bell too much or because grandma will be crushed 
if you refuse to eat her Christmas roast. What’s a wannabe vegetarian to 
do? What I would say is that morality comes in degrees. It’s wrong to eat 
meat, but it’s far worse to eat meat at every meal than to eat meat just on 
holidays and a Taco Bell Double Decker Taco now and again. So my advice 
is to make a good faith effort to decrease your meat consumption—to once 
a day or once a week—and then transition to a 100% (or 99%) vegetarian 
diet when you’re ready. 
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Reflection Questions 
1. Can the argument from precedent or naturalness be defended against 
my objections? Or can you think of a superior line of argument in 
defense of eating meat? 
 
2. Can you think of a plausible way of arguing against premise FP2, that 
what Fred does is immoral? Make sure that your argument in defense 
of slaughtering puppies won’t double as a defense of slaughtering 
human infants.  
 
3. Can you defend one of the putative morally relevant differences 
discussed in sections 7 and 8 against my objections, or can you think of 
a morally relevant difference that was not discussed? 
 
4. If not for the meat industry, the billions of animals raised and 
slaughtered annually for food would never have existed. Could this fact 
be used as the basis for an argument in defense of eating meat? Why or 
why not? 
 
5. What should someone who accepts the Argument from Fred’s Puppies 
think about “freeganism”, the practice of eating only meat that someone 
else has purchased or thrown in the dumpster and that would otherwise 
go to waste? 
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What Makes Things Right 
 
Views and arguments advanced in this chapter are not necessarily endorsed by the 
author of the textbook, nor are they original to the author, nor are they meant to be 
consistent with arguments advanced in other chapters. Different chapters represent 
different philosophical perspectives. 
 
1. Utilitarianism 
We’re constantly confronted with questions about what it’s right or wrong 
to do. Some arise in our daily lives: is it wrong to download pirated movies, 
run a red light at an empty intersection, tell on a friend who you know 
cheated on an exam? Some arise in political discussion: is to wrong for the 
government to ban assault rifles, or abortions? Some arise in stories and 
movies: is it wrong for the super-villain to kill off half the population so that 
the survivors can benefit from the abundance of resources? 
 We’d like to know which of these things are right and which are wrong. 
What would be even better is a perfectly general answer to the question of 
which things are right and wrong, an answer that identifies what makes 
right actions right and wrong actions wrong. My aim here is to answer that 
question. In particular, I will defend a utilitarian answer, according to which 
the rightness or wrongness of an action is entirely a function of how it 
contributes (positively or negatively) to people’s well-being. Since a 
person’s well-being is ultimately a matter of how happy they are, what this 
means is that an action’s rightness or wrongness comes down to how much 
an action increases or decreases levels of happiness.  
 Here, then, is the utilitarian theory of morality that I plan to defend, 
which I call “act utilitarianism”.   
 
Act Utilitarianism 
Performing a certain action is the right thing to do if and only if it will 
have a more positive effect on overall levels of happiness than any other 
available action 
 
By “happiness”, I mean any sort of pleasurable mental state, including both 
physical and emotional pleasures. And I’m thinking of “levels of 
happiness” as including degrees of unhappiness. Two situations in which 
everyone is completely unhappy may still differ in their level of happiness 
if they are unhappier in one than in the other.  
 In section 2, I’ll explain why act utilitarianism is an appealing theory of 
morality. Then, in section 3, I’ll consider an important objection to the view, 
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namely that it implies that killing an innocent person and distributing his 
organs to save five lives is the right thing to do. In section 4, I consider, but 
ultimately reject, an alternative utilitarian view—“rule utilitarianism”—
which seems to avoid this undesirable consequence. Finally, in section 5, I 
argue that act utilitarianism is correct to say that killing one person to save 
five is the right thing to do, as becomes clear when we consider other sorts 
of cases (involving runaway trolleys).  
 Before proceeding, let me clarify a couple things. First, act utilitarianism 
does not say that the right thing for a person to do is whatever makes that 
person the happiest. To help see this, consider the following case: 
 
TERRORIST ATTACK  
Kristian discovers that her girlfriend Demi is planning a terrorist attack. 
Kristian knows that if she calls the cops on Demi, it will end their 
relationship, Demi will never forgive her, and she’ll feel incredibly 
guilty about turning Demi in. Kristian also knows that if she doesn’t tell 
the cops, countless people will lose their lives or their loved ones. 
Kristian decides not to tell the cops, and Demi carries out the 
devastating attack. Demi is never caught. Kristian puts it out of her mind 
and feels no guilt or remorse about not preventing the attack. 
 
Keeping the information to herself has a greater positive effect on Kristian’s 
overall level of happiness than ratting out Demi would have. Still, act 
utilitarianism says that the right thing for Kristian to have done was to tell 
the cops. Why? Because act utilitarianism requires us to take into account 
the happiness of everyone affected by the action, not just the person who 
performed the action. The effects of withholding the information include 
not just Kristian and Demi’s happiness but also the grief experienced by the 
victims’ families and friends. The effects of telling the cops would include 
not just Kristian and Demi’s unhappiness but also all the happy experiences 
that the victims and their families and friends would otherwise have 
enjoyed. Telling the cops clearly would have had a greater positive effect 
on overall levels of happiness in the world. So, according to act 
utilitarianism, Kristian should have turned Demi in. 
 Second, I say that I am defending a utilitarian theory. What makes a 
view utilitarian is that it considers rightness and wrongness to be a function 
of how actions affect overall well-being, that is, a function of the things that 
make people better or worse off. I am assuming that people’s well-being is 
entirely a matter of how happy or unhappy they are, though one could in 
principle defend a utilitarian theory on which well-being consists in 
something other than happiness (for instance, people getting what they 
want, even when it doesn’t make them happy). Additionally, act 
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utilitarianism describes one way in which morality might be a function of 
happiness, but there are other possible ways of saying what the function is. 
For instance, as we’ll see in section 4, one could say that it’s a function not 
simply of how one’s specific actions affect people’s happiness but rather of 
how the rules that one is following generally tend to affect people’s 
happiness. 
 
2. Why Accept Act Utilitarianism? 
I’m not sure how to argue definitively for the truth of act utilitarianism. 
Still, I can give several reasons for taking it seriously as a theory of morality.  
 First, act utilitarianism delivers the right verdicts about which actions 
are right and wrong in a wide range of cases. Cheating on your romantic 
partner is wrong because it leads to so much emotional pain, in exchange 
for a comparably small and short-lived amount of sexual gratification. If I 
promise to drive you to the airport early in the morning and then I don’t 
bother to show up because I don’t feel like getting out of bed, I’ve done 
something wrong because your distress over missing your flight has a 
bigger negative effect on overall happiness (taking into account both yours 
and mine) than does dragging myself out of bed and getting you to the 
airport.  
 On the other hand, suppose I promise to drive you to the airport and I 
don’t show up because, on the way out the door, I happen upon someone 
in desperate need of medical attention, and I drive him to the hospital. In 
that case, I did the right thing, even though I broke my promise. Why? 
Because leaving him to die would have had a greater negative effect on the 
overall level of happiness of all involved (including yours, mine, his, and 
his family and friends’) than you missing your flight.  
 We’ll consider some cases later where act utilitarianism may seem to get 
the wrong result. In the meantime, I would encourage you to think of cases 
from your own life where you judged that someone did the morally right 
or morally wrong thing, and see whether act utilitarianism renders the 
same verdict about whether it was right or wrong. I bet it does.  
 Second, it’s extremely plausible that morality is about making people 
better off and making the world a better place. If some action I perform 
increases the overall levels of happiness in the world more than any other 
action I could have performed, then I’ve done the best I can to make the 
world a better place. And surely, if I’ve done the best I can to make the 
world a better place, I’ve done the right thing. Or put it another way. 
Suppose, just for the sake of argument, that act utilitarianism is false. That 
means that there could be some action that, on the whole, makes people 
better off and makes the world a better place—more so than any other 
action I could have performed—and yet it’s the wrong thing to do. And I 
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could sometimes be doing the right thing by choosing the action that 
generates more unhappiness. Both of these things would be possible if act 
utilitarianism were false: it could be wrong to make the world a better place, 
and right to make the world a worse place. But that’s absurd. So, act 
utilitarianism must be true.  
 Third, act utilitarianism is egalitarian. Act utilitarians are against sexist 
laws and practices. Since these practices have a dramatic negative effect on 
levels of happiness, by profoundly decreasing the levels of happiness for 
women, act utilitarianism rules them to be immoral. Act utilitarians oppose 
racist laws and practices for the same reason. Act utilitarians are against 
persecuting and discriminating against LGBTQ people for the same reason. 
These kinds of oppression are wrong, and act utilitarianism agrees that 
they’re wrong. For, even though there are always those who benefit from 
the oppression, what they gain in happiness is far outweighed by the 
unhappiness experienced by the victims of the oppression. Act utilitarians 
have all along been saying that everyone’s happiness has to be given equal 
weight, regardless of race, gender, or sexual orientation—even back when 
these were radical things to say.   
 Fourth, act utilitarianism makes good sense of the respects in which 
morality is, and isn’t, a subjective matter. Morality is subjective insofar as 
the same action might affect one person’s happiness differently from how 
it affects another’s. For instance, suppose I tell you to close your eyes, and I 
feed you a bite of pepperoni pizza. Have I done something wrong? It 
depends. If you love pepperoni pizza and it makes you happy, then no. If 
you’re a vegetarian and what I did makes you furious and nauseous, then 
yes. Act utilitarianism easily explains why what I did is right in the one case 
and wrong in the other.  
 The same goes for cultural differences. In countries like the U.S., tipping 
your waiter is customary, whereas in countries like Japan it’s often 
considered offensive. Accordingly, tipping is the right thing to do in the 
U.S. and the wrong thing to do in Japan. Act utilitarianism explains why 
the same action can be right in once place and wrong in another: because in 
the one place it makes people happy and in the other it makes them 
unhappy. 
 That’s not to say that morality is entirely a subjective matter. We cannot 
change what’s right or wrong just by changing our minds about what’s right 
or wrong. To see this, consider the following case: 
 
CONDONED LOBOTOMIES  
The leaders of a certain oppressive country instituted a law that requires 
all newborn girls to be lobotomized. Dissenters were lobotomized as 
well. After a few generations, there are no more dissenters. The men are 
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all happy with the arrangement, and the women are all lobotomized and 
have no opinion on the matter. 
 
No one in this country thinks that it is wrong to lobotomize newborn girls. 
And yet obviously the leaders are doing something deeply immoral. Act 
utilitarianism explains why: the women of this country are deprived of the 
full range of intellectual and emotional enjoyments that they would 
otherwise have had. The fact that no one in the country believes that the 
practice is wrong is neither here nor there. What matters is how the practice 
affects the well-being of all involved, and (unlike tipping) the effects of 
lobotomies don’t vary from one country to the next. 
 
3. Killing One to Save Five 
We saw that act utilitarianism tends to give the right answers to moral 
questions. But one might object that it at least sometimes gives the wrong 
answer, misidentifying a wrong action as the right thing to do. In other 
words, the objection is that there are counterexamples to act utilitarianism, 
examples in which one action does more than another to increase overall 
levels of happiness and yet is not the right thing to do. So, it is incumbent 
upon me, as a defender of act utilitarianism, to address all such cases and 
show that they are not genuine counterexamples. 
 One might wonder, though, why any such defense is needed. If act 
utilitarianism generally gives the correct verdicts, why does it matter if it 
doesn’t get the answer right in every single case? It matters because I am 
trying to do more than just give a useful rule of thumb for answering moral 
questions. For suppose act utilitarianism were just a useful, but not 
exceptionless, rule of thumb. In that case, even if I could convince you 
beyond any doubt that legalizing polyamorous marriages would increase 
overall levels of happiness, that would not yet settle the question of whether 
legalizing them is the right thing to do. After all, maybe polyamorous 
marriage is one of the exceptions to the rule, where increasing overall levels 
of happiness isn’t the right thing to do.  
 A merely useful rule of thumb for investigating moral questions ends 
up being useless for settling moral questions. For that reason, I want to 
defend the view that act utilitarianism provides the complete story of what 
makes actions right or wrong. I want to defend a theory on which showing 
that one action is better than any alternative at improving happiness levels 
definitively settles the question of whether it is the right thing to do. 
Accordingly, even one case in which my theory misclassifies the wrong 
thing to do as the right thing to do, or vice versa, would be enough to falsify 
the theory.  
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 Here, then, is the case I want to discuss, which is meant to be a 
counterexample to act utilitarianism.  
 
ORGAN DISTRIBUTION  
Jonathan is a doctor, and his patient Nick is coming in for a routine 
physical. Looking over his past bloodwork, Jonathan realizes that Nick 
is an exact match for five patients in critical condition upstairs in the 
Intensive Care Unit. When Nick arrives, Jonathan kills him (painlessly), 
making it look like an accident. Since Nick is an organ donor, his body 
is rushed upstairs, and his heart, lungs, liver, and each of his kidneys 
are successfully transplanted into those five patients, saving their lives. 
No other organs arrived that day, and the five patients would have died 
had Jonathan not killed Nick for his organs. The five patients all go on 
to lead long, happy lives. No one ever finds out that Nick’s death was 
not an accident. 
 
Some will say that what Jonathan did is immoral. And yet, killing Nick and 
saving the five patients results in higher overall levels of happiness than 
letting him live and allowing the five patients to die. After all, killing Nick 
results in the loss of one life’s worth of happiness and one group of 
mourners, whereas letting the five patients die would have resulted in the 
loss of five lives’ worth of happiness and five times as many mourners. 
 If all that is right, then act utilitarianism is false. The argument can be 
reconstructed as follows: 
 
The Organ Distribution Argument 
(OD1) Killing Nick has a greater positive effect on overall levels of 
happiness than letting him live 
(OD2) If killing Nick has a greater positive effect on overall levels of 
happiness than letting him live, then: if act utilitarianism is true, 
then killing Nick was the right thing to do 
(OD3) Killing Nick was not the right thing to do 
(OD4) So, act utilitarianism is false 
 
OD1 is true. There would have been more mourning and fewer happy lives 
if Jonathan hadn’t killed Nick. OD2 is true as well: act utilitarianism says 
that, without exception, the action with the greatest positive effect on 
happiness levels is the right thing to do. And OD3 is supposed to simply be 




4. Rule Utilitarianism 
One option for a utilitarian—which is worth exploring, but which I do not 
myself endorse—is to grant that the Organ Distribution Argument works 
and that act utilitarianism is false. The idea would then be to provide an 
alternative utilitarian view, one that won’t deliver the result that Jonathan 
did the right thing in killing Nick. What would such an alternative view 
look like? 
 One idea would be to insist that doing the right thing isn’t so much a 
matter of how a single action affects happiness levels, but rather a matter of 
how the rules one is following tend to affect happiness levels. Consider the 
following rules that one might choose to follow: 
 
• Do not kill innocent people 
• Do not steal 
• Do not lie 
• Keep your promises 
• Do unto others as you would have them do unto you 
 
Even if following these rules doesn’t always maximize happiness, it usually 
does, which is what makes them good rules. 
 With this in mind, one possibility for avoiding the implication that 
Jonathan did the right thing in killing Nick would be to reject act 
utilitarianism in favor of rule utilitarianism: 
 
  Rule Utilitarianism 
Performing a certain action is the right thing to do if and only if it is 
prescribed by the collection of rules that, if adopted, would have the 
greatest positive effect on overall levels of happiness 
 
Even though following the rules listed above won’t have the greatest 
positive effect on overall levels of happiness in every single case, following 
them does more often than not have a positive effect on happiness. If so, 
they may well belong to the collection of rules that, if adopted, would have 
the greatest positive effect on overall levels of happiness—or, in short, “the 
best collection of rules”. 
 Here is how rule utilitarianism is supposed to help with ORGAN 
DISTRIBUTION. According to rule utilitarianism, the right thing to do is to 
follow the best collection of rules. So, let us compare two rules: don’t kill an 
innocent person unless doing so saves multiple lives and don’t ever kill any 
innocent people. While it’s true that following the first rule sometimes has a 
better effect on happiness levels (as in ORGAN DISTRIBUTION), typically it 
doesn’t. If doctors were constantly killing healthy patients to distribute 
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their organs, word would get out. People would be terrified to go to the 
hospital. There would be widespread panic and untreated illness and 
injuries (from people avoiding hospitals). So, even though five people 
would be saved for every one person killed, thousands of others would be 
sick, scared, and miserable.  
 Following the first rule tends, on the whole, to have a negative effect on 
happiness levels. Following the second rule, by contrast, tends on the whole 
to have a positive effect on happiness levels, even though in some rare cases 
it has a negative effect. Accordingly, the best collection of rules is going to 
include the second rule, not the first. Rule utilitarianism therefore tells us 
that the right thing for Jonathan to do is to let Nick live, since that’s what’s 
dictated by the better rule: don’t kill any innocent people. Rule utilitarianism, 
unlike act utilitarianism, delivers what intuitively seems to be the right 
result in ORGAN DISTRIBUTION. 
 The problem with rule utilitarianism is that it faces counterexamples of 
its own—counterexamples that, to my mind, are even more damning than 
the alleged counterexample to act utilitarianism. For instance, recall the case 
mentioned above where I break my promise to take you to the airport 
because, on my way to get you, I find someone desperately in need of 
medical attention and decide to drive them to the hospital instead. Clearly, 
I am doing the right thing in that case. But rule utilitarianism says that I’ve 
done the wrong thing. After all, the rule I am following, keep your promises 
unless something more important comes up, tends on the whole to have a 
negative effect on overall happiness. If everyone broke their promises every 
time something more important came up, no one would trust anyone to 
keep their promises, and not being able to trust one another would have a 
huge negative impact on our emotional well-being.  
 By contrast, following the simpler rule keep all your promises tends on the 
whole to have a positive effect on happiness levels, even though in some 
rare cases is has a negative effect. So, by the same logic as above, rule 
utilitarianism says that the right thing to do is to keep my promise and leave 
the needy person to die on my doorstep. But that clearly is not the right 
thing to do. So, rule utilitarianism is false. 
 Perhaps the rule utilitarian will respond that there’s a rule I’m 
overlooking: keep your promises unless you need to break them in order to drive 
a dying person to the hospital. Following that rule will tend on the whole to 
have a positive effect on happiness levels, since it only allows promise-
breaking in certain rare cases where promise-breaking really is the right 
thing to do. So, the rule utilitarian might say, it’s this rule—and neither of 
the previous two rules about promises—that belongs to the best collection 
of rules. 
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 But if the “rules” at issue in the statement of rule utilitarianism can be 
that specific, then we need to reassess what rule utilitarianism says about 
ORGAN DISTRIBUTION. After all, Jonathan is following the rule don’t kill 
innocent people unless you’re absolutely certain you can do it secretly and you’ll 
save five people with the organs. Following that rule will tend to have the 
greatest positive effect on the whole, since it only allows killing innocent 
people in rare cases where the killings save lives and don’t lead to 
widespread panic (because they’re done in secret). So, by rule 
utilitarianism, Jonathan is doing the right thing by killing Nick—exactly the 
consequence the rule utilitarian wanted to avoid!  
 The point here is that the rule utilitarian faces a dilemma. Either her 
rules are understood to be relatively general things, in which case rule 
utilitarianism has the absurd implication that I’m never allowed to break 
my promises, even in extreme cases. Or her rules can be highly specific, in 
which case rule utilitarianism does imply that killing Nick was the right 
thing to do, and switching from act utilitarianism to rule utilitarianism is 
no help in escaping that consequence. Since rule utilitarianism is either false 
or unhelpful, let’s set it aside, return to act utilitarianism, and reassess 
whether act utilitarianism can be defended against the Organ Distribution 
Argument. 
 
5. The Trolley Argument 
Premise OD3 of the Organ Distribution Argument says that killing Nick 
was not the right thing to do. I admitted above that this premise seems true: 
it seems morally wrong for Jonathan to kill Nick. But things are not always 
as they seem. I will now argue that, despite appearances, OD3 is false. 
 My argument against OD3 involves considering a different case, one in 
which it isn’t wrong to kill one to save five. Here is the case: 
 
TROLLEY DRIVER  
Corrine is driving a trolley, which is hurtling down the tracks, faster 
than it should. Five pledges from a local fraternity have been tied to the 
tracks as part of an initiation ritual. By the time she sees them, it’s too 
late to slow down. The only way to avoid killing them is to swerve the 
trolley onto a side track at an upcoming junction. But the pledge master, 
who is asleep on the side track, will be killed if she does. Corrine decides 
to steer the trolley onto the side track anyway, killing the pledge master. 
She then stops the trolley, unties the pledges, and they all go on to lead 
long, happy lives. 
 
Corrine did the right thing: it was morally better to steer onto the side track, 
killing the pledge master, than to continue forward and kill the five pledges. 
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And yet there would seem to be no morally relevant difference between 
what Corrine did and what Jonathan did. Both killed one person to save 
five. So, if it was right for Corrine to do what had to be done to save five 
people, how could it be wrong for Jonathan to do what had to be done to 
save five people?  
 Here, more explicitly, is the argument: 
 
The Trolley Argument 
(TR1) If there is no morally relevant difference between two actions A 
and B, then: if A is the right thing to do, then B is the right thing 
to do 
(TR2) Diverting the trolley was the right thing to do 
(TR3) There is no morally relevant difference between diverting the 
trolley and killing Nick 
(TR4) So, killing Nick was the right thing to do 
 
The idea behind TR1 is that, whenever there is some moral difference 
between two cases, there must always be some explanation of why they 
differ morally. Absent some such explanation, it would be arbitrary to say 
that the one action is wrong and the other isn’t. TR2 is hopefully obvious; 
I’m not sure what more I could do to argue for it. And TR3 seems true as 
well: the cases are structurally identical, both being cases in which one 
person is sacrificed to save five. Thus, even though the act utilitarian 
conclusion that Jonathan did the right thing may strike you as 
counterintuitive, we nevertheless have excellent reason to think it’s correct. 
Those who wish to say that it was wrong to kill Nick must find some flaw 
in the Trolley Argument. 
 I can imagine someone objecting to TR3, insisting that there is an 
important difference between the cases. Here’s the idea. If Corrine hadn’t 
swerved onto the other track, she would have killed those five pledges. By 
contrast, if Jonathan hadn’t killed Nick, we wouldn’t say that he killed the 
five needy patients. He merely let them die, and allowing people to die is not 
morally equivalent to actually killing them. Killing is worse, one might say, 
and that’s why Jonathan’s actions are worse than Corrine’s: Corrine but not 
Jonathan had to do what she did in order to avoid killing five people.  
 I have my doubts about whether there is any morally relevant difference 
between killing and letting die. But let’s suppose that there is. Even so, we 
can revise the trolley case so that it too involves a choice between killing 




TROLLEY LEVER  
A runaway trolley with no driver is hurtling down the tracks towards 
five pledges. Corrine is an onlooker, standing beside the tracks. Next to 
her is a lever which can divert the trolley onto a side track. She can do 
nothing, and let the pledges die. But if she pulls the lever and diverts 
the trolley, it will kill the pledge master, who is asleep on the side track. 
Corrine decides to pull the lever, killing the pledge master and saving 
the pledges. She then unties the pledges, and they all go on to lead long, 
happy lives. 
 
Again, Corrine intuitively did the right thing by pulling the lever and 
killing one person to save five. But the earlier objection no longer holds. For 
if she hadn’t pulled the lever, she wouldn’t thereby be killing anyone. She 
would merely be letting five people die. Just like Jonathan. So, the alleged 
morally relevant difference disappears, and the objection to TR3 disappears 
along with it. Importantly, TR2 remains true even once the case is revised: 
faced with a decision between killing one and letting five die, killing the 
one is the right thing to do. 
 
6. Conclusion 
I have defended a utilitarian theory of morality, according to which the 
right thing to do is always whatever will have the greatest positive effect 
on overall levels of happiness. We saw that there are powerful motivations 
for accepting utilitarianism, for instance that it is intuitive, that it is 
egalitarian, and that it respects the subjectivity and culture-relativity of 
morality without entailing an extreme subjectivism according to which 
what’s right or wrong can be changed at whim. Finally, we saw some ways 
of defending utilitarianism against the objection that it wrongly condones 
killing one person to save five. 
 
Reflection Questions 
1. In section 2, I said that utilitarianism is admirably egalitarian, opposing 
the mistreatment of women and minorities. But might it be egalitarian 
but for the wrong reasons? Is the problem with oppression really that 
the oppressed group’s suffering outweighs the happiness the 
oppressors derive from the oppression? 
 




3. Were you convinced by the argument in section 5 that killing one to save 
five in ORGAN DISTRIBUTION is no different from killing one to save five 
in the trolley cases? 
 
4. Suppose act utilitarianism is true. In that case, in order to know whether 
something is the right thing to do, one would evidently have to know 
all of the different ways that the action might affect people’s happiness, 
both in the short-term and long into the future. Is that a problem for act 
utilitarianism? How might a utilitarian respond? 
 
5. What should a utilitarian say about the morality of eating meat and 
other animal products?   
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Classic defenses of utilitarianism can be found in Jeremy Bentham’s 
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Fundamentals of Ethics for a broader overview of theories of well-being and 
morality. See the opening of Elinor Mason’s Feminist Philosophy (titled 
‘Feminism in the Multicultural Context’) on defending universal values in 
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• Ursula K. Le Guin: The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas 
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• Alastair Norcross: Consequences Make Actions Right 
• J.C.C. Smart and Bernard Williams: Utilitarianism: For and Against 







Throughout this book, I present arguments, defend their premises, and then 
claim that the conclusions of those arguments follow from the premises. In 
this appendix, I’ll explain what it means for a conclusion to follow from 
some premises and how you can tell when a conclusion follows from some 
premises. In section 1, I introduce the notion of a valid argument, that is, an 
argument whose conclusion follows from it premises. Then, in section 2, I 
identify four types of valid arguments. Finally, in section 3—because 
nothing is sacred in philosophy—I show how even claims about which 
types of arguments are valid can be called into question.     
 
1. Valid Arguments 
Suppose you and I have gotten our hands on a live chicken. I want to keep 
it as a pet, and I’ve already even given it a name: ‘Camilla’. You want to 
slaughter it and eat it. I’m trying to convince you that we can’t eat Camilla, 
and I give you the following two arguments: 
 
The Cuteness Argument 
(CA1) Camilla is cute 
(CA2) It’s wrong to eat cute things 
(CA3) So, it’s wrong to Camilla 
 
The Feathers Argument 
(FA1) Camilla has feathers 
(FA2) Feathers are soft 
(FA3) So, it’s wrong to eat Camilla 
 
You probably aren’t convinced by either argument. Why not? 
 It’s easy to say what goes wrong with the Cuteness Argument. You 
might say the first premise is false, because chickens are ugly. Or you might 
deny the second premise, saying that just because something is cute doesn’t 
mean it’s wrong to eat it. Or maybe you’ll deny both. Either way, the 
problem with the argument is that its premises aren’t true.  
 But what about the Feathers Argument? You probably don’t find it any 
more convincing than the Cuteness Argument. But both of its premises are 
true. So, what is the problem with the Feathers Argument? The problem is 
that the conclusion doesn’t follow from the premises. Or, as we philosophers 
like to say, the argument is not valid. 
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 A valid argument is an argument whose conclusion is a logical 
consequence of the premises. When an argument is valid, the premises 
guarantee the truth of the conclusion; it’s impossible for the premises to be 
true without the conclusion being true. You would be contradicting 
yourself if you accepted all the premises but denied the conclusion.  
 The problem with the Feathers Argument is that it’s invalid: it doesn’t 
follow from Camilla’s having feathers and feathers’ being soft that it’s 
wrong to eat her. There’s no contradiction in accepting the premises of that 
argument while denying its conclusion. The Cuteness Argument, by 
contrast, is valid: the claim that it’s wrong to eat Camilla is a logical 
consequence of the claim that Camilla is cute and the claim that it’s wrong 
to eat cute things. Anyone who accepts the premises of the Cuteness 
Argument is logically required to accept the conclusion as well, on pain of 
contradicting themselves. 
 You might be surprised that I just called the Cuteness Argument ‘valid’. 
But look again at how I characterized validity just above. That 
characterization doesn’t require the premises of a valid argument to be true, 
or even plausible. All that’s required is that if the premises are true, then 
the conclusion is guaranteed to be true as well. An argument can be valid 
and still be a pretty bad argument, like the Cuteness Argument, because its 
premises are implausible. (Philosophers have a different word for 
arguments that are valid and all of whose premises are true: we call them 
sound arguments.) Also, as defined above, validity can only ever be a 
feature of arguments. So, at least in philosophical discussions, it’s best to 
avoid calling premises or points “valid”. Only arguments should be 
characterized as valid or invalid.  
 One more word of warning: don’t confuse following and following from. 
To see what I have in mind, consider this argument from chapter 6: 
 
Against Fearing Death 
(FD1) You cease to be conscious when you die 
(FD2) If you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead isn’t 
bad for you 
(FD3) So, being dead isn’t bad for you 
(FD4) If being dead isn’t bad for you, then you shouldn’t fear death 
(FD5) So, you shouldn’t fear death 
 
It’s true that FD2 follows FD1. That is, it comes immediately after FD1. But 
FD2 does not follow from FD1. To say that it follows from FD1 is to say that 
there’s a valid argument whose conclusion is FD2 and whole only premise 
is FD1. That, in turn, implies that you would be contradicting yourself if 
you accepted FD1 while at the same time denying FD2. But notice that this 
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isn’t at all contradictory. You can agree that you cease to be conscious when 
you die (FD1), and yet reject FD2 on the grounds that you don’t have to 
consciously be aware of bad things in order for them to be bad for you. 
What is true is that FD3 follows from FD1 and FD2. But FD2 doesn’t itself 
follow from FD1. 
 
2. How to Check for Validity 
Many of the arguments in the book have conclusions you don’t like. If the 
arguments were invalid then, as with the Feathers Argument, you could 
just reject the conclusion without having to find a premise to resist. But 
since the arguments are all valid—I made sure of it!—rejecting the 
conclusion of any one of them always requires finding some premise to 
deny. 
 But what did I do to ensure that the arguments were all valid? How can 
you tell if an argument is valid? One way is to eyeball it: look at the 
premises, and check whether it seems like the conclusion follows from 
them. But we can do better than that. We can identify certain recurring 
forms or patterns whose presence guarantees that an argument is valid, 
regardless of what the argument is about. So, another way to check for 
validity is to see if the argument has one of these forms. If it does, then it’s 
valid. I’ll give four examples. 
 
2.1 Modus Ponens 
To see what I have in mind by a “form” of argument, compare these two 
arguments: 
 
The Drinking Age Argument 
(DK1) Kristina is twenty years old 
(DK2) If Kristina is twenty years old, then Kristina is not allowed to buy 
alcohol 
(DK3) So, Kristina is not allowed to buy alcohol 
 
The Moral Argument 
(MA1) There are objective moral values 
(MA2) If there are objective moral values, then God exists 
(MA3) So, God exists 
 
In some ways, the arguments are pretty different: one is about Kristina and 
drinking, the other is about God and morality. But there’s also something 
they have in common, something structural.  
 To see what they have in common, let’s recall some vocabulary that we 
learned in the Introduction. Claims of the form “if… then…”, like DK2 and 
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MA2, are called conditionals. The bit that comes between the ‘if’ and the 
‘then’ is the antecedent of the conditional, and the bit that comes after the 
‘then’ is the consequent of the conditional.  
 What the Drinking Age Argument and the Moral Argument share in 
common is that each contains one premise that’s a conditional, another 
premise that’s the same as the antecedent of that conditional, and a 
conclusion that’s the same as the consequent of that conditional. In other 




If P, then Q 
So, Q 
 
Arguments with this form are called modus ponens arguments. (‘Modus 
ponens’ is Latin for method of affirming: you reach the conclusion by taking 
a conditional premise and combining it with a premise that affirms its 
antecedent.) Every modus ponens argument is a valid argument.   
 Here are two things to note about modus ponens arguments. First, it 
doesn’t matter whether the conditional premise comes first or second. For 
example, this is also a modus ponens argument: 
 
The Rearranged Drinking Age Argument 
(RD1) If Kristina is twenty years old, then Kristina is not allowed to buy 
alcohol 
(RD2) Kristina is twenty years old 
(RD3) So, Kristina is not allowed to buy alcohol 
 
That said, you do have to “mind your Ps and Qs” and how they’re 
distributed in the argument. This, for instance, is not a modus ponens 
argument: 
 
The Mangled Drinking Age Argument 
(MD1) Jean Blanc is not allowed to buy alcohol   
(MD2) If Jean Blanc is twenty years old, then Jean Blanc is not allowed 
to buy alcohol 
(MD3) So, Jean Blanc is twenty years old 
 
This one doesn’t have the form “P, if P then Q, so Q” but rather “P, if Q then 
P, so Q”. The latter argument form is called “affirming the consequent”, and 
is clearly invalid. Think about it. You can consistently accept MD1 and MD2 
while denying MD3, for instance if you thought Jean Blanc was 18 years 
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old. (You’d still accept MD2, that if he’s twenty, he’s still not allowed to buy 
alcohol.) By contrast, you can’t consistently accept RD1 and RD2 while 
denying RD3. That’s because the argument for RD3 is valid, whereas the 
argument for MD3 is invalid. 
 
2.2 Modus Tollens 
Another form that guarantees the validity of an argument is what’s called 
modus tollens, Latin for method of denying. A modus tollens argument is an 
argument with one premise that’s a conditional, another premise that’s a 
denial of the consequent of that conditional, and whose conclusion is the 
denial of the conditional’s antecedent. Using the ‘~’ symbol to symbolize 
denial, we can display the form of modus tollens arguments as follows:  
 
Modus Tollens 




Here are some examples of modus tollens arguments: 
 
Whales Aren’t Fish 
(WF1) If whales are fish, then whales use gills to breathe 
(WF2) Whales don’t use gills to breathe 
(WF3) So whales aren’t fish 
 
The Flipped Moral Argument 
(FM1) If God does not exist, then there are no objective moral values  
(FM2) There are objective moral values 
(FM3) So, God exists 
 
Again, the arguments are about entirely different topics but share a 
common structure. Also, as with modus ponens arguments, the order of the 
premises doesn’t matter: it would still be a modus tollens argument if WF2 
came first and WF1 came second. But the order within the premises does 
matter. You’ve got to have the denial of the conditional’s consequent as a 
premise and a denial of its antecedent as the conclusion, not vice versa. 
 One other thing to notice here is that the same basic line of thought can 
be presented either as a modus ponens or as a modus tollens argument. The 
Moral Argument (from section 2.1) and the Flipped Moral Argument (just 
above) are really just two ways of packaging one and the same idea: that 
God must exist because objective morality presupposes the existence of 
God. 
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 With these two types of valid arguments in hand, one can also construct 
more complicated arguments that involve both. For instance: 
 
The Foreknowledge Argument 
(FK1) God knew before you were born that you were going to read this 
book 
(FK2) If God knew before you were born that you were going to read 
this book, then you couldn’t have chosen not to read this book 
(FK3) So, you couldn’t have chosen not to read this book 
(FK4) If you did freely choose to read this book, then you could have 
chosen not to read it 
(FK5) So, you didn’t freely choose to read this book 
 
This argument combines a modus ponens argument and a modus tollens 
argument. The subconclusion FK3 follows, by modus ponens, from FK1 
and FK2. And the conclusion FK5 follows, by modus tollens, from FK3 and 
FK4. Looking back at the Against Fearing Death argument in section 1, you 
can see that that argument combines two instances of modus ponens: a 
modus ponens argument from FD1 and FD2 to FD3, and another modus 
ponens argument from FD3 and FD4 to FD5. 
 
2.3 Chained Conditionals  
Here is a third type of valid argument, which I’ll call a chained conditional, 
since the conclusion chains together the antecedent of one conditional 
premise with the consequent of another conditional premise. 
 
Chained Conditional 
If P then Q  
If Q then R  
So, if P then R 
 
This form of argument is especially useful when you want to argue for a 
conditional claim, that is, when you want to give an argument that has a 
whole conditional as its conclusion.  
 Here are two examples of arguments with this form: 
 
Against Fearing Non-Existence 
(FN1) If you stop existing when you die, then being dead is not bad for 
you 
(FN2) If being dead is not bad for you, then you shouldn’t fear death 




The Right to the Womb Argument 
(RW1) If an embryo has a right to life, then an embryo has a right to use 
the mother’s womb 
(RW2) If an embryo has a right to use the mother’s womb, then abortion 
is immoral 
(RW3) So, if an embryo has a right to life, then abortion is immoral  
 
2.4 Universal Instantiation 
I’ll mention one more form that a valid argument can have. This one is 
called universal instantiation, since it involves a “universal” premise 
claiming that everything belonging to one category also belongs to some 
second category. Together with an additional premise that one or more 
particular things belong to the first category, what follows is that those 




All Fs are Gs 
o is F 
So, o is G 
 
To get a valid argument of this form, you plug in some category for “F”, 
some second category for “G”, and one or more people or objects for “o”. 
(This makes it unlike the previous three types of valid arguments, where 
you plug in whole sentences for the variables “P”, “Q”, and/or “R”.)  
 Here’s an example of an argument by universal instantiation: 
 
The Philosophical Genius Argument 
(PG1) All philosophers are geniuses 
(PG2) Korman is a philosopher 
(PG3) So, Korman is a genius 
 
The argument is valid, and what makes the argument valid is not the truth 
or the plausibility of the premises, but rather that the conclusion is a logical 
consequence of the premises. If you affirm the premises and yet deny the 
conclusion, you’ve contradicted yourself.  
 Universal instantiation arguments don’t always wear their form right 




The Cuteness Argument 
(CA1) Camilla is cute 
(CA2) It’s wrong to eat cute things 
(CA3) So, it’s wrong to eat Camilla 
 
Superficially, this doesn’t match the form of a universal instantiation 
argument, specified above. But with just a bit of rewording and 
rearranging, we can see that it’s a universal instantiation in disguise: 
 
(CA2*) All cute things are things that it is wrong to eat 
(CA1*) Camilla is a cute thing 
(CA3*) So, Camilla is a thing that is wrong to eat 
 
3. Challenging Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens 
We have now seen four types of valid arguments: modus ponens 
arguments, modus tollens arguments, chained conditionals, and universal 
instantiations. These are not the only types of valid argument, and there’s a 
good deal of controversy (in the philosophy of logic) about what would go 
on a complete list of valid forms of argument. But when you’re constructing 
arguments of your own, so long as they have one of these four forms—or 
combine together arguments of these forms in the way suggested in section 
2.2—you can be confident that your own argument is valid. 
 That said, because I apparently cannot go ten pages without arguing for 
some outrageous conclusion, I’m now going to argue—contrary to what 
virtually every philosopher will tell you—that modus ponens and modus 
tollens arguments are not always valid.  
 Let’s start with modus tollens.  
 
FLIGHT CONFUSION 
I know that Olivia is due to fly from New York to Chicago, but I can’t 
remember if she flew in this morning, or if she’s flying tomorrow. So, I 
know she’s either in Chicago or New York right now, but I don’t know 
which.  
 
Now, consider the following argument, which looks to be a counterexample 
to the thesis that all modus tollens arguments are valid: 
 
The Defective Tollens 
(DT1) If Olivia is in Chicago, then Olivia must be in Illinois 
(DT2) It’s not the case that Olivia must be in Illinois 
(DT3) So, Olivia isn’t in Chicago 
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 This does appear to be a modus tollens argument: the first premise is a 
conditional, the second is a denial of its consequent, and the conclusion is a 
denial of its antecedent. Moreover, the premises are both true. DT1 is true 
because Chicago is in Illinois, so Olivia can’t very well be in Chicago 
without being in Illinois. DT2 is true too. If someone were to say “she must 
be in Illinois,” I could rightly respond: no, she might still be in New York. 
So DT2 rightly denies that she must be in Illinois. 
 But surely the argument is not valid. If it were, then DT3 would follow 
from those premises, and I would be able to use this argument to figure out 
where she is: she isn’t in Chicago, so she must be in New York. Clearly, 
though, I can’t know that Olivia is not in Chicago by using this argument. 
So, the argument must not be valid. In other words, this looks to be a 
counterexample to the claim that all modus tollens arguments are valid.  
 Now for modus ponens. Consider the following case:  
 
TALENT SHOW  
Celeste, Grant, and Esmée are the three finalists in a talent show. 
Celeste’s performance was a complete disaster. Grant did a pretty good 
job. Esmée gave the performance of a lifetime, and she receives a 
standing ovation from the audience as well as all the judges. The judges 
are about to announce the winner. 
 
Now consider the following argument, which looks to be a counterexample 
to the thesis that all modus ponens arguments are valid. 
 
The Defective Ponens 
(DP1) A woman is going to win 
(DP2) If a woman is going to win, then: if Esmée loses, then Celeste will 
win 
(DP3) So, if Esmée loses, then Celeste will win 
 
This is a modus ponens argument. One premise is a conditional (albeit one 
that has a whole conditional as its consequent); another premise affirms the 
antecedent of that conditional; and the conclusion is the consequent of the 
first conditional. Moreover, the premises are both true. Esmée is clearly 
going to win, and she is a woman. So DP1 is true. DP2 is true as well. If a 
woman wins and it isn’t Esmée then it has to have been Celeste, since she 
is the only other woman still in the running. But DP3 is false: if Esmée loses, 
then it’s Grant who’s going to win. Celeste’s performance was a disaster, so 
if Esmée lost, it would certainly be because a majority of the judges voted 
for Grant, not because they voted for Celeste.  
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 If the argument were valid, then the truth of the premises would 
guarantee the truth of the conclusion. But since the premises are true and 
the conclusion is false, the premises clearly don’t guarantee the truth of the 
conclusion. So, the argument isn’t valid. Thus, not all modus ponens 
arguments are valid. 
 I’ll leave it to you to figure out what (if anything) goes wrong in these 




The argument against modus tollens is drawn from Niko Kolodny and John 
MacFarlane’s “Ifs and Oughts”. The argument against modus ponens is 
drawn from Vann McGee’s “A Counterexample to Modus Ponens”. For 
more on the philosophy of logic, see Susan Haack’s Philosophy of Logics or 








This appendix provides some advice for writing papers for philosophy 
courses. The advice primarily concerns assignments requiring you to 
critically assess some view or argument, though a good deal of what I say 
applies equally to assignments only requiring you to explain some view, 
argument, or debate in your own words (without weighing in with your 
own view on the matter). Of course, you should follow all instructions you 
receive from your instructors and disregard anything I say here that 
conflicts with those instructions. Absent explicit conflicts, however, it’s 
likely that your instructor is looking for the sort of paper I describe here.  
 If you follow the advice I offer below, the final result will be a paper 
with three numbered and labeled sections, with each section broken up into 
multiple paragraphs, just as I have done in the chapters of this book. The 
first section introduces the view or argument you’re criticizing, the second 
advances your objections to that view or argument, and the third addresses 
possible responses to your objections. (Some instructors may expect a short 
concluding paragraph at the end of the paper, summarizing what you’ve 
argued for. Others may find it unnecessary, especially for very short papers. 
Check with your instructor.) 
 To be clear, there is nothing sacred about this three-section model. 
Depending on the content of your paper, it may be useful to organize it 
differently. For instance, if your plan is to advance two very different 
objections to some premise, then perhaps a better structure for you would 
be to introduce the argument you’re criticizing in section 1; advance your 
first objection and address possible responses to it in section 2; and advance 
your second objection and address possible responses to it in section 3. Or 
perhaps you plan to defend some argument against a particular objection. In 
that case, you might opt for a four-section model: introduce the argument 
in section 1, introduce the objection you’ll defend it against in section 2, 
respond to the objection in section 3, and defend your response against 
potential challenges in section 4. The main thing is just that your paper be 
clearly organized, and that you take the time not just to present your own 
perspective but also to demonstrate an appreciation of your opponent’s 
perspective.  
 For purposes of illustration, I’ll imagine that your assignment asks you 




The Argument from Suffering 
(AS1) There is suffering in the world 
(AS2) If there is suffering in the world, then God does not exist 
(AS3) So, God does not exist 
 
Your plan, let’s suppose, is to reject AS2 by arguing that God allows 
suffering in order to test our devotion. 
 
1. Introducing Your Target 
The point of section 1 of your paper is to introduce your target—the view 
or argument you plan to criticize—and indicate what you plan to do in the 
paper. There are five main elements you’ll want to make sure to include in 
this section, though not necessarily in this order. 
 First, you’ll identify the topic of the paper. In this case, that’s the 
Argument from Suffering. So, you’ll want to begin the paper by saying 
something like this: “My aim in this paper is to assess a certain argument 
against the existence of God.” Beginning your paper with a straightforward 
sentence like that is preferable to a flowery opening sentence like, “For 
centuries upon centuries, men have debated the existence of God.” 
 Second, you’ll state the view or argument that you’re targeting. In the 
case at hand, you can simply copy and paste my formulation of the 
Argument from Suffering into your paper, of course citing the book and the 
page where you found it. (Ask your instructor for their preferred method 
of citation.) 
 Third, you’ll go through the premises of that argument, one by one, 
clarifying what each premise is saying and why it is supposed to be 
plausible. This will likely be the lengthiest part of section 1, and it’s 
important to do the best job you can explaining, on your opponents’ behalf, 
how their argument is supposed to work. You’ll have your chance to 
criticize the argument in section 2. For now, your goal should be the make 
the argument look as good as possible. Ideally, you want your opponents to 
think “I couldn’t have said it better myself!” and the rest of your readers to 
think, “how is anyone ever going to find a flaw in that argument?!” Keep 
in mind that part of what you’ll be graded on is the extent to which you 
understand and appreciate your opponent’s perspective. Failing to present 
your target in its best light may suggest to your instructor that you don’t 
truly understand the argument or position you’re criticizing. 
 Importantly, when you pause on the different premises, don’t simply 
restate them in your own words, but also identify your opponent’s reasons 
for accepting those premises. So, for instance, when you pause on AS2, 
don’t just say: “According to AS2, there wouldn’t be any suffering if God 
existed.” That’s just reiterating what AS2 is saying. You also need to spell 
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out the reasoning behind AS2 by saying something like: “The idea behind 
AS2 is that God is supposed to be perfectly benevolent, and thus would 
want to eliminate all suffering, and also all-powerful, and thus would be 
able to eliminate suffering if he wanted to.” 
 Fourth, state your thesis, that is, the conclusion that you are ultimately 
arguing for. For instance, you’ll want to say something like this: “My aim 
is to show that the Argument from Suffering fails because AS2 is false: even 
an all-good God would want to allow suffering so that we could have the 
opportunity to prove our devotion.” Here, you are only stating your thesis, 
not yet defending it (that’s what section 2 is for). Also, here and throughout 
the paper, it is perfectly appropriate to use first-person pronouns like ‘I’ and 
‘my’. 
 Fifth, you’ll give an outline of your paper. If you’re using the three-
section model, you’ll say something like this: “In section 2, I will present 
my objection to AS2 of the Argument from Suffering. Then, in section 3, I 
will address two possible responses to my objection.”  
 
2. Advancing Your Argument 
Section 2 is where you offer your own criticism of your target. In other 
words, this is where you present your argument for the thesis of your 
paper. We’re imagining that your thesis is that God allows suffering in 
order to test our devotion. What you need to do now is offer some reasons 
for thinking that God would do this. For instance, you would need to 
explain why there would have to be suffering in order for our devotion to 
be tested, and why being able to test our devotion is sufficiently important 
that a good God would want to do it despite having to make us suffer. 
 Here are some further tips for section 2.  
 First, it’s crucial that you deny a premise of the argument you want to 
resist, and not just the conclusion. If your aim is to criticize the Argument 
from Suffering, you shouldn’t be arguing directly against AS3, that God 
doesn’t exist (for instance by arguing that God must exist because there has 
to be a First Cause of the universe). Rather, your goal is to show where the 
Argument from Suffering goes wrong, and you do that by challenging one 
of its premises. Additionally, make sure it’s 100% clear which premise your 
objections are meant to be targeting.  
 Second, you need to do more than simply express your opinion that the 
premise in question is false. It’s not enough just to say (repeatedly, but in 
five different ways) that you don’t think that suffering is incompatible with 
God’s existence. Rather, you need to be presenting reasons for thinking this. 
You’re trying to persuade another person—your reader—to change their 
mind about something, not just recording your own personal views and 
opinions about the issue. 
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 Third, in a short philosophy essay, “less is more”. It’s generally better to 
raise a single, well-developed objection to a single premise, than to raise 
multiple objections to that premise, or to raise objections to multiple 
premises. 
 Fourth, avoid “nuclear options”, that is, argumentative strategies that 
amount to very general critiques of philosophical or moral reasoning, and 
that have nothing in particular to do with the argument at hand. Here I have 
in mind, for instance, challenging AS1—which says that there is suffering 
in the world—by arguing that it’s impossible for anyone to really know 
anything about the world since (after all) we may just be dreaming this 
whole thing. Or challenging the claim (in chapter 10) that it’s morally 
permissible to pull the lever in the Trolley case by arguing that thought 
experiments are useless and should never be relied upon, or that morality 
is just a myth and nothing is really right or wrong. There is a time and a 
place for such challenges, and philosophers do take them seriously. But, 
because these critiques are so general, advancing such a critique is unlikely 
to demonstrate comprehension of the material at hand—which is the main 
thing you need to do in a short paper assignment. 
 When you present your arguments against your target, should you 
present them in the same labeled and indented premise/conclusion format 
that I’ve used throughout the book? It depends. If you have read appendix 
A on Logic and feel confident in your ability to tell the difference between 
valid and invalid arguments, then yes: presenting your own arguments in 
this format can add a good deal of clarity to the paper and demonstrate an 
advanced understanding of the dynamics of argumentation. If, on the other 
hand, you don’t feel that you have a firm grip on how to ensure that your 
arguments are valid, then trying to frame your arguments as I have is likely 
to do more harm than good. In that case, it’s better just to state your reasons 
plainly, in paragraph form. 
 What if you’re having trouble coming up with an objection to use in 
section 2? My advice would be to read and re-read and re-re-read the 
chapter that you plan to criticize. (The chapters aren’t that long.) If you have 
your choice of chapters to criticize, choose the one whose conclusion you 
are most inclined to disagree with. On the first reading, let it all wash over 
you. On the second reading, keep an eye out for claims that seem especially 
fishy. On the third reading, skim through the parts you agree with but slow 
down and very carefully read the parts that seemed fishy, trying to pinpoint 
the exact sentence where the reasoning go wrong. Having pinpointed 
where it goes wrong, try to articulate why you think it goes wrong, and use 




3. Anticipating Possible Responses 
The point of section 3 of your paper is to address possible responses to the 
things you said in section 2. To understand what you’re supposed to be 
doing in this section, consider an analogy. A governor is giving a televised 
speech, trying to convince his constituents to support a proposition 
abolishing the death penalty. His argument is that it should be abolished 
because the death penalty isn’t actually effective in deterring people from 
committing violent crimes. He knows that some people will be skeptical of 
his argument, but he also knows he can’t talk to them all one on one. So, he 
tries to anticipate and address the most likely objections people will have. 
For instance, he says: “Look, a lot of people are going to say: what about 
Oklahoma? When they reinstated the death penalty, violent crime dropped 
by ten percent. But those statistics are misleading. It was actually the new 
gun laws they passed, not the reinstatement of the death penalty, that 
accounts for the drop in violent crime.” 
 This is the sort of thing you’ll be doing in section 3. Put yourself in the 
shoes of your readers, and try to identify one or two ways that they are 
likely to push back against the argument you gave in section 2. For instance, 
if you claimed in section 2 that God allows suffering in order to test our 
devotion, you might imagine someone objecting that God is supposed to be 
all-knowing, in which case he should already know how devoted people 
are without having to test their devotion. And then you should respond to 
that objection, for instance by explaining why it’s important for God to test 
our devotion despite already knowing how devoted we are.  
 Keep in mind that the point of section 3 is to defend the objection you 
originally put forward in section 2. Accordingly, you should avoid 
introducing a brand-new line of objection to the target argument from 
section 1. To see what I mean, imagine two different students, both of whom 
have argued (in section 2) that God allows suffering in order to test our 
devotion. Now compare the following two responses (in section 3) to the 
complaint that God would already know how devoted people are without 
having to test their devotion. 
 
Student A: I would respond that even God can’t know how people will 
behave when their devotion is tested. Here’s why that 
doesn’t entail that God isn’t all-knowing… 
 
Student B: I would respond that if God prevented all suffering, then we 




Notice that Student A is coming to the defense of the very objection that she 
was advancing in section 2. Student B, by contrast, has completely 
abandoned the devotion defense and shifted to an entirely new objection to 
the Argument from Suffering (what, in chapter 1, I called “The Appreciated 
Goods Defense”). Be like Student A.  
 A few additional tips about section 3 of your paper. 
 First, make sure to carefully and charitably lay out the objections you’re 
anticipating before going on to address them. Ideally, you’ll want to devote 
a whole paragraph, not just a single sentence, to explaining the anticipated 
objection and how it’s supposed to be a problem for what you said in 
section 2. What I said about section 1 applies equally here: when your 
opponent sees your presentation of the anticipated objection, you want her 
to think “exactly, I couldn’t have said it better myself!” 
 Second, make sure that the objections you anticipate actually advance 
the discussion. In particular, don’t imagine your opponent simply 
reiterating the argument from section 1 in defense of the targeted premise. 
In the case at hand, that would look something like this: “One might 
respond to my objection to AS2 by insisting that God is supposed to be all-
powerful and all-good and such a being cannot allow any suffering.” But if 
one were to say that, one would just be ignoring your argument from 
section 2. Contrast this with the anticipated objection I suggested just above: 
that God wouldn’t need to test us to know whether we’re devoted. That 
isn’t merely a defense of AS2. Rather, it challenges your stated reasons for 
rejecting AS2, and that’s what makes it a good objection to address in 
section 3. 
 Third, one way for your opponents to respond to your objections from 
section 2 is to try to show that those objections fail. But that’s not the only 
way. Another possibility is for them to concede that your objections work, 
but then try to revise their own argument in a way that makes it immune 
to your objections, perhaps by revising some of the premises. In section 3, 
you could consider some way that they might try to do that, and then 
respond by raising a new objection to their revised argument.  
 
4. Editing 
Make sure to leave yourself plenty of time to revise your paper after 
completing the initial draft. First drafts tend to be pretty messy and full of 
small mistakes, and cleaning up the mess and catching all these small 
mistakes will go a long way towards improving the paper. 
 Here is the procedure I would recommend for editing your paper. Go 
through the rough draft of your paper very slowly, at a snail’s pace, 
lingering on every sentence. Read each sentence out loud, and ask yourself 
the following four questions about it. 
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1. Is this exactly what I meant to say?  
2. How might someone challenge this?  
3. Can I make the sentence clearer? 
4. Can I make the sentence shorter? 
 
Let me say a bit about each of these questions. 
 Is this exactly what I meant to say? Philosophers—including your 
instructor—care a great deal about getting the small details right, and you 
will be amazed by their laser-like focus on the exact wording of your 
sentences. You might write something like “Killing is always wrong”, and 
they’ll leave a comment like: “Even killing blades of grass?” Presumably 
what you meant was that killing people is always wrong. But it’s not their 
job to read your mind; it’s your job to say exactly what you mean. Getting 
the details right is especially important when you’re explaining the views 
and arguments you plan to criticize. One or two small errors in your 
description of those views and arguments will often be enough to convince 
your instructor that you don’t really understand them.  
 How might someone challenge this? This question is especially important 
in section 2, when you’re advancing your own argument or objection. 
Thinking hard about every possible way someone might try to deny 
something you’ve said is a great strategy for identifying good responses to 
address in section 3. But you should also be on the lookout for “cheap” 
ways that someone might challenge the sentence, which can be addressed 
by simply rewording it. For instance, you might close off the “what about 
blades of grass?” objection above by changing “killing is always wrong” to 
“killing people is always wrong”. But then of course you should be thinking 
about other challenges, for instance that killing in self-defense isn’t wrong. 
 Can I make the sentence clearer? This is where reading the sentence out 
loud will be especially helpful. If it sounds like something no one would 
ever say in a normal conversation—and more like something a pretentious 
old geezer would say with his nose in the air—then you need to find a 
simpler way of saying it. You might find that the sentence is so complicated 
that you have trouble even reading it off the page. If so, simplify the 
wording, simplify the grammar, and consider breaking it into two smaller 
sentences. You might find that the sentence includes “vocabulary words” 
that you would never use in ordinary conversation. Replace them with 
ordinary words that mean the same thing. Don’t let the point you’re trying 
to make get obscured by needlessly complicated ways of saying it. 
 Can I make the sentence shorter? A philosophy paper should be a lean, 
mean, arguing machine. If a word or phrase isn’t serving some clear 
purpose, cut it out. You might find that you’ve written “I will argue that 
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God doesn’t exists and that anyone who believes in God is mistaken.” If so, 
you’ve said the same thing twice; you should delete the second half of the 
sentence. In some cases, the right way to make a sentence shorter is to delete 
all the words in it, getting rid of the sentence altogether. For instance, you 
might find that some sentence is just repeating the very same point you 
made earlier in the paragraph. In that case, choose the sentence you like 
best and delete the other one. Or you might find that the sentence is making 
a point that, although interesting, is actually just a digression that’s 
irrelevant to your argument. Delete it. 
 Finally, when editing, make sure to give special attention to sentences 
starting with words like ‘So’ or ‘Therefore’ or ‘Thus’. When your laser-
focused instructor sees any of these words, her head is going to whip back 
to the previous sentence to see whether the current sentence really does 
follow from the previous one, or if it’s just a separate point (in which case 
you shouldn’t have said ‘Therefore’). Likewise for ‘That is’ or ‘In other 
words’. Suppose you say: “We weren’t created by God. In other words, 
humans did not have an intelligent designer.” The ‘in other words’ suggests 
that the sentences are saying the same thing. But they don’t: saying that 
God didn’t create us still leaves open that we had an intelligent designer 
other than God (maybe aliens). Since the two sentences don’t say exactly 
the same thing, you shouldn’t have said ‘In other words’. 
 
5. Likely Criteria for Grading 
Even if your instructor does not have an explicit rubric for the assignment, 
it’s likely that your grade will be largely determined by four criteria: 
comprehension, critical development, use (or misuse) of philosophical 
vocabulary, and quality of writing.  
 
Comprehension 
Your grade will likely be determined primarily by how well you 
demonstrate understanding of the philosophical concepts, views, and 
arguments you’re discussing in your paper. Because you’re being evaluated 
on whether you’ve demonstrated understanding the material, you should try 
to explain things in such a way that any intelligent person would be able to 
understand your paper, particularly someone who is not in the class and 
has never encountered the argument or chapter you’re talking about.  
 Among other things, this means you have to define any technical jargon 
you’re using. For instance, if the argument includes terms like ‘expected 
utility’ or ‘omnibeing’, you have to explain what these terms mean. Even 
though your instructor of course already knows what they mean, she wants 
to see whether you know what they mean well enough to explain them in 
your own words. There typically is no need to define perfectly ordinary 
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terms like ‘suffering’ or ‘wrong’—unless, of course, the question of how to 
define wrongness is central to the paper. 
 To check whether you’ve pitched the paper at the right level, show a 
draft to your smartest friends, and see what they do and don’t understand. 
 Demonstrating comprehension of the material also requires explaining 
things in your own words. For this reason, it’s important not to rely too 
heavily on quotations from the readings. As I mentioned earlier, it’s fine to 
directly copy and paste the indented arguments used in the textbook. But 
when (in your section 1) you’re trying to explain the idea behind some 
premise, don’t simply quote the textbook’s explanation of the premise and 
move on. My own advice would be to read and re-read the textbook’s 
explanation until you’re sure you understand it, and then set the textbook 
aside and explain what you’ve just read and understood. You may find it 
easier to find your own words when you don’t have the textbook’s words 
right in front of you. 
 
Critical Development 
Assuming that your assignment is to critically assess some view or 
argument, and not simply to explain it in your own words, your instructor 
will want to see you developing an interesting objection or response. As I 
emphasized in connection with section 2, it’s important to do more than 
simply express your opinion. You need to give reasons for adopting the 
position you do. And as I emphasized in connection with section 3, it’s 
important to be thinking about, and explicitly addressing, concerns that an 
imagined opponent might have about the way you’ve defended your 
position.  
 Additionally, remember that you’re being evaluated for comprehension 
even in the critical development portion of your paper. If you “straw man” 
your opponents by downplaying or ignoring sensible things they might say 
in response to your objections, your instructor may take that as evidence 
that you haven’t entirely understood their position. If you rush too quickly 
to developing your own position without first carefully laying out the view 
or argument that you’re criticizing, your instructor may feel that you 
haven’t demonstrated an understanding of the views under discussion. So, 
take the time to explain the views or arguments you’re targeting before 
trying to respond to them. 
 
Philosophical Terminology 
Your instructor will be paying careful attention to how you use 
philosophical terminology like ‘argument’, ‘conclusion’, ‘premise’, 
‘counterexample’, ‘valid’, and so on. Here are three things to be especially 
careful about. First, as I explain in appendix A, ‘valid’ has a special meaning 
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in philosophy. Arguments are the only things that should be called ‘valid’ 
in a philosophy paper, and an argument does not necessarily count as 
invalid just because it has false or implausible premises. Second, the 
conclusion and subconclusions of an argument are not premises. In the 
Argument from Suffering above, only AS1 and AS2 are premises, not AS3. 
Third, the view that someone is defending isn’t itself an argument. If 
someone is advancing the Argument from Suffering, you shouldn’t say 
“her argument is that God doesn’t exist.” Rather, her view is that God 
doesn’t exist, she argues that God doesn’t exist, and her argument is the 
whole sequence of claims consisting of AS1, AS2, and AS3. 
 
Quality of Writing 
Your instructor likely won’t be too fussy about whether your use of commas 
or semicolons is exactly right. Still, they will be unlikely to give you a good 
grade if your writing is full of typos and blatantly ungrammatical 
sentences, or if your writing is unclear or poorly organized. After all, this is 
a humanities class, and an “A” in such a class indicates, among other things, 
that you are a competent writer. 
 
6. Citation and Plagiarism 
When discussing this book in class assignments, remember that I don’t 
myself endorse all of these arguments, so you shouldn’t say “According to 
Korman…”. Instead, you can say “According to The Author, …”, and then 
cite the page numbers where I made the statement or argument you are 
discussing.   
 You may wish to consult outside sources when writing your essays, for 
instance the sources listed at the end of each chapter or other things floating 
around online. But this is not something your instructor will typically 
expect you to do. Indeed, in my experience (especially in one’s first 
philosophy course), reading through journal articles and other materials 
you find online—and trying to reproduce the advanced ideas you find in 
there—often does more harm than good. Your time is better spent closely 
reading and re-reading the assigned texts. 
 Most importantly, you must make sure to acknowledge any sources 
you’re drawing from by promptly citing them in your paper. Otherwise, 
you may be charged with plagiarism, that is, presenting someone else’s work 
as your own. This includes not only directly copying and pasting sentences 
from outside sources without putting them in quotation marks and citing 
the source, but also copying sentences from outside sources and changing 
around some of the words. Here are some examples of plagiarism that I’ve 
encountered in my own classes: 
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Student: In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, David Hume explores 
the basic fundamentals of religious belief, and whether they can 
be rational.  
Website: In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Hume explores whether 
religious belief can be rational. 
 
Student: He excels in using the reference of FLO (future like ours) because 
it is reasonable to use emotional attachment in comparing the life 
of a fetus to that of the life that we experience and live out.  
Website: Marquis is highly persuasive using this FLO method because he 
uses emotional attachment comparing the life of a fetus to a life 
that we may experience. 
 
Student: It is meaningless to assume an analogy between one part of the 
universe and the whole universe. 
Website: It makes no sense to assume that one part of the universe is 
analogous to the whole of the universe. 
 
Even one such sentence is often enough to warrant a failing grade on the 
assignment. 
 You may be charged with plagiarism even if you had no intention to 
plagiarize, even if the plagiarism appears only in the opening section of the 
paper where you’re explaining the views or arguments you plan to criticize, 
and even if the plagiarism was the result of accidentally submitting the 
“wrong version” of the paper or “accidentally” memorizing and 
reproducing the wording from a website. Being charged with plagiarism or 
other academic infractions may seriously jeopardize your applications to 
law schools, business schools, and grad schools, in addition to severely 
affecting your grade in the course and possibly resulting in suspension or 
expulsion from your college or university. So, you need to be very careful 




Theses and Arguments 
 
This document is meant to be used as an easy reference for the key 
arguments and theses that appear in the book. Print it out or keep it open 
on a separate tab. 
 
CHAPTER 1: CAN GOD ALLOW SUFFERING? 
 
The Argument from Suffering 
(AS1) There is suffering in the world 
(AS2) If there is suffering in the world, then God does not exist 
(AS3) So, God does not exist 
 
The Argument from Pointless Suffering 
(PS1) There is pointless suffering in the world 
(PS2) If there is pointless suffering in the world, then God does not exist 
(PS3) So, God does not exist 
 
The Argument for Disbelief  
(DB1) You should not believe that all the suffering in Nornia is necessary 
for some unknown greater good that its ruler has in mind 
(DB2) If you should not believe that all the suffering in Nornia is 
necessary for some unknown greater good that its ruler has in 
mind, then you should not believe that all the suffering in the 
actual world is necessary for some unknown greater good that 
God has in mind 
(DB3) So, you should not believe that the suffering people endure in the 
actual world is necessary for some unknown greater good that 
God has in mind 
 
CHAPTER 2: WHY YOU SHOULD BET ON GOD 
 
The Argument for Betting on God 
(BG1) One should always choose the option with the greatest expected 
utility 
(BG2) Believing in God has a greater expected utility than not believing 
in God 




CHAPTER 3: NO FREEDOM 
 
The Argument for Freedom 
(FR1) Sometimes you perform an action after deciding to perform that 
action 
(FR2) If one performs an action after deciding to perform it, then one 
performs that action freely 
(FR3) So some of your actions are performed freely 
 
The Desire Argument 
(DS1) What you choose to do is always determined by your desires 
(DS2) You can’t control your desires 
(DS3) So, what you choose to do is always determined by something 
you can’t control 
(DS4) If what you choose to do is always determined by something you 
can’t control, then you never act freely 
(DS5) So, you never act freely 
 
The Argument from Determinism 
(DT1) Determinism is true 
(DT2) If determinism is true, then you are never able to do otherwise 
(DT3) If you are never able to do otherwise, then none of your actions 
are free 
(DT4) So, none of your actions are free 
 
The Doomed Regardless Argument 
(DM1) If an action is determined to happen, then you couldn’t have 
done otherwise  
(DM2) If you couldn’t have done otherwise, then the action is not free 
(DM3) So, if an action is determined, then it is not free 
(DM4) If an action happens randomly, then it is not free 
(DM5) Every action you perform is either determined to happen or 
happens randomly 
(DM6) So, none of your actions are free   
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The Consequence Argument  
(CQ1) If determinism is true, then what you do is always a consequence 
of the laws of nature and the distant past  
(CQ2) You have no control over the laws of nature or the distant past 
(CQ3) So, if determinism is true, then what you do is always a 
consequence of things over which you have no control  
(CQ4) If what you do is always a consequence of things over which you 
have no control, then you are never able to do otherwise 
(DT2) So, if determinism is true, you are never able to do otherwise  
 
CHAPTER 4: YOU KNOW NOTHING 
 
(FLP) Future states of the world will be like past states of the world 
 
Against Knowing the Future 
(KF1) If you are not justified in believing that FLP is true, then your 
belief that the sun will set in the west tomorrow is unjustified 
(KF2) You are not justified in believing that FLP is true 
(KF3) So, your belief that the sun will set in the west tomorrow is 
unjustified  
(KF4) If your belief that the sun will set in the west tomorrow is 
unjustified, then you don’t know that the sun will set in the west 
tomorrow 
(KF5) So, you don’t know that the sun will set in the west tomorrow 
 
The Faulty Foundation Argument 
(FF1) Your belief that the sun will set in the west tomorrow is based on 
FLP 
(FF2) If a belief is based on something that you aren’t justified in 
believing, then that belief itself is unjustified 
(KF1) So, if you are not justified in believing that FLP is true, then your 
belief that the sun will set in the west tomorrow is unjustified 
 
FLP is Unjustified 
(UJ1) If your belief in FLP is justified, then it is either justified by direct 
observation or by inductive reasoning 
(UJ2) Your belief in FLP isn’t justified by direct observation 
(UJ3) Your belief in FLP isn’t justified by inductive reasoning 




The Anti-Circularity Argument 
(AC1) All inductive reasoning about the future assumes the truth of FLP 
(AC2) If all inductive reasoning about the future assumes the truth of 
FLP, then any inductive reasoning about FLP is circular 
(AC3) No belief can be justified by circular reasoning  
(UJ3) So, FLP isn’t justified by inductive reasoning 
 
(TDH) You are currently lying down in bed dreaming about sitting 
down reading a philosophy textbook 
 
The Dreaming Argument 
(DR1) If you have no way of knowing that TDH is false, then you don’t 
know that you’re sitting down reading 
(DR2) You have no way of knowing that TDH is false 
(DR3) So you don’t know that you’re sitting down reading 
 
The Argument from Deduction 
(DE1) If you know you’re sitting down reading, you can deduce that 
TDH is false from things you know 
(DE2) If you can deduce something from things you know, then you 
have a way of knowing that thing 
(DE3) So, if you know you’re sitting down reading, then you have a way 
of knowing TDH is false 
 
The No Evidence Argument 
(NE1) If you have no evidence against something, then you have no way 
of knowing it’s false  
(NE2) You have no evidence against TDH  
(DR2) So, you have no way of knowing that TDH is false 
 
CHAPTER 5: WHAT MAKES YOU YOU 
 
The Same Body Account 
A at t is the same person as B at t* if and only if A has the same body as 
B 
 
The Psychological Descendant Account 
A at t is the same person as B at t* if and only if A is either a 




The Same Soul Account 
A at t is the same person as B at t* if and only if A has the same soul as 
B 
 
The Body-And-Mind Account 
A at t is the same person as B at t* if and only if A has the same body as 
B and A is a psychological ancestor or descendant of B 
 
The Body-Or-Mind Account 
A at t is the same person as B at t* if and only if A has the same body as 
B or A is a psychological ancestor or descendant of B 
 
The Conjoined Twins Argument 
(CT1) If the Same Body Account is true, then either Abby and Brittany 
have different bodies or Abby and Brittany are the same person 
(CT2) Abby and Brittany have the same body 
(CT3) Abby and Brittany are not the same person  
(CT4) So, the Same Body Account is false 
 
The Body Swap Argument 
(BS1) MaleT and MaleW have the same body 
(BS2) If MaleT and MaleW have the same body, then: if the Same Body 
Account is true, then MaleT and MaleW are the same person 
(BS3) MaleT and MaleW are not the same person 
(BS4) So, the Same Body Account is false 
 
The Blackout Argument 
(BL1) The unconscious man is not a psychological descendant of the 
conscious man 
(BL2) If the unconscious man is not a psychological descendant of the 
conscious man, then: if the Psychological Descendant Account is 
true, then the conscious man is not the same person as the 
unconscious man 
(BL3) The conscious man is the same person as the unconscious man 
(BL4) So, the Psychological Descendant Account is false 
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The Fission Argument 
(FS1) If the Psychological Descendant Account is true, then JoJo is the 
same person as ChadRW and is the same person as AlexRW 
(FS2) If JoJo is the same person as ChadRW and the same person as 
AlexRW, then ChadRW is the same person as AlexRW 
(FS3) So, if the Psychological Descendant Account is true, then ChadRW 
is the same person as AlexRW 
(FS4) ChadRW is not the same person as AlexRW 
(FS5) So the Psychological Descendant Account is false 
 
CHAPTER 6: DON’T FEAR THE REAPER 
 
Against Fearing Death 
(FD1) You cease to be conscious when you die 
(FD2) If you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead is not 
bad for you 
(FD3) So, being dead is not bad for you 
(FD4) If being dead is not bad for you, then you should not fear death 
(FD5) So, you should not fear death 
 
The Argument from Hedonism 
(AH1) If you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead 
doesn’t result in more pain than you would otherwise have had 
(AH2) Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain than 
you would otherwise have had  
(FD2) So, if you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead 
isn’t bad for you 
 
(HD*) Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain than 
you would otherwise have had  
 
(HD**) Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain or 
less pleasure than you would otherwise have had   
 
The Unread Mail Argument 
(UM1) Carly would have had more pleasure had she not met Evan 
(UM2) If Carly would have had more pleasure had she not met Evan, 
then: if HD** is true, then meeting Evan was bad for her 
(UM3) Meeting Evan was not bad for her 




Against Post-Mortem Consciousness 
(PC1) If Animal ceases to be conscious when you die and you are 
Animal, then you cease to be conscious when you die 
(PC2) Animal ceases to be conscious when you die 
(PC3) You are Animal 
(FD1) So, you cease to be conscious when you die 
 
The Too Many Thinkers Argument 
(TT1) Animal is in your chair and is thinking  
(TT2) You are the only thing in your chair that is thinking  
(PC3) So you are Animal 
 
CHAPTER 7: TAXATION IS IMMORAL 
 
Against Taxation and Imprisonment 
(TX1) If there is no morally relevant difference between two actions A 
and B, then: if A is wrong, then B is wrong 
(TX2) It is wrong for Jasmine to extort and kidnap her neighbors 
(TX3) There is no morally relevant difference between Jasmine extorting 
and kidnapping her neighbors and the government taxing and 
imprisoning its citizens 
(TX4) So, it is wrong for the government to tax and imprison its citizens 
 
No Consent 
(NC1) Someone tacitly consents to an arrangement only if (i) there is a 
reasonable way to opt out and (ii) explicit refusal to opt in is 
recognized 
(NC2) There is no reasonable way to opt out of paying taxes and 
following laws, and explicit refusal to opt in is not recognized 
(NC3) So, we have not tacitly consented to paying taxes and following 
laws 
 
The Argument for Open Borders 
(OB1) If there is no morally relevant difference between two actions A 
and B, then: if A is wrong, then B is wrong 
(OB2) It is wrong for Jasmine to restrict access to the park 
(OB3) There is no morally relevant difference between Jasmine 
restricting access to the park and the government restricting 
access to the country 




CHAPTER 8: ABORTION IS IMMORAL 
 
The Right to Life Argument 
(RL1) Emm has a right to life 
(RL2) If Emm has a right to life, then it is seriously immoral to deprive 
Emm of Taylor’s womb 
(RL3) So, it’s seriously immoral to deprive Emm of Taylor’s womb 
 
The Requirements of Life Argument 
(RQ1) If something (or someone) has a right to life, and it needs a certain 
something in order to survive, then it is seriously immoral to 
deprive it of that thing 
(RQ2) Emm needs Taylor’s womb in order to survive 
(RL2) So, if Emm has a right to life, then it is seriously immoral to 
deprive Emm of Taylor’s womb 
 
The Violinist Argument 
(VA1) Maurissa has a right to life and needs Ben’s blood in order to survive 
(VA2) It is not seriously immoral for Riley to deprive Maurissa of his blood 
(VA3) So, it is not always seriously immoral to deprive someone with a 
right to life of something they need in order to survive 
 
The Entitled Requirements Argument 
(RQ1*) If something (or someone) has a right to life, and it needs a 
certain something in order to survive, and it has a right to that 
thing, then it is seriously immoral to deprive it of that thing 
(RQ2) Emm needs Taylor’s womb in order to survive  
(RQ3) Emm has a right to Taylor’s womb  
(RL2) So, if Emm has a right to life, then it is seriously immoral to 
deprive Emm of Taylor’s womb 
 
The Known Risk Argument 
(KR1) Taylor freely chose to have sex and knew that this could lead to 
Emm using her womb 
(KR2) Whenever someone freely does something and knows that it 
could lead to certain consequences, one consents to those 
consequences 
(KR3) So, Taylor consented to Emm using her womb 
(KR4) If Taylor consented to Emm using her womb, then Emm has a 
right to Taylor’s womb 
(RQ3) So, Emm has a right to Taylor’s womb  
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The Simple FLO Argument 
(SF1) It is seriously immoral to kill something (or someone) if killing it 
deprives it of a future like ours 
(SF2) Killing Emm deprives Emm of a future like ours 
(SF3) So, it is seriously immoral to kill Emm 
 
The Modified FLO Argument 
(MF1) It is seriously immoral to kill something (or someone) if killing it 
deprives it of a future like ours and the killing does not involve 
any FLO-overriding factors 
(MF2) Killing Emm deprives Emm of a future like ours 
(MF3) Killing Emm does not involve any FLO-overriding factors 
(MF4) So, it is seriously immoral to kill Emm 
 
CHAPTER 9: EATING ANIMALS IS IMMORAL 
 
The Argument from Precedent 
(PR1) There have been people who eat meat throughout human history 
(PR2) If there have been people doing a certain thing throughout human 
history, then it is morally permissible for you to do it 
(PR3) So, it is morally permissible for you to eat meat 
 
The Natural Order Argument 
(NO1) Other animals eat meat 
(NO2) If other animals do something, then it’s morally permissible for 
you to do it 
 
The Natural Capacity Argument 
(CP1) You are naturally capable of eating meat 
(CP2) If you are naturally capable of doing a certain thing, then it is 
morally permissible for you to do that thing  
(CP3) So, it is morally permissible for you to eat meat 
 
The Necessity of Protein Argument 
(NP1) Eating meat is necessary for getting enough protein 
(NP2) If doing something is necessary for getting enough protein, then 
it is morally permissible for you to do it 




The Argument from Fred’s Puppies 
(FP1) If there is no morally relevant difference between two actions A 
and B, then: if A is immoral, then B is immoral 
(FP2) What Fred does is immoral 
(FP3) There is no morally relevant difference between what Fred does 
and you buying and eating meat 
(FP4) So, it is immoral for you to buy and eat meat 
 
CHAPTER 10: WHAT MAKES THINGS RIGHT 
 
Act Utilitarianism 
Performing a certain action is the right thing to do if and only if it will 
have a more positive effect on overall levels of happiness than any other 
available action 
 
The Organ Distribution Argument 
(OD1) Killing Nick has a greater positive effect on overall levels of 
happiness than letting him live 
(OD2) If killing Nick has a greater positive effect on overall levels of 
happiness than letting him live, then: if act utilitarianism is true, 
then killing Nick was the right thing to do 
(OD3) Killing Nick was not the right thing to do 
(OD4) So, act utilitarianism is false 
 
 Rule Utilitarianism 
Performing a certain action is the right thing to do if and only if it is 
prescribed by the collection of rules that, if adopted, would have the 
greatest positive effect on overall levels of happiness 
 
The Trolley Argument 
(TR1) If there is no morally relevant difference between two actions A 
and B, then: if A is the right thing to do, then B is the right thing 
to do 
(TR2) Diverting the trolley was the right thing to do 
(TR3) There is no morally relevant difference between diverting the 
trolley and killing Nick 
(TR4) So, killing Nick was the right thing to do 
 
 
 
